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ABSTRACT 
 
Historians consider the years between World War I and World War II to be 
a period of decline for German America. This dissertation complicates that 
argument by applying a transnational framework to the history of German 
immigration to the United States, particularly the period between 1919 and 
1939. The author argues that contrary to previous accounts of that period, 
German migrants continued to be invested in the homeland through a 
variety of public and private relationships that changed the ways in which 
they thought about themselves as Germans and Americans. By looking at 
migration through a transnational lens, the author also moves beyond 
older conventions that merely saw Germanness in language and culture. 
Instead, the author suggests a framework that investigates race, class, 
consumerism, gender and citizenship and finds evidence that German 
migrants not only utilized their heritage to define their Americanness but 
that German immigrant values, views and norms did indeed fundamentally 
shape American national identity. 
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Introduction 
 
In 1937 Georg Durrschmidt, one of the roughly 600,000 German 
immigrants that had arrived in the United States after World War I,1 wrote 
a letter to the editors of the Sächsische Heimatbriefe (“Letters from the 
Saxon Home”), a small make-shift publication that had recently reached 
out to reconnect Saxon emigrants with their home state, and in particular 
with the “new” National Socialist Germany.2 Funded by the Volksbund für 
das Deutschtum im Ausland (“People’s Association for Germandom 
Abroad,” or VDA), an organization dedicated to the preservation of 
German language and culture across the globe, 3  the editors of the 
Heimatbriefe were asking their readers all over the world  
that you write back to us and tell us about yourself and the 
Germans out there so that we can tell our boys and girls at 
home and in school how you […] wrestle for self-assertion 
                                                        
1 LaVern Rippley, The German-Americans (Boston: Twayne, 1976), 198. 
2 Georg Durrschmidt to the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA), 
Sächsischer Landesverband, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden (henceforth 
abbreviated HSTA), Call Number 12460 Nr. 41, 1937-1036. Having received 
thousands of responses from all over the world, VDA staff transcribed the letters. 
They are stored in numbered folders (in this case: Nr. 41) sorted by region. 
Within those folders they are numbered annually, though the year is not noted on 
the respective document. I have thus consistently added the year to the citation 
by inserting it between the number of the folder and the number of the 
letter.transcripts survived the war and continue to be stored at the 
Hauptstaatsarchiv in Dresden, Germany. I have translated all quotes from the 
German. Spelling errors are omitted since it was often impossible to determine 
whether writer or transcriber committed them.  
3 The history and origins of the VDA will be discussed in Chapter 3. See 
especially Section 3.4.2.  
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and for the reputation and continued existence of the Reich 
that we are building for all future generations.4 
Durrschmidt, a married tinsmith with two children and a veteran of 
World War I, had moved his family to Queens, New York, where he had 
secured a job with Bell Laboratories. He had been naturalized and had 
adjusted his name from the original Dürschmidt to a more suitable 
American equivalent in 1932. Durrschmidt owned a home where he and 
his family lived and enjoyed the benefits of a steady income. Yet, his ties 
to the small village near Zwickau in the heart of Saxony, where he was 
born, had prompted him to respond to the editors. As he considered the 
state of German America, he wrote: “We really shouldn’t be homesick 
here in New York, after all, there are so many German churches, clubs, 
amusement facilities etc. And yet,“ he continued, “especially among the 
urbanites no intimate alliance will develop, something that is so much 
easier to do on the countryside.“5 
Historians of German America have long wrestled with the question of 
what exactly happened to this group of immigrants once vibrant, visible, 
and imbued with a “strong ethos of separatism.“6 How is it, they wonder, 
that one of the largest ethnic groups7 ever to reach the United States fell 
                                                        
4 Sächsische Heimatbriefe, October 1934, 1. 
5 Durrschmidt to VDA, HSTA, 41-1937-1036. 
6 Kathleen N. Conzen, “The Paradox of German-American Assimilation,” 
Yearbook of German-American Studies 16 (1981), 153. 
7 “Ethnicity” is a contested term. I am employing Russell Kazal’s definition of an 
ethny as a group with “a shared sense of peoplehood tied […] to specific Old 
World ancestries”. See: Russell Kazal, “Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, 
and Reappraisal of a Concept in American Ethnic History,” The American 
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apart into disparate regional varieties while other groups from Europe, 
particularly the Irish and Italians, left such distinct traces in American 
national life and culture? Most scholars agree that the early twentieth 
century was the key period in the “disappearance“ of German America. 
They argue that both negative experiences such as the ostracism of World 
War I and increased opportunities to join the American 
“mainstream“ prompted Americans of German origin to blend into the 
“white ethnic.“8 
But German America did not just disappear. As George Durrschmidt 
and many others writing from all over the continental United States 
reported to the VDA, there still existed a vast infrastructure of German 
American life as late as the 1930s, including stores, movie-theaters, 
churches, clubs, and restaurants. There were public debates about the 
future of the German community in newspapers and radio shows, but 
discord seemed to triumph over unity. Alice Kern, the wife of the 
prominent German American writer and scholar Dr. Albert J.W. Kern, had 
                                                                                                                                                       
Historical Review 100:2 (April, 1995), 439, footnote 7. For a good discussion of 
the ongoing debate about the meaning of ethnicity, see: Jason McDonald, 
American Ethnic History: Themes and Perspectives (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007), 4-6. 
8 For a good overview of older arguments in German-American History, see: 
Patricia Herminghouse, “German-American Studies in a New Vein,” 
Unterrichtspraxis 9:2 (1976), 3-14. For more recent work, see Conzen, “Paradox,” 
and especially: Russell Kazal, “The Interwar Origins of the White Ethnic: Race, 
Residence, and German Philadelphia, 1917-1939,” Journal of American History 
23:4 (Summer, 2004), 78-131; and Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of 
German-American Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). I offer 
my own detailed discussion and critique of the migration historiography between 
contemporary Germany and the United States in Chapter 1.  
  4 
experienced the evolution of German America since her arrival in the 
United States in 1884. Alongside her husband, who served as the 
president of the United German Societies of New York City in the early 
1900s, she had witnessed successful attempts to unite German American 
organizations, only to see those efforts disintegrate during World War I. 
The 1920s brought some resurgence, but as she wrote in late 1937, “our 
German community today is more splintered than ever before.“ 9 
Importantly, neither Kern nor Durrschmidt described submergence or 
disappearance, but rather disintegration and division – and both pointed to 
interior causes rather than blaming outside forces. Such reasoning was a 
general trend among the writers to the VDA. To be sure, there were many 
complaints about German immigrant assimilation, about the lack of 
enthusiasm many Americans of German heritage showed for German 
culture and language. But the biggest cause for internal discord seemed to 
have been disagreements about what exactly German culture was and 
how to best express that culture in the United States. 
This dissertation discusses intra-ethnic and transnational10 dynamics in 
German America. Like other works on U.S. immigration history, my study 
                                                        
9 Alice Kern to VDA, HSTA 42-1937-112. Her date of arrival can be determined 
via the 1900 United States Federal Census. 
10 The term “transnational” has its own contested history, which I discuss in 
Section 1.2. In general, I am utilizing Eiichiro Azuma’s notion of the transnational 
as “inter-National”, a perspective “that stresses the interstitial (not 
transcendental) nature of [migrants’] lives between the two nation-states.” See: 
Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in 
Japanese America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5. For a good 
overview of transnationalism’s potential and pitfalls, see: Bryce Traister, “The 
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builds on recent developments in trans-/international scholarship, which 
emphasize the fluidity and global reach of the immigrant experience. 
Rather than describing immigration in linear, teleological, and 
essentialized terms, historians have begun to employ a model that views 
historical transformations as the result of multidirectional exchange of 
people, goods, and ideas, while simultaneously pointing to the interrelated 
attempts of nation-states to restrict, control, and profit from these 
movements. This approach has been applied with particular success to 
the Americas and to trans-Pacific movements. 11  While the history of 
European immigration has certainly not been neglected, it has received 
substantially less “transnational” coverage. 12  This gap is particularly 
evident in the case of German America. Despite an emerging interest in 
the role that emigration and “Germans abroad” played in the discursive 
negotiations of national consciousness in Germany,13 there have been 
                                                                                                                                                       
Object of Study; or, Are We Being Transnational Yet?” Journal of Transnational 
Studies 2:1 (2010). 
11 Azuma, Between Two Empires; David Gutierrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican 
Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995); Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese 
Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003); Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants 
and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995); George Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, 
Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
12 Donna Gabacchia and Vicki L. Ruiz, eds., American Dreaming, Global 
Realities: Rethinking U.S. Immigration History (Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press, 2006). Dorothee Schneider, Crossing Borders: Migration and Citizenship 
in the Twentieth-Century United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
13 Krista O’Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagin, eds., The Heimat 
Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
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almost no studies investigating the impact of changing notions of ethnic 
and cultural belonging on the status and identity of German migrants in 
the United States between World War I and World War II.14 However, 
considering the academic assumption of German America’s demise after 
1915, this is not surprising. 
I argue that German Americans continued to be strongly invested in 
the homeland throughout the interwar era,15 negotiating their hyphenated, 
heterogeneous identities along lines of race, gender, citizenship, and 
class. 16  More specifically, I identify transnational spaces for such 
negotiations and explore the “discursive strategies and everyday 
                                                                                                                                                       
Press, 2005); Mathias Schulze et al, eds., German Diasporic Experiences: 
Identity, Migration, Loss (Waterloo: Winfried Laurier Press, 2009); Neil Gregor, 
Nils Roemer, and Mark Roseman, eds., German History From the Margins 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Bradley Naranch, “Inventing the 
Auslandsdeutsche: Emigration, Colonial Fantasy, and German National Identity, 
1848-1871,” in: Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal, eds., Germany’s 
Colonial Pasts (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 21-40. 
14 The only exception I am aware of is Hans-Werner Retterath’s 2000 dissertation, 
which is available only in German. Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und 
Volkstumsgedanke. Zur Ethnizitätskonstruktion durch die auslandsdeutsche 
Kulturarbeit zwischen 1918 und 1945 (PhD. Diss., Philipps-Universität Marburg, 
2000). 
15 It should be noted that I am not the first one to do so. In the past two or three 
decades, numerous studies, particularly of urban German-America have found a 
vibrant culture alive and well until at least World War II, sometimes beyond. 
Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 2. See also: Ronald Bayor, Neighbors in Conflict: 
The Irish, Germans, Jews, and Italians of New York City, 1929-1941 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Robert Paul McCaffrey, Islands of 
Deutschtum: German-Americans in Manchester, New Hampshire and Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, 1870-1942 (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); Leslie V. Tischauser, 
The Burden of Ethnicity: the German Question in Chicago, 1914-1941 (New 
York: Garland, 1990); Don Heinrich Tolzmann, The Cincinnati Germans after the 
Great War (New York: Peter Lang, 1987). 
16 Another important aspect, the role of German-language religious institutions, 
could not be included in this dissertation. 
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practices,” 17  by which immigrants in the United States of all social 
backgrounds used their pasts to explain the present and shape the future. 
German immigrants to the United States continuously re-imagined their 
position in American society through a prism that included both a 
retrospective memory of their migratory experience and the homeland, as 
well as a projective consideration of contemporary political, social, and 
economic events.  Since the majority of emigrants permanently stayed in 
the United States their experiences became part of the American 
experience in the interwar era. 
In this sense, my work hopes to participate in a resurging debate about 
the various manifestations of “Germanness abroad.” 18  While this 
increasingly large body of scholarship investigates the ways in which 
emigrants negotiated their sense of ethnicity and belonging within the 
respective host cultures, such explorations have almost completely 
                                                        
17 Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires, 5. More specifically, Azuma’s work 
confronts the “bounded meanings of nation and race through close analysis of 
the discursive strategies and everyday practices that the immigrants adopted and 
deployed relative to the different hegemonic powers.”17 
18 See sources in footnote 13, and: Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good 
Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America 
in World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Malte Fuhrmann, 
Der Traum vom deutschen Orient. Zwei deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen 
Reich 1851–1918 (Frankfurt: Campus, 2006); Andrew Zimmerman, Alabama in 
Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the 
New South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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ignored the United States, by far the most popular destination of German 
emigrants.19  
One objective of this dissertation is to contextualize and complicate the 
argument that the period during and immediately after World War I was a 
critical juncture, at which German Americans, once a vibrant and vocal 
ethnic group, no longer felt the bonds of the Heimat and largely 
assimilated into the American mainstream. Striving to explain this decline, 
historians such as Russell Kazal have pointed to a slow process, in which 
lower class migrants rejected the high culture celebrated in privileged 
German American cultural organizations and became more confident to 
embrace American culture particularly because their whiteness allowed 
them to participate in public sphere and consumer marketplace. 20 
Scholars have cited additional external reasons such as anti-German 
hysteria during the war, Prohibition, and the 1924 Immigration Act to 
explain why ethnic Germans never regained their prewar visibility as a 
group.21 Some exceptions notwithstanding,22 the period after World War I 
                                                        
19 A recent conference, held at Berlin’s Free University, “Rethinking the 
Auslandsdeutsche,” that brought together many of the most prominent scholars 
on the topic, did not feature a single paper on the United States.  
20 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, passim. 
21 To be sure, this was not an argument reserved for German immigrants. 
Newcomers from around the world were seen as bearers of anti-American ideas 
like Communism, Socialism, Anarchism, and Fascism. As Charles R. Crisp, a 
congressman from Georgia, put it: “Little Bohemia, Little Italy, Little Russia, Little 
Germany, Little Poland, Chinatown […] are the breeding grounds for un-
American thought and deeds.” Quoted in: Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race 
and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2001), 100. 
  9 
has consequently received little attention beyond a focus on how 
America’s Nazis overshadowed German American attempts to maintain 
neutrality. 23  The problem with such approaches is their simplistic and 
largely uncritical adoption of “Germanness” as a collective identity defined 
by either bourgeois nationalists or, later, radical National Socialists. I 
maintain that most German immigrants in the United States pragmatically 
incorporated only those elements of Germanness abroad into their 
personal (as opposed to collective) sense of belonging that helped them 
master their complicated lives in the United States, characteristics such as 
their whiteness, work ethic, economic prudence or civic education. 
My work is thus more closely aligned with studies that have focused on 
the impact of migration on civic and national consciousness in the United 
States.24 The racial and political diversity of the immigrants that arrived in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century challenged the status quo 
in the United States, as these new arrivals demanded the full benefits of 
American cultural, political, and economic citizenship. At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                                       
22 Gregory Kupsky,“The True Spirit of the German People”: German-Americans 
and National Socialism, 1919-1955 (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2010); 
McCaffery. Islands of Deutschtum: Tischauser, Burden of Ethnicity. 
23 Sander Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States: 1924-1941 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1974); Cornelia Wilhelm, Bewegung oder Verein? 
Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik in den USA (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 
1998). 
24 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of 
the Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Schneider, Crossing Borders; 
Wendy L. Wall, Inventing the “American Way”: The Politics of Consensus from 
the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
  10
immigrants continued to be heavily invested in the politics of the 
homeland. 25  My dissertation shows that German Americans closely 
observed the struggles to put Germany back on its feet after World War I 
and that the sharp differences that emerged among the populace back 
home changed the political, social and cultural standpoints of Germans 
abroad. At a time when both Germany and the United States underwent 
rigorous renegotiations of nationalism and belonging – usually ensconced 
in cheery slogans such as Volksgemeinschaft and the “American Way of 
Life” – the migrants who appear in this history had to find new ways to 
think about themselves. Their heritage often became a means to escape 
the reality of everyday life, make sense of it, or even resist it. 
Writing Transnational History 
 
For more than a decade, transnationalism has transformed academia. 
Notoriously hard to define, it is best summed up as “a diverse, contested, 
cross-disciplinary intellectual movement”26 without one definite meaning. 
Generally, transnational histories attempt to investigate beyond the 
national and international, beyond the domestic and foreign policies of one 
                                                        
25 In essence, this argument is at the core of transnational studies of migration. 
Scholars describe networks rather than unidirectional trajectories. See footnote 
29. For some recent applications, see: Azuma, Between Two Empires; Mark 
Choate, Emigrant Nation – The Making of Italy Abroad (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008); Richard S. Kim, The Quest for Statehood: Korean 
Immigrant Nationalism and U.S. Sovereignty, 1904–1945 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Bruce Nelson, Irish Nationalists and the Making of the 
Irish Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
26 Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick, and J.T. Way, “Transnationalism: A 
Category of Analysis,” American Quarterly 60:3 (September, 2008): 628. 
  11
nation or another, thus decentering the nation-based narratives that still 
shape much of public history. More importantly, however, transnational 
theory compels us “to acknowledge that the nation […] is a thing 
contested, interrupted, and always shot through with contradiction.” 27 
History written from a transnational vantage point contextualizes 
nationalism, it recognizes that national borders and boundaries as well as 
the spaces, institutions, and traditions defining national identity are 
constantly renegotiated and everything but stable.28  
For my own work, transnationalism signifies a different understanding 
of migratory processes. Transnational scholars view migration not as a 
one-way-street, a teleological voyage with a final destination from one 
national body to the other. Instead, they envision transnational spaces and 
“multisited ‘imagined communities’ whose boundaries stretch across the 
borders of two or more nation-states.”29 Migrants traveling back and forth 
between origin and destination inhabit these spaces and use them to 
reimagine who they are now and were in the past. That knowledge is then 
passed on to the next generations. Through such processes, migrants 
change our cultural understanding of nation, nationality, national identity, 
                                                        
27 Briggs et al., “Transnationalism,” 627. 
28 A standard introduction to transnational history is: Thomas Bender, ed., 
Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2002). 
29 David Gutiérrez and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, “Introduction Nation and 
Migration,” American Quarterly 60:3 (September, 2008): 504. For an extensive 
discussion of transnationalism and migration, see: Jorge Duany, Blurred Borders: 
Transnational Migration between the Hispanic Caribbean and the United States 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 17-33. 
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and national belonging. A transnational approach thus enables historians 
to understand migrants not as silenced, disappearing voices, at best 
invisible to the “national” eye, at worst perceived and understood as a 
threat to the nation-state. Instead, they become active participants in a 
political, cultural, and social sphere in which they are empowered to 
choose “among various strategies of accommodation or opposition” 30 
available in the transnational space of the ethnic community. 
An important example of such work is Eiichiro Azuma’s Between Two 
Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America, 
which chronicles the experience of Japanese immigrants in the United 
States between the late 1800s and World War II.31 There were, of course, 
differences between the German and the Japanese experiences, most 
notably the racial politics of the time, which undermined Japanese 
Americans’ civic rights. However, the similarities between the two groups 
are just as striking: Both German and Japanese immigrants originated 
from strong, nationalistic and militaristic societies, which emphasized race 
as a crucial part of their self-definition.32 And both groups had to deal with 
                                                        
30 Kathleen Conzen, David Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George Pozzetta, and 
Rudolph Vecoli, “The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.,” 
Journal of American Ethnic History 12 (Fall, 1992): 11. 
31 Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires.  
32 Studies of Japanese ethnic nationalism include: Kevin M. Doak, “Ethnic 
Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan,” Journal of 
Japanese Studies 22 (1996), 77-103; Kevin M. Doak, “What Is a Nation and Who 
Belongs? National Narratives and the Ethnic Imagination in Twentieth-Century 
Japan,” American Historical Review 102:2 (April, 1997), 283-309; John Dower, 
Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986); Michael Weiner, 
“Discourses of Race, Nation, and Empire in Pre-1945 Japan,” Ethnic and Racial 
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the intractable conflict of war, which forced them into an antagonistic 
relationship with the American state and its people and left them in an 
emotional no-man’s-land. Azuma’s work has been a guideline for my own 
because of the juxtaposition of subjectivity and responsibility: Japanese 
immigrants, Azuma wrote, may have been “caught between the 
ideological and often repressive apparatuses of the two nation-states, [but] 
their bodies were anchored in America, their interests rooted in its 
socioeconomic structure, and their activities disciplined by its politicolegal 
system.” In other words, while certainly remaining connected to the social 
sphere of the homeland, Japanese immigrants had no choice but to deal 
with the society they encountered – a hostile society, in which they were 
racially othered, excluded, and eventually even imprisoned. At the same 
time, Azuma held immigrants “accountable for their actions and inaction, 
their choices and judgments, and their complicity and resistance.”33 This is 
to say that immigrants were not merely victims, but agents of their own 
fate – if only to the degree permitted by the society they encountered.  
I believe that acknowledging this dichotomy is one of the fundamental 
preconditions to any viable approach dealing with the history of German 
America between the two World Wars. While certainly subjected to some 
injustice, I will show that Germans in the United States engaged in 
                                                                                                                                                       
Studies 18:3 (July, 1995), 433-456, which is also reprinted along with other 
essays on race and nationalism in modern Japan in: Michael Warner, ed., Race, 
Ethnicity and Migration in Modern Japan (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005).  
33 Azuma, Between Two Empires, 6 and 8. 
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arguments amongst each other and against other groups, thus helping to 
create new injustices while resisting and helping to dispel old ones. Like 
Japanese-Americans they had to find ways to retain a sense of belonging 
rooted in the past while embracing their presence and future as Americans. 
Many did so successfully. Others only reluctantly followed suit. Still others 
decided to embrace their German heritage and even remigrated to 
participate in what the Nazis proclaimed to be a millennial empire.    
Chapters 
 
Chapter One of this dissertation explores how Germany’s conception 
of national belonging developed throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and provided an ideological framework for the histories 
of German migration to the United States. I maintain that German 
American historians and writers such as Albert B. Faust and Rudolf 
Cronau pursued transnational agendas in appealing to both American and 
German discourses, particularly to nationalized prototypes of “the 
immigrant.” In their descriptions of the migratory past, they focused on the 
contributions of a mythical immigrant – the hard-working, virtuous pioneer 
– to the settlement and development of the United States, while 
simultaneously lamenting the lack of appreciation for those achievements 
by the American and German publics. Unfortunately, their perspective has 
rarely been questioned but frequently reproduced, setting the paradigm of 
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victimization and decline that clouded much of German American 
historiography during the Twentieth Century.  
The next four chapters counter such arguments.  
Chapter Two compares the transformation of two competing national 
ideologies in Germany and the United States and discusses how migrants 
navigated that divide. The 1920s and 1930s were two decades in which 
the respective paradigms of citizenship evolved into strictly opposing 
models, the German based on ethnicity (and thus exclusive), the 
American based on a commitment to its civic norms (and thus inclusive 
and open to repatriation).34 For German Americans this evolution was a 
painful process. Many of them had employed their ethnic belonging as a 
source of pride and, more importantly, as justification for their challenge to 
Anglo-American superiority in the United States. German American 
leaders continued to define Germanness in increasingly chauvinistic terms, 
often closely following events back home and aligning with views 
proposed by governments from Weimar to Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, 
“average” migrants, far from simply being assimilated Americans, 
continued to draw upon their heritage to negotiate challenges unique to 
their particular group. As I will argue, they tried to define Germanness as 
compatible with the “American Way of Life,” even though that eventually 
proved to be impossible. 
                                                        
34 See especially: Patricia Hogwood, “Citizenship Controversies in Germany: The 
Twin Legacy of Völkisch Nationalism and the Alleinvertretungsanspruch,” 
German Politics 9:3 (December, 2000): 125-144. 
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Chapter Three examines the intersection of race and nation: German 
migrants were outraged at their treatment during the “Great War,” which 
undermined their belonging in the “white ethnic” by othering them racially 
(the “Hun”) and by ostracizing them politically, culturally and socially. The 
response may have been a thorough submergence into American society 
for some, but many others were repelled by the treatment and vowed to 
fight back against the prejudices. One way to do so was to reaffirm their 
racial belonging in a campaign against the “Horror on the Rhine,” the 
purported acts of sexual violence committed by black African occupation 
troops against the German population in the Rhineland. The campaign 
culminated in a mass meeting at New York’s Madison Square Garden on 
February 28, 1921. Examining a variety of sources, including newspapers 
and pamphlets from the United States and Germany, I argue that this 
meeting helped set the tone for much of the next two decades, in which 
German Americans stressed the racial unity of Northern Europeans and 
white European Americans. Invoking transnational discourses of 
whiteness and belonging, they used their German heritage to reassert that 
they were members of humanity’s “finest race,” and thus demanded to be 
accorded the full benefits of American citizenship. While widely 
denounced by American media for its overt pro-German and anti-British 
rhetoric, the campaign thus helped reinforce a racialized ethnic-national 
identity among organized German Americans that opened the door to Nazi 
propaganda a decade later.  
  17
Chapter Four complicates the argument from the previous chapter by 
pointing to internal divisions along social lines. It shows how German 
American organizations alienated lower class immigrants by transposing 
“old world” social norms and conventions on migrants, who frequently had 
come to the United States precisely to escape these norms. At the same 
time, these social constructions of Germanness abroad, which imbued a 
seemingly homogeneous German people with qualities such as reliability, 
character and the reputation for a strong “work ethic,” proved to be 
advantageous for some individuals to achieve their goals in the United 
States – not least, because contemporaneous American praises for the 
“self-made man” and “free enterprise” were based on such virtues. These 
contradictions appear throughout the 1920s and 1930s in letters – either 
written to the VDA or published in the German American press – in 
middle-class accounts of German American life, and in the internal 
documents of German American organizations, which were reluctant to 
accept working-class members among their ranks. Taking into account the 
social and political conflicts dividing Germany at the time, I argue that 
much of the frustration about assimilation and decline can be attributed to 
social disagreements about what exactly it meant to be “German” between 
1919 and 1939. 
Chapter Five examines the intersection of gender and nation through 
the prism of consumer culture, particularly focusing on German American 
women and their adoption of a hyphenated identity to assert their essential 
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role in private and public life. I focus especially on a 1932 incident that 
caused righteous indignation among the German immigrant population in 
Philadelphia: At the height of the Great Depression, the department store 
Wanamaker’s had stopped publishing its advertisements in the 
Philadelphia Gazette Democrat, one of the most-widely read German 
American dailies at the time. Several German organizations drafted 
resolutions and individuals added protest letters demanding that the ads 
be returned – first, due to the critical importance of the advertisements for 
the financial well-being of the Gazette Democrat, an important 
transnational space for the local German community; and second, 
because the advertisements were perceived as important guidelines to 
navigate private budgets and master the public shopping sphere. I 
contend in this chapter that German Americans, particularly women, 
attempted to preserve these hyphenated “safe spaces” and that their 
failure to do so had little to do with neglect. Conversely, the unstoppable 
expansion of mass consumer culture may be more to blame. A culture 
“almost violently hostile to the past and to tradition”35 left little room for 
ethnic niche markets, which had consolidated by the 1930s across the 
United States and across all ethnic groups. Celebrations of European 
migratory cultures remained local and did not reappear on a national scale 
                                                        
35 William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New 
American Culture (New York: Vintage, 1993), xiii. 
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until the ethnic revivals of the 1960s. Here, too, German emigrant history 
mirrored, shaped, and became American history. 
Conclusion 
 
What constitutes Germanness abroad? German language, song, and 
tradition? A German meal, Oktoberfest, and beer brewed according to the 
German purity law, the Reinheitsgebot? Or can we locate the traces of a 
transatlantic migratory wave in everyday American life today – in it’s racial 
and social politics, in American patterns of shopping and consumerism, 
and in the discursive negotiations of what it means to be an American? My 
argument is: All of the above. All of these characteristics can potentially 
help us understand the ways in which German migrants helped bring 
about the contemporary United States, its culture and institutions, its 
norms and values.  
I believe the study of German migration to the United States is a wide-
open field. Whereas other immigrant groups have been thoroughly studied, 
German America has thus far rarely been examined through a theoretical 
lens that exhausts the full potential of four transformative decades in the 
study of immigration (see especially Chapter 1). This dissertation can 
hardly close that gap. Instead, it aims to open up investigative areas for 
future research. For every question it answers, it raises many more. When, 
for example, I investigate the politics of citizenship and belonging in 
Chapter Three, it is all but inevitable to draw a straight line to the civic 
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discourse of the 1950s, when McCarthyism ruled in the United States, 
driven by a populist anti-Communism deeply entrenched in the German 
American community. And when I discuss the transnational negotiations of 
modernity and consumer culture in Chapter Five, it raises the question, 
whether or not German Americans drove the popularization of Austrian 
economic ideas propagated by libertarian theorists Friedrich Hayek and 
Ludwig von Mises, which led to the rise of the neo-liberal economics 
during the 1960s and beyond.36  
Moreover, the implications of my argument go well beyond the 
American continent. At a time (2016), when Germany is once more 
dealing with a perceived threat to its national cohesion, this time because 
of a refugee exodus from war-torn Syria and elsewhere, the question of 
what constitutes Germanness is as relevant as ever. “In Germany, a big 
question is back on the table: What is German — and how German do you 
have to be to belong to Germany?,” journalist Anna Sauerbrey recently 
asked in the New York Times. Her answer: “For a disturbing number of 
Germans, the answer is culture, including religion.”37  
As I wrote and researched this dissertation, I learned quickly that the 
vision of German identity propagated during the 1920s and 1930s still 
influences the ways in which Germans think about belonging to the nation 
                                                        
36 See, for example, the story of German American, Peoria-born Frederick J. 
Schlink, who founded the consumer protection agency Consumer Research, but 
ended up “a full-fledged apologist for unregulated capitalism” of the Austrian kind. 
See: Charles McGovern, Sold American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890-
1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 166-167, 309.  
37
 Anna Sauerbrey, “What is German?” The New York Times, May 26, 2015,  
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today. Even though some of the policies have been excised of their 
essentialist, even racist connotations, these undertones still shape the 
contemporary discourse on migration and belonging. The transnational 
perspective on emigrated Germans in the “New World” and the role they 
played in defining the boundaries of belonging there, thus serve as a 
mirror to understanding “Old World” politics. As such, this dissertation is 
more than just an historical inquiry into a demographic subgroup of the 
United States – it is indeed a contribution to a contemporary political 
debate.    
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Chapter 1: A “Tragedy”? – German American Historiography in 
Transnational Tension 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
In 1940, the British historian John A. Hawgood published The Tragedy 
of German America, a sweeping overview of German immigration to the 
United States from the 1830s to the 1920s. In his study, Hawgood argued 
that in their attempts to create a better Germany abroad, German 
immigrants not only met with the resistance of Americans, who rejected 
the hyphenated nationalism of all newcomers, but also with the dismissal 
of Germans back home, who despised the emigrants for leaving the 
“fatherland.” The “tragedy,” according to Hawgood, was this peculiar 
position outside both old and new world cultures, while the reconciliation 
of the two poles became the decisive challenge of the immigrant group – a 
challenge that German Americans had thus far failed to overcome.38  
The reception of Hawgood’s book by many historians of German 
America at the time was quite positive, not merely because of its intriguing 
argument, but also because of the quality of the research. Dieter Cunz of 
the University of Maryland, a recent émigré from Nazi Germany, noted 
that despite a large body of work covering German immigration to the 
                                                        
38 John A. Hawgood, The Tragedy of German-America; the Germans in the 
United States of America During the Nineteenth Century--and After (London, 
New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940), main argument on page 52. 
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United States, “German-American historiography has remained a quite 
thorny and rocky field, in which only few flowers bloom that one can 
enjoy.”39 In Cunz’ opinion, Tragedy was different. Hawgood had moved 
beyond hagiographic – and quite common – descriptions of German 
immigrants as virtuous pioneers and trailblazers. Instead, he observed 
that they tended to stay clustered together, preferring the security of urban 
areas and established communities to the adventure of the prairie. Even 
the book’s shortcomings, for example its ignorance of social differences 
among German Americans, did not undermine its scholarly acumen. To 
the opposite, the fact that other scholars critically engaged with it was 
evidence of its academic excellence.40 Even the New York Times, which 
frequently criticized German American works for their ethnic chauvinism, 
reviewed Hawgood’s book favorably, echoing Cunz’ criticism of German 
American historiography: “Perhaps it took a disinterested outsider to give 
a complete and unbiased report of the history of the Germans in the 
United States.”41  
I argue in this chapter that the lack of scholarly acumen, which 
characterized German American studies from its beginnings until mid-
century, was largely due to the struggle to come to terms with two 
rejecting poles, German and American national identity. In other words, 
                                                        
39 Dieter Cunz, “Die Deutsch-Amerikaner: Zu dem Buch von John Hawgood ‘The 
Tragedy of German-America,” Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht 33:8 
(December, 1941), 343-348, quote on 343. 
40 Hawgood, Tragedy, 33; Cunz, “Die Deutsch-Amerikaner,” 343-348.    
41 New York Times, April 5, 1942, BR16. 
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Hawgood’s “tragedy” argument applied to the historiography of German 
America as well, particularly to those accounts written in the United States 
by authors with German origins. They will be the focus of this chapter. As I 
will lay out, these historians, many of them amateurs, aimed to relieve the 
transatlantic tension by writing histories that attempted to please both 
contemporary Americans as well as their kin in Germany. In their 
narratives, Germans were both leading contributors in American life, while 
also successfully preserving German language and culture abroad. 
Unsurprisingly, given their political focus, many early works on German 
America lacked academic objectivity. However, when met with criticism, 
these historians frequently resorted to narratives of persecution and self-
loathing, which transcended the postwar era and cast a long shadow on 
German American historiography until today. Hawgood’s book could have 
become a watershed – but it didn’t.  
In fact, I suggest that much (though certainly not all) of the subsequent 
scholarship written by German Americans was conceived within the 
confines of that conflict. Whereas other ethnic histories 42  successfully 
emerged from the pressures of Americanization during the 1960s and 
1970s, German American history has struggled to come to terms with its 
convoluted past, open up to modern academic trends and find meaningful 
ways to attract new talents. Though some works have explored new 
territories, such as gender, race, and class, too many others have been 
                                                        
42 For a good overview, see Russell A. Kazal, “Revisiting Assimilation,” 437-471. 
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unable to transcend old narratives, engage with that history critically and 
lead German American historiographical studies into the twenty-first 
century. To be sure, this chapter will not be able to fill that void. But it 
attempts to begin the discussion by exploring the transnational dynamics 
in the “tragic” historiography of German America. 
To do so, I have read and analyzed some of the most important texts 
of the time. Unlike most of the following chapters, which use a variety of 
archival sources, this chapter is largely based on the contextualization of 
those histories and a discussion of the authors’ motifs. It is meant to start 
a conversation on the transnational background of German American 
historiography – but it also sets the stage for my exploration of German 
American life during the interwar era in the chapters that follow. As such, it 
is not only a metacritique of existing accounts through a transnational 
prism, it also provides a detailed view on the discursive strategies 
employed by migrants, in this case the writers of German American history, 
to explain their present status through a historical lens.  
In this chapter, I will thus first lay out in brief the history of German 
emigration to the United States and, next, the role of that emigration on 
the German national consciousness in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Then, I will discuss how the first authors wrote within the 
confines of that context, which set the historiographical narrative patterns 
that can – to a certain degree – still be found today.  
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2. Emigration, Historiography and the Nation in 19th Century 
Germany 
2.1. Emigration to the U.S. and the Heterogeneity of German 
America 
 
A useful place to start this brief overview43 of emigration from Germany 
to the United States is the period around 1815 and after. Though many 
families had sought religious or political freedom as well as economic 
opportunities in the “new world” before, emigration did not become a 
widespread social phenomenon in the German states until then. Wars had 
ravaged Central Europe, the old order of aristocratic and church rule had 
collapsed while overpopulation and corruption challenged the survival of 
countless families who could no longer live off the land. In 1816, 
catastrophic harvest failures put many families on the brink of disaster. As 
Mack Walker notes, there was “emotional turmoil at all levels of society, 
for the old orientations of loyalty, status, and law were wrenched apart and 
twisted into new.” In other words, it seemed as if an old way of life was 
collapsing.44  
                                                        
43 This section does not provide a comprehensive overview of German 
emigration, but rather keeps in mind the focus of this chapter. A better place to 
find such a complete overview, including an excellent bibliography, is James M. 
Bergquist, “German-Americans,” in Multiculturalism in the United States: A 
Comparative Guide to Acculturation and Ethnicity, eds. John D. Buenker and 
Lorman Ratner (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2005), 152-172. 
44 Mack Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 1816-1885 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), 1. Walker’s study Germany and the Emigration 
continues to be the definitive English-language study on this topic. Other 
American authors have largely focused on the immigrant experience. See for 
example Kathleen Neils Conzen, Immigrant Milwaukee, 1836-1860. 
Accommodation and Community in a Frontier City (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1976) and LaVern Rippley, The German-Americans. An Ethnic 
Experience (Boston: Twayne, 1976). For German sources, see: Hans-Jürgen 
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Desperate, the first families decided to emigrate, particularly from the 
South Western German states that bordered the Rhine River, which 
provided easy access to the transatlantic ports on the North Sea. Actual 
emigration numbers remained comparatively low until mid-century, 
ranging between a few hundred annually in the 1820s to a high of nearly 
30000 in 1840,45 yet the period was critical for the establishment of major 
migratory patterns: Once settled in rural farming villages or booming 
industrial centers, those that had left sent letters home and told of their 
lives across the Atlantic. Families, friends, and neighbors read of their 
exploits and decided to tread the same paths as previous generations, 
often migrating to the exact same town or city, where they knew fellow 
villagers from back home. 46  Others followed the advice of bourgeois 
adventurers like the doctor Gottfried Duden from Bonn, who contributed to 
the excitement with descriptions of “freedom in paradise.” 47  In short, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Grabbe, Vor der großen Flut. Die europäische Migration in die Vereinigten 
Staaten 1783-1820 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001); Sabine Heerwart and 
Claudia Schnurmann, eds., Atlantic Migrations: Regions and Movements in 
Germany and North America/USA during the 18th and 19th Century (Hamburg: Lit, 
2007); Günter Moltmann, ed., Deutsche Amerikaauswanderung im 19. 
Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1976); and Moltmann, ed., Aufbruch nach 
Amerika. Die Auswanderungswelle von 1816/1817 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1989).  
45 Moltmann, Deutsche Amerikaauswanderung, 201.  
46 Bodnar, Transplanted, 57-84. See also Walter D. Kamphoefner, “Immigrant 
Epistolary and Epistemology: On the Motivators and Mentality of Nineteenth-
Century German Immigrants,” Journal of American Ethnic History 28:3 (Spring, 
2009), 34-54, here: 36. 
47 LaVern Rippley notes that those who were actually motivated to emigrate 
because of Duden’s descriptions later denounced him as a “lying dog” (Rippley, 
German-Americans, 44). The quote is from a later visitor, Nikolaus Lenau, one of 
Duden’s admirers. See: G.A. Mulfinger, “Lenau in Amerika,” Americana 
Germanica I(1897), 7-61. Quote on pages 20/21. See also: Kamphoefner, 
“Immigrant Epistolary,” 38-41.  
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transatlantic exchange between Germany and the United States was a 
critical component of migration from the start. 
As most other newcomers to the United States, Germans emigrated 
during the nineteenth century through necessity. Pushed by political and 
religious restrictions, military duties, poverty and lack of opportunity, those 
that left often did so with a heavy heart rather than, simply, because they 
were drawn by the American promise.48   As more and more families 
established migratory “bridgeheads”, emigration numbers rose.49 Between 
1845 and 1858, 1.3 Million people left the German states, constituting the 
first of three large emigration waves to the United States during the 
nineteenth century.50 Mostly peasants and small-town craftsman facing 
economic ruin from industrialization and the structural reforms that 
benefitted the aristocracy and the middle-class, migrants faced a choice 
either to move to German cities to work in factories – or to leave the 
country. Mack Walker argued that the “prospect of joining the wage-labor 
class, the lowest he [sic] knew, was abhorrent to the pride, training, and 
traditions of the independent freeholder or artisan.”51  
                                                        
48 Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 34. 
49 Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 42. See also Kamphoefner, Westfalians, 
183-189; or for an example on Italian-Americans: Rudolph Vecoli, “The 
Formation of Chicago’s Little Italies,” Journal of American Ethnic History 2:2 
(Spring, 1983), 1-20. 
50 David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century:  A History of Germany, 
1780-1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 192. 85 to 90 percent of 
all emigrants from Germany left for United States (Ibid., 194). 
51 Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 52.  
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Instead, those desperate to preserve their dignity and independence 
chose to leave and preserve the way of life they knew elsewhere, with little 
regard for the German nation: “He who chose Auswanderung [emigration] 
might be attached to his home village, but probably not much to his home 
country […]; if his roots must be torn up, let them be transplanted to a new 
land, not another province or another duchy”.52 Walker’s 1964 study of 
German emigration to the United States in 1964 was thus an early 
proponent of the “transplantation” theory; he argued that immigrants were 
not simply passively “dislocated” or “uprooted,” dropping any “cultural 
baggage” from the homeland as soon as they stepped foot on American 
soil. 53  Instead, Walker describes them as active agents of their own 
destiny with the clear intention to recreate as much of their old life as 
possible. “The Auswanderer [emigrant] went to America less to build 
something new than to regain and conserve something old, […] theirs 
were not so much acts of radical affirmation as acts of conservative 
rejection.” 54  Though Walker’s argument is somewhat simplistic, as a 
general observation it has stood the test of time. More importantly, it 
critically undermines the observations of later historians (see Section 1.3) 
that envisioned German migrants as pioneers and trailblazers. By and 
large, they were not. 
                                                        
52 Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 52. 
53 Dirk Hoerder, Migration Research in Global Perspective: Recent Development,” 
Sozial.Geschichte Online 9 (2012), 63–84, here: 63. 
54 Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 69. 
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After the volume of emigration had slowed down during the 1850s, 
numbers began to rise again in the mid-1860s, when the end of the 
American Civil War and a number of armed conflicts in Central Europe 
increased both the “push” and “pull” factors.55 During the second wave of 
emigration, which lasted from roughly 1864 to 1873, about one million 
migrants left the German states. A third wave began in 1880 and lasted 
until the mid-1890s. In 1881 alone, 220,000 people left the German 
Empire, which was unified following the Franco-Prussian war of 1871.56 
Walker maintains that a general desire for security and independence, 
which neither the German states nor Empire could provide, remained an 
important reason prompting many families to leave.57 But there was a shift 
in geographical origins and social backgrounds. During the first half of the 
century, emigrants had been mostly peasants and artisans from the 
Southwest. By the late 1800s, increasing numbers from the Eastern states, 
from Mecklenburg, Saxony and Eastern Prussia, joined the flow. Instead 
of landowning peasants they were agricultural laborers, factory workers 
instead of skilled artisans.58   
The change in the social makeup of the migrants had great 
implications for the experience abroad. While earlier generations had often 
become peasant farmers and settled in small rural German-language 
                                                        
55 Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 180. A good overview about the 
implications of the “push” vs. “pull” debate is provided in: Jason McDonald, 
American Ethnic History, 38-42.   
56 Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, 192.  
57 Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 180.  
58 Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, 193. 
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communities, now increasing numbers of immigrants went to America’s 
booming industrial centers, opting for manufacturing jobs instead of 
agricultural labor. “New and solidly German farming communities were 
indeed established, in south-western states like Texas as well as the 
Middle West, but the typical German experience in America was urban.”59 
German immigrants were a large and vocal minority in cities like Chicago, 
New York and Philadelphia, and they were influential in the development 
of such smaller but no less booming cities as St. Louis, Milwaukee, and 
Cincinnati. 60  And they were increasingly aware of the new social 
categories that separated people into working class, educated bourgeoisie, 
and those that owned capital. This strong urban association 
notwithstanding, there has been a persistent “myth” in German American 
historiography that claims the German immigrant was a frontiersman 
realizing America’s “Manifest Destiny.” 61  Many, if not most Germans 
instead preferred the security of “prepared” land or urban comforts to 
daring ventures on the frontier. And they sought familiar environments – 
the forested hills of Ohio for those from the Southwest, the ethnic 
neighborhoods of Chicago and Milwaukee for later generations – where 
                                                        
59 Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, 196-197. 
60 Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, 196-197. 
61 Historian John Hawgood, referenced in the introduction of this chapter, was 
one of the first historians to dispel the myth spread in the 1920s and 1930s. See: 
Hawgood, Tragedy, 33.  
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they could recreate the way of life they knew and preserve old world 
customs.62 
Finally, before discussing the impact of emigration on the burgeoning 
German national consciousness, a small, but influential group of 
emigrants should be highlighted: After the failed Revolution of 1848/963, 
between four and ten thousand so-called “Forty-Eighters” escaped 
persecution and left for the United States. Even though their number was 
small, they wielded significant influence in the public life of the United 
States. Equally important, they would shape the image of the German 
American in American life. The “Forty-Eighters” often originated from the 
educated middle-class and held respectable jobs – lawyers, professors, 
scientists, writers and journalists – and they brought with them great 
expectations about German culture abroad.64 While their contributions to 
German American cultural life were significant, the new national self-
                                                        
62 Hawgood, Tragedy, 33. 
63 This is not the place to recapitulate the history of that revolution. Suffice it to 
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confidence and pride they imported to the United States also caused 
severe conflicts with older German Americans, particularly those who had 
come to the United States to escape the damning influence of the German 
bourgeoisie in proscribing a way of life.65 Many of these more established 
migrants had no sympathy for the missionary zeal of the newcomers, 
precisely because it caused an indiscriminate nativist backlash against all 
Germans. I will discuss the internal conflicts in more detail in Chapters 2 
and 4. 
American nativists viewed the runaway revolutionaries with suspicion. 
While they were often at best ambivalent about German migrants in 
general “the refugee intellectuals of 1848 and their adherents received the 
harshest bashing from the nativist camp.”66 “Native” Americans worried 
that the failed revolutionaries would meddle with American politics and 
infuse American life with atheist views of European enlightenment. 
European radicals, the Congressman Henry M. Fuller of Pennsylvania 
believed, had “already raised the black standard of atheism, and declared 
a war of extermination against the faith which supported [native-born 
Americans’] ancestors.”67 As Mischa Honeck has observed, this fear was 
not entirely unfounded. German liberals immediately got involved in the 
social lives of their host communities and subjected the politics and 
institutions to the harshest criticism. The German-language Turn-Zeitung, 
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a newspaper published by a group of “Forty-Eighters,” exclaimed in 1853: 
“Anglo-Saxon civilization, which measures the value of a human being 
only on the basis of income, in which outer appearance is everything, truth 
and honor nothing, leads to a moral servitude, material slavery, and 
antisocial barbarity; it destroys all bonds of society, consolidates the 
monarchical principle, wherever it exists, and undermines the republic.” 
The German revolutionaries considered themselves to be the real 
democrats. They felt that American democracy, though certainly politically 
ahead of European nations, desperately needed some infusion of 
(German) culture. “I would feel more comfortable here if there were more 
paintings, better drama, and less religion,” the feminist journalist Ottilie 
Assing, a confidante of Frederick Douglass’, wrote.68  
In essence, then, by the late nineteenth century, the German American 
community was no community at all. Social, religious, and regional 
differences made it hard to celebrate a common culture, especially since 
being German meant different things to different people and, more 
importantly, since those that claimed for themselves the right to define 
Deutschtum (Germandom) did not always find the support of others.69 The 
successful ascension of the second German Reich into the rank of a 
global world power and the consolidation of the nation-state around its 
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racial/ethnic roots added another layer to the migrants’ complicated 
negotiations of hyphenated belonging. While liberal revolutionaries in the 
United States demanded the preservation of German culture abroad, 
changing perception of the “immigrant” in the old world also increased the 
pressure on those, who felt an emotional connection to the national project 
back home. For many German migrants, however, the social discourses 
that drove the evolution of turn-of-the-century American national identity – 
decreasing immigration, Americanization, suburbanization and the 
evolution of a “white ethnic” – proved to be an appealing alternative.70 
However, as I will argue in the chapters to follow, they did so in ways that 
reflected their own origins in ways that nationalists on neither side of the 
Atlantic Ocean recognized. 
World War I further subdued all-too public displays of immigrant 
nationalism. American public opinion, never truly in favor of the Reich, 
increasingly shifted towards a view of German monarchy and militarism as 
antithetical to U.S. democracy. Reports of German atrocities in France 
and Belgium early in the war further added to the mistrust, as did the 
German sinking of the British passenger ship Lusitania, which killed 197 
Americans in May 1915. The American entry into World War I in April 
1917 set of an intense anti-German atmosphere. With suspicions of 
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German fifth column activities in the United States circulating across the 
country, many German Americans suffered from the comprehensive 
Americanization campaigns that aimed to homogenize U.S. society and to 
eradicate the remnants of German ethnic nationalism.71 
The fact is undisputed that these Americanization campaigns 
negatively affected German American life. 72  German Americans were 
expected to show their loyalty by taking on American citizenship and by 
abandoning the German language at home and in public. Vigilante 
organizations, which often resorted to violence and intimidation, pursued 
those that dared to question the American war effort. Readership of 
German American newspapers declined sharply.73 And by early 1918, the 
American government had enacted sweeping restrictions that forced all 
“enemy aliens” to register, punished everyone obstructing the sale of war 
bonds, and even went after those spoke ill of the American flag, its army, 
its uniforms, the constitution or its government. 74  Moreover, “German-
language training was expurgated from school curricula in communities 
across the nation, patriotic ceremonies featured the burning of German 
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books, and several states restricted the freedom to speak German in 
public.”75 
At the same time, recent research has shown that the German 
American experience during the “Great War” was nowhere near as 
catastrophic as earlier histories suggested.76  The majority of migrants, 
whether those in small towns or those in major cities, continued their lives 
largely undisturbed. Some paradigmatic anti-German milestone events 
have turned out to be much more complicated than originally assumed. 
For example, the lynching of Robert Praeger, a German-born miner in 
Collinsville, Illinois, was probably rather motivated by the victim’s socialism 
than his German origins, an assumption supported by the fact that the 
mob itself contained a great number of German Americans.77 Instead, it is 
much more likely that the contemporary idea of what it meant to be 
German led those willing and able to define Germanness in the United 
States between World War I and World War II to the conclusion that 
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German identity was fading. In order to understand that perception, we 
need to take a closer look at the impact of emigration, particularly to the 
United States, on the burgeoning German national consciousness 
throughout the nineteenth century.  
2.2. Emigration and Nationalism in Germany 
 
Authorities in the affected “emigration” states, especially in the German 
Southwest, almost immediately took note when emigration numbers rose 
in the 1810s and 1820s. To make sense of what was happening, 
governments commissioned reports, quickly learning about miserable, 
stranded emigrants crowding roads and harbors across Europe. From the 
Americas, they heard tales of broken promises and miserable migrants 
living in great poverty. Assuming wrongly that merely the poorest of the 
poor as well as discontented radicals were leaving for a better future 
elsewhere,78 officials and aristocrats in states like Württemberg, Bavaria or 
Hessen showed little concern for the effects of emigration. They failed to 
appreciate its causes, in particular the hopelessness and distrust in 
government that pervaded many rural areas.79  
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On a local level, some officials encouraged emigration, fearing “rioting 
and revolt at any moment if the distressed people did not leave.”80 In that 
sense, municipal and state governments often saw emigration as a “safety 
valve,” an easy way to solve overpopulation and dislodge political 
dissent.81 Others, incapable of grasping the impact of what was happening, 
described emigration as a disease, a “fever” or an “epidemic.82 There also 
existed a widespread belief that “the Auswanderung [emigration] was 
created by swindlers and demagogues, disturbers of the public order who 
exploited the misery of the populace” with empty promises of free passage 
and free property in the United States.83 Rather than recognizing their 
citizens as active agents seeking a better future elsewhere, aristocrats 
and authorities often saw passive victims of exploitation and deceit. 
Rather than accepting a duty to support them at home, they saw in their 
citizens little more than assets of the state, to be used for military and 
economic exploitation. Many of the perfunctory explanations “tended to 
deny the emigrant his or her unique and often sensible reason for leaving 
their ancestral homelands to seek better opportunities or career prospects 
for themselves and their children abroad.”84  
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If state governments routinely failed emigrants, they found powerful 
advocates within the growing nationalist movement to unify Germany that 
picked up in intensity during the 1820s and 1830s. In fact, care for 
emigrants proved to be an ideal way to showcase the paternalistic 
concern of the educated bourgeoisie for the people, a core message of 
the movement. Nationalists spoke of, and often believed in, the organic 
composition of the people, which “belonged” in and to Germany. As both 
the national movement and out-migration picked up in volume and 
intensity, nationalists envisioned emigration as a process akin to a body 
losing blood,85 and they lamented the virility of emigrants lost to “foreign 
acres, where only foreigners harvest the fruit,” according to the colonial 
officer Johann Jacob Sturz (1800-1877).86  
Bemoaning the failure of the burgeoning national community to feed 
and protect its citizens, liberal intellectuals like Ludwig Gall (1791-1863), 
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who had emigrated to the United States in 1819 but returned one year 
later,87 implored state governments to support emigrants. “The state was 
to serve both as a paternalistic protector and defender of German 
interests abroad and as a caring and compassionate maternal figure who 
did not abandon her children to foreign exploitation and appropriation.”88 
But in their attempts to initiate more proactive government action, 
bourgeois agitators like Gall met with the resistance of German authorities, 
especially those in the rising power Prussia, who declined to take on any 
responsibility for emigrants. 89  This failure of the state to act, writes 
historian Bradley Naranch 
became a long-term political grievance that had a profound 
impact on the confidence of later generations in the cultural 
resiliency of the German nation to prosper in a modern 
environment characterized by international economic rivalry, 
global exploration, and colonial conquest.90  
Emigration became one of the defining challenges to German nationalist 
pride and self-confidence. 
With governments slow to respond to requests for action, members of 
the intellectual middle-class invested in the politics of emigration turned to 
the private sphere to enact their own imperial adventures. Here, migration 
intersected with visions of a powerful German nation on par with other 
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European empires. Instead of losing German emigrants to “foreign acres,” 
as Sturz had suggested, bourgeois nationalists envisioned future German 
colonies in the Americas that would add to the glory of the would-be nation, 
a new Germany abroad “that was not riven by internal conflicts of class, 
region, and confession.” Again misjudging the motivations of those who 
left, they felt that migrants shared in that dream and that the “colonies” 
they founded could help establish a permanent German presence 
abroad.91 
Countless new organizations were founded during the 1830s and 
1840s, which purported to (and often did) provide for the welfare of 
emigrants. They sought out spaces, where national feelings could be 
strengthened and nationhood maintained. For example, one such 
organization devoted to promoting “colonization” abroad, the Verein zum 
Schutze deutscher Einwanderer in Texas (“Association for the Protection 
of German Immigrants in Texas”) planned to establish a permanent and 
independent German colony there. “Organizers of the society had two 
objectives: land investments that would increase in time and a safe outlet 
for countrymen who wanted to emigrate.”92  
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The Revolution of 1848 and 1849 and the assembly of national 
delegates in Frankfurt93 put this discourse on a political foundation and 
provided an arena to further debate the impact of emigration on the 
developing German nation-state. The result, not surprisingly, was “a mixed 
record of colonial fantasy and practical, if unrealized, measures designed 
to connect the fatherland to its disparate communities of ‘nationals’ 
abroad.”94 Colonialism and emigration, in other words, emerged as two 
interconnected issues where anxieties about population loss, cultural 
decline and the threat of alien invasion converged. Bourgeois elites could 
position themselves as custodians of a superior culture, educated, hard-
working, spiritually sound, and destined to protect “Germanness” against 
the denigrating influence of everything non-German. The constitutional 
congress in Frankfurt aimed to set up a unified German state capable of 
protecting emigrants and asserting Germany’s role as a leading super 
power akin to its British and French counterparts, while simultaneously 
protecting and controlling its subjects at home and abroad.95  
An emblematic trope in this vision became the figure of the 
Auslandsdeutsche (the ‘German abroad’). Bradley Naranch has described 
how this “imagined identity” came to express in the post-revolutionary 
middle-class print culture “the conflicted feelings of national pride and 
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powerlessness felt by many Germans who were interested in the fortunes 
and misfortunes of German emigrants in the United States, Latin America, 
Western Europe and elsewhere.”96 The terminology signified a paradigm 
shift: whereas during the first half of the nineteenth century, middle-class 
nationalists often described emigrants as Auswanderer, powerful, 
adventurous individuals who took on their own destiny and voluntarily left 
Germany for good, the Auslandsdeutsche represented tragic loss of the 
homeland. Much like the patronizing assessments of governments and 
aristocracy, this had little to do with the reality experienced by emigrants.97 
While bourgeois Germans envisioned romanticized images of the nation 
and its empire in cultural and ethnic terms, millions of peasants, artisans, 
and workers that saw their way of live permanently destroyed and left 
European societies not to resurrect a German empire abroad but to save 
an old, quite regional or even local way of life. “The Auslandsdeutsche, 
quite simply, was not the German emigrant […].”98  
This is not to say that emigrants abandoned everything German or 
denied their heritage, as many observers alleged. But most emigrants 
merely possessed a rudimentary sense of German national identity. While 
their way of life collapsed in the old world, lower-class Germans remained 
disenfranchised politically, economically and culturally – to them, 
“Germany” had little to offer. As I discussed in the previous section, 
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emigrants were in fact aiming to transplant life to the United States in a 
much more active and optimistic manner than assumed by bourgeois 
observers. When the latter fantasized about emigrants’ separation from a 
mythical homeland, they only partly captured migrant reality. Emigrants 
lost a Heimat, but not necessarily a nation, and their losses were far from 
mythical, they were real. Like the terminology describing it, bourgeois 
visions of emigration  
did not encapsulate the immense diversity of experiences 
and cultural identities of the millions of persons of German 
descent living around the globe. Instead it located them in a 
monolithic national imaginary that denied their claims to 
individual expression and autonomy of self in ways that were 
politically and rhetorically useful domestically.99  
This conflict between myth and reality, between Auslandsdeutsche and 
Auswanderer, arose when the liberal revolutionaries in the late 1840s 
arrived in German American communities across the United States. The 
“Forty-Eighters” found the state of German America to be lacking. 
Politically, they despised slavery and uniformly supported the Republican 
Party, whereas older immigrants “found their ideas of liberty and equality 
in the Jeffersonian doctrines of the Democratic party,”100 which tolerated 
slavery. And while established immigrants often congregated in religious 
institutions where German language, culture and traditions were passed 
on, the liberal revolutionaries founded social and cultural clubs as well as 
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parochial schools. The 1848 liberals often rebuked older settlers publically, 
“calling them barbarians, without art, music, and culture.”101  
When liberal nationalists reported their observations back to Germany, 
they further added to the already deteriorating opinion Germans held 
about their kin abroad. The more the reality of German unification 
converged with colonial fantasies and an increasingly racial view of the 
nation, the less German America fit into the romanticized descriptions of 
migrant life that pervaded the German public sphere for much of the 
second half of the nineteenth century.102 Originally, the Auslandsdeutsche 
had been, “the ultimate cultural colonizer, bringing the values of hard work, 
spiritual vitality, classical education, and love of order to the inferior races 
on the imperial periphery as well as to the civilized metropolises of 
Western Europe and the United States.”103 Now, many questioned the 
suitability of emigrants to extend the German nation beyond its borders. 
Some even spoke of an “emigration fever” and suggested that emigrants 
left not because of poverty or social immobility but due to their own lack of 
roots and ability. To others, emigration amounted to treason.104 In essence, 
elites blamed the émigrés for the conditions that pushed them out. By the 
1890s,  
                                                        
101 Rippley, German-Americans, 53. 
102 For a more detailed discussion, see Bradley Naranch, Beyond the Fatherland, 
53. 
103 Naranch, Beyond the Fatherland, 55-56. 
104 Quoted in Hans-Werner Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und 
Volkstumsgedanke. Zur Ethnizitätskonstruktion durch die auslandsdeutsche 
Kulturarbeit zwischen 1918 und 1945 (PhD. Diss., Philipps-Universität Marburg, 
2000), 132. 
  
 
47
growing Anglophobia, skepticism of the ultimate national 
allegiances of German-American families, and the end of the 
last major wave of German transatlantic migration further 
eroded the importance of the Auswanderer as a symbol of 
national identity. The Auslandsdeutsche and the possibility 
of seeking new colonization spaces for the German diaspora 
in its African colonies and a German-dominated Mitteleuropa 
became a fixture in the nationalist imaginary of the radical 
right.105  
 
As I will attempt to show throughout this dissertation, such rejection by 
the fatherland greatly disappointed German Americans. For many 
migrants that had left Germany disillusioned after the failed Revolution of 
1848/9 – as well as many others106 – the country’s ascension into the elite 
circle of world powers was a matter of great personal pleasure. To be sure, 
liberals were missing some of the democratic elements that they had 
fought for during the revolution, but even those critical of some of the 
Kaiser’s policies “found it difficult to hide their enthusiasm over 
developments in Bismarck’s Germany.”107 Not surprisingly, many of the 
historians, activists and writers who first told the story of German migration 
to the United States shared a great “pride in the progress of Germany” 
and they attempted to appeal to the Germans back home by writing 
histories of hard-working, diligent, and resilient settlers, who preserved 
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German language and culture abroad.108 In that sense, as I will argue in 
more detail below, early German American history was steeped in the 
transnational politics of belonging from the start: its writers participated in 
a transatlantic debate about the past, presence, and future of German 
America.  
It was not until the 1920s that German nationalists again reached out 
to Germans abroad,109 when German foreign policy discovered ethnicity 
as a political lever following World War I.110 The Versailles Treaty curtailed 
German military, political, and economic might. Cultural approaches were 
often not merely the only affordable means to make international politics, 
but also the only ones accepted by the Allies. Aiming to reverse Versailles, 
the German government, and in particular the German Foreign Office, the 
Auswärtige Amt, believed that it could awaken the ethnic national 
consciousness of Germans around the world and use them politically. The 
United States, which was not only becoming a major global power, but 
also had an enormous number of citizens that were ethnically German, 
became one of the main targets of the cultural foreign policy of Weimar 
Germany, which aimed to rekindle the pride in German heritage through 
culture, language – and history. I will discuss in more detail throughout the 
following chapters the implications of that shift for German migrants in the 
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United States. Here, it should simply be noted that in its increasingly 
racialized manifestations, the post-World War I German nationalism 
emphasized the history of its people to create a symbolic transnational 
unity (particularly in Europe, of course) around the simple argument that 
despite outmigration and diaspora, Germans all over the world had 
retained their traditional character.111  
3. The Historiography of German America 
3.1. Origins and Early Developments up to World War I 
 
Apart from some scattered local and clerical histories largely written by 
amateur historians, there was no professional or scholarly effort to capture 
the German experience in the United States prior to the 1850s. Among the 
first authors to take on such a task was the jurist and historian Franz von 
Löher (1818-1892) who published his Geschichte und Zustände der 
Deutschen in Amerika (“History and Circumstances of the Germans in 
America”) in Cincinnati in 1847.112 Von Löher was a temporary visitor to 
the United States. In fact, having stayed only seven months, he returned 
to Germany the year his book was published and participated in the 
German Revolution the year after. His views were similar to those of other 
liberal revolutionaries, who – before settling in the United States 
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themselves – believed in the achievements of the Auswanderer and 
lamented the Anglo-American establishment’s lack of appreciation for the 
German “element”.  
Von Löher may also have believed in the power of history to unite 
German migrants around an ethnic-national identity that was still in its 
development.113 That belief was more prevalent a few decades later, when 
German American historiography experienced its first scholarly and 
popular impulse. With nativism on the rise, Anglo-American master 
narratives questioned the contributions of German immigrants and 
threatened to further exclude them from the evolving American identity.114 
A new generation of historians attempted to counter that trend by 
establishing a more pluralist vision of the United States. They “saw in 
German American achievements an argument for the retention of their 
own identity and distinction apart from others, and they viewed history as 
the means to preserve and further ethnic group pride and solidarity.”115 
                                                        
113 Don Heinrich Tolzmann, “German-American Studies: History and 
Development,” Monatshefte 80:3 (Fall, 1988), 278-288. 
114 As historian John A. Doyle noted in 1889: “I have preferred to regard the 
history of the United States as the transplantation of English ideas and 
institutions to a distant soil, and the adaptation of them to new wants and altered 
modes of life […] The history of the American colonies is in one sense nothing 
more than a continuation of English history.” John A. Doyle, English Colonies in 
America, Vol 1-5 (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1882-1907), I, 1-2. Doyle was a 
British historian, but his argument stood for one particular school of thought that 
viewed the American colonies as nothing but an extension of the British Empire. 
Even the opposing school of “nationalist” historians saw early American history 
as a product of British democratic culture, if not as one directly tied to the Empire. 
See: Max Savelle, “The Imperial School of American Colonial Historians,” Indiana 
Magazine of History 45:2 (1949), 123–34.  
115 Don Heinrich Tolzmann, “German-American Studies,” 281.  
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Moreover, since they were intimately familiar with the accusations and 
prejudices discussed in the previous section, I argue that they also hoped 
to appease German nationalists back in the old world by highlighting the 
great achievements of their kin in America.116  
Writers like the historian Albert Bernhard Faust (1870-1951), the 
philologist Julius Goebel (1857-1931) or the journalist and painter Richard 
Cronau (1855-1939) were either born or trained in Germany.117 They had 
spent many of their formative years in the old world. And the model of 
German American history they created hinged upon a hybrid nationalism 
molded in the transnational immigrant world that most German migrants 
lived in, a world shaped by their desire to belong as full members to the 
United States, while simultaneously retaining a stake in the evolving 
German nationalism back home. As such, writing German American 
history they developed discursive strategies, to use Eiichiro Azuma’s 
terminology, to position themselves and the ethnic group they purportedly 
spoke for between two evolving empires: Germany and the United 
States.118 
Of course, historiography was only one part of the larger German 
American project that aimed to entrench its culture, its language, and its 
unified political voice firmly in mainstream American life and as a part of 
                                                        
116 Appel, “Marion Dexter Learned,” 290-292. 
117 Faust, born in Baltimore in 1870, was a first generation American, the son of a 
shoemaker from Hessen. Goebel was born in Frankfurt, Germany and Cronau 
originated from Solingen. See Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und 
Volkstumsgedanke, 403-406. 
118 See also Introduction, especially pages 10-14. 
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American national identity. The historian Hans-Werner Retterath has 
recognized three interrelated strategic “pillars” in that struggle: First, the 
idealization of the German American, which meant homogenizing and 
stereotyping groups and individuals by highlighting their virtues and their 
character, both to show achievements past, but also to proscribe a way of 
life to contemporary generations that slowly drifted towards 
Americanism; 119  second, the preservation of language in institutions, 
publications and communities;120and third, a consensual historiography of 
German American achievements.121  
Retterath argues that one of the unique characteristics of German 
American historiography – as opposed to German or American 
historiography – was its assimilatory approach. Whereas German writers 
often attempted to emphasize how migrants had kept separate, German 
American authors aimed to convince their audience that the historic 
achievements of their subjects had helped build the contemporary United 
States, earning them the right to define what it meant to be American.122 
They thus sought to counter nativism and Americanism in the United 
States, increase the self-confidence and pride of German Americans in 
                                                        
119 Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 224-268. 
120 Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 269-302. 
121 Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 303. Retterath 
focuses on the period between the two World Wars and he includes in his study 
a vast number of writers and activists based in Germany. But since the general 
patterns were established before World War I, his observations also help us 
understand the motivations of the German-American authors who operated 
largely from the United States. 
122 Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 304. 
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their own heritage, and establish a collective identity as well as a sense of 
unity among the heterogeneous group of immigrants in the United 
States.123 And they did not, as Kathleen Neils Conzen once noted, accept 
assimilation as “the normal fate of any immigrant group,” but rather literally 
wrote against that assimilation by stressing the historical achievements of 
German immigrants.124  
As early as 1883, German Americans had begun holding annual 
German Days across the country to commemorate their own and their 
ancestors’ achievements. Around the same time, the first histories of 
German America were published.125 In 1886, the first German American 
historical society was founded in Baltimore, others followed in Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania in 1891 and in Chicago, where the German American 
Historical Society of Illinois began publishing its journal, the Deutsch-
Amerikanischen Geschichtsblätter, in 1901.126  
                                                        
123 Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 303. 
124 Conzen, “Paradox,”153.  
125 Charles T. Johnson, Culture at Twilight: The National German-American 
Alliance, 1901-1918 (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 9; Retterath, 
Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 123; Anton Eickhoff, In der 
Neuen Heimath: geschichtliche Mittheilungen über die deutschen Einwanderer in 
allen Theilen der Union (New York: Singer, 1884); Gustav P. Körner, Das 
deutsche Element in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, 1818-1848 
(Cincinnati: A.E. Wilde & Co, 1880). There are very few earlier examples of 
German-American historiography. One is Franz von Löher’s Geschichte und 
Zustände der Deutschen in Amerika. Another is a Cincinnati-based journal called 
Der Deutsche Pionier that collected stories of German achievement and was 
published between 1869 and 1887. 
126 Rudolf Cronau, Drei Jahrhunderte deutschen Lebens in Amerika; eine 
Geschichte der Deutschen in den Vereinigten Staaten (Berlin: D. Reimer, 1909), 
614-615; Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 313; 
Tolzmann, “German-American Studies,” 282. On the role of the historical 
societies, see: Albert B. Faust, “German-American Historical Societies: Their 
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But activities remained scattered and largely unorganized on a national 
level, so that by the late 1890s, German American leaders attempted to 
unite the entire ethnic group in one national organization. In 1901, this led 
to the foundation of the National German-American Alliance (NGAA, 
Deutsch-Amerikanischer Nationalbund), a federation of hundreds of 
German immigrant organizations and by far the largest group ever 
attempting to represent the entire German ethnic group in the United 
States.127 Of course, the NGAA did more than to publish histories. Its self-
proclaimed aims included the unification of German Americans, their 
protection against nativist attacks and the promotion of a good relationship 
between the United States and the German Empire. 128  The NGAA 
organized cultural events, proposed and lobbied for public policies 
supporting the perpetuation of German culture and language in the United 
States. And to drive the latter objective, the NGAA financed a variety of 
historical publications outlining the achievements of German 
immigrants.129 
Importantly, the NGAA was largely run by members of the educated 
middle and upper classes with strong ties to Germany. Charles J. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Achievements and Limitations,” Report: A Journal of German-American History 
28(1953): 21-28. 
127 On the eve of World War I, the NGAA had somewhere between 2 and 2,5 
Million members. Kupsky, The True Spirit, 5-6. For a complete history of the 
organization, see Johnson, Culture at Twilight and Clifton James Child, The 
German-Americans in Politics, 1914-1917 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1939).  
128 Appel, “Marion Dexter Learned,” 294.  
129 Appel, “Marion Dexter Learned,” 294. 
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Hexamer (1862-1921), president of the NGAA from 1901 to 1917 was an 
engineer and the son of a failed 1848 revolutionary who had fled Germany 
in 1856.130 The German-born and educated Rudolf Cronau, famous for his 
paintings of the Sioux, continued publishing his articles in middle-class 
German magazines like Die Gartenlaube long after he had permanently 
settled down in the United States.131  Richard Bartholdt (1855-1932), a 
Congressman from St. Louis who arrived in the United States as a 
sixteen-year old adolescent in 1862, pressed for the official incorporation 
of the NGAA in Congress in 1907 and was a frequent visitor to the 
homeland until his death.132 And Dr. Marion Dexter Learned (1857-1917), 
Professor of German at the University of Pennsylvania, who edited the two 
NGAA publications, the academic Americana Germanica as well as the 
bulletin Mitteilungen, was a key member of the transatlantic academic 
network that drove the advancement of German Studies in the United 
States.133 All of these men had distinct ties to the German bourgeoisie, a 
                                                        
130 Johnson, Culture in Twilight, 5-9. 
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Steuben Society,” http://steubensociety.org/News/MayJun06.htm (retrieved: 
December 18, 2015).  
132 Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 401. 
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University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), 16-25. Other board members included 
Hermann Carl George Brandt (1870-1920), a German-born linguist who taught 
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personal and professional interest in preserving German culture in the 
United States – and limited insights on the experiences of working class 
German immigrants across the country. Their social bias may, in fact, be 
the common denominator in a group that was still highly diverse in 
regional, religious, and political backgrounds. 
It is an important aspect of this historiography – one that I will explore 
in much greater detail in Chapter 4 – that many of the texts coming out of 
this network never reached a mass audience, for one because they were 
written from a vantage point representing the authors’ social perspective. 
As the historian John Appel has shown, among the members of the GAHS, 
there was an outspoken disdain for “popular” or “readable” books.134 This 
is surprising given their objective to awaken widespread awareness 
among America’s German migrants for their past achievements. Oddly 
enough, writers who otherwise praised the agency and achievements of 
their subjects, particularly working-class “pioneers”, explicitly excluded 
them from reading their texts.135 This aspects is a striking example of the 
gap between myth and reality discussed in the previous section, a 
disconnect that prevented German American historiography from ever 
making an impact, either in academia or the public mind. Whereas Italian 
                                                                                                                                                       
who later “presented the Allied cause in America” (Cornell Daily Sun, September 
21, 1921, n.p.).  
134 Appel, “Marion Dexter Learned,” 300. See also Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 
137 
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and Irish American ethnic cultures were rooted in the working class, 
German American culture was frequently not.  
*** 
As noted above, a deeply political, revisionist and consensual 
historiography was an essential tool identified by the NGAA to reach its 
aims of unification and advancement. “To value something,” Hexamer 
argued in 1901, “one must know its history.”136 To pass on that knowledge, 
the NGAA encouraged the foundation of local and regional historical 
associations, explicitly in order to include the contributions of German 
Americans in the history of the United States. In 1901, the NGAA also 
created a national organization, the German-American Historical Society 
(GAHS), to coordinate its activities and homogenize the message. 137 
Based at the University of Pennsylvania, the GAHS published an 
academic journal, the Americana Germanica, renamed the German-
American Annals in 1903.138 Americana Germanica had been founded in 
1897, four years before the GAHS made it its official organ, and its board 
members represented the highest echelons of American academia 
including the University of Chicago’s Starr W. Cutting (1868-1935), Faust 
of Cornell,139 and Harvard University’s Kuno Francke (1855-1930), who 
                                                        
136 Quoted in: Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 134. 
137 Appel, “Marion Dexter Learned,” 299. Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und 
Volkstumsgedanke, 312/3. 
138 Appel, “Marion Dexter Learned,” 291 and 299. Kazal, 135. 
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devoted a lifetime to developing and curating the Germanic Museum 
there. 140  The German-American Annals focused on the historical and 
present-day achievements of German Americans, with special 
considerations to language and literature.141  While ostensibly objective 
and academic, the journal always provided ample room to make the 
political case for “German Achievement in America,” for example when it 
reprinted an eponymous speech given by NGAA president C.J. Hexamer 
at Madison Square Garden in New York in November 1902, in which he 
praised the historic accomplishments of German migrants.142  
But it was the historical monographs written by and for the NGAA that 
would permanently transform the historiography of German America. In 
March 1904, the Germanic Department of the University of Chicago 
announced the Conrad Seipp Memorial Prizes, donated by Mrs. Catherine 
Seipp in memory of her late husband, a successful German American 
brewer. The prizes were to be awarded to the three best monographs 
written in German American history, or more precisely on “The German 
Element in the United States with Special Reference to Its Political, Moral, 
Social, and Educational Influence.” The books were to number roughly 
                                                                                                                                                       
Wägenbaur et al, Internationales Germanistenlexikon, 1800-1950 (Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter, 2003), 473-475. 
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800 pages in volume and could be written in either German or English.143 
The three members of the committee to select the winners were 
Professors Hanno Deiler (1849-1909) of Tulane 144 , Bryn Mawr’s Karl 
Detlev Jessen (1872-1919)145 and the famous pioneer historian Frederick 
Jackson Turner (1861-1932), then a Professor of history at the University 
of Wisconsin.146  
The first price of $3,000 was eventually awarded to Albert Bernhard 
Faust’s two volume The German Element in the United States (1909). 
Faust, a regular contributor to the Annals, approached the subject from a 
strictly academic point of view. At the time, his book fulfilled all standards 
of the historical discipline and was praised, by one reviewer, for “its 
scholarly thoroughness, its impartiality, its logical arrangement, and its 
interesting style.” 147  Its comprehensive approach made it “both 
indispensible and suggestive to all subsequent workers in German and 
                                                        
143 See announcement for the Conrad Seipp Memorial Prize in The Stanford 
Daily, Volume XXV: 26, 4 October 1904.  
144 Deiler was himself a prolific scholar of German-American history in the New 
Orleans area. “At a time when immigration was dwindling, and the majority of the 
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American history”.148 In fact, Faust’s book still stands out single-handedly 
as the defining work on German America of that time. It was reprinted as 
late as 1995 and favorably reviewed as late as 2005.149  
The committee awarded the second prize, worth $2,000, to Rudolf 
Cronau’s Drei Jahrhunderte deutschen Lebens in Amerika (“Three 
Centuries of German Life in America”). Cronau had first visited the United 
States in the 1880s to report about the American West for the bourgeois 
magazine Die Gartenlaube. After permanently relocating to the United 
States in 1901, he became involved in German American organizations 
and wrote extensively about the migrant experience in the United 
States.150 Published in German only, his book went through two editions in 
                                                        
148 Cornell University Faculty Memorial Statement:  
http://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/bitstream/1813/17833/1/Faust_Albert_Bernh
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1909 and 1924, reaching a broad audience in the United States and in 
Germany. Like the third-prize winner, Georg von Bosse’s Das deutsche 
Element in den Vereinigten Staaten (1904), its aim was to rekindle the 
relationship between Germany and German America by highlighting the 
achievements of German migrants in the United States, both with regards 
to their prosperity and to the preservation of German language and culture 
abroad.151 
In essence, all these histories shared a joint perspective that attempted 
to establish the impact of German virtues – loyalty, modesty, diligence, 
efficiency, frugality, sense of duty – on the “New World” from the 
beginning of European discovery: The authors “found” Germans among 
the Vikings, Germans in Jamestown, Germans in New Amsterdam, 
Germans on the frontier. They described the diligence of German settlers, 
hailed the bravery of their military achievements – for example by General 
von Steuben in the Revolutionary War and the countless Germans fighting 
in the Civil War – and praised the loyalty of contemporary German 
Americans, whose character and personality made them ideal assets to 
the United States.152  The suggestion was, as Russell Kazal has aptly 
summarized “that Germans did not simply contribute to the progress of 
                                                        
151 Alt, “The Ideology of American Germanics,” 18. Other books written in the 
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America but counted among its founders—just as much as Anglo-
Americans, if not more so.”153 
German American historiography was always written in a transnational 
context of two competing, increasingly aggressive nationalisms that could 
hardly be combined into one, hyphenated hybrid identity. That, as 
discussed above, was the tragedy of German America, as the British 
historian John Hawgood would describe it in the 1940s. The effect of this 
transnational intermingling was that German migrant historians lent 
heavily from their colleagues back home, engaging in, for example, 
aggressively anti-English arguments as well as constant laments about 
the lack of appreciation that American historiography showed for the 
German achievements. 154  “How often have American circles hated, 
ridiculed and even persecuted the strange, but noble German ways,” 
Julius Goebel, head of the German Department at Stanford, 
complained.155  Somewhat more cautiously, A.B. Faust simply declared 
“the prominence of the Germans as a formative element of the American 
people, their continuous participation in the labors of peace and the 
                                                        
153 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 135. 
154 Appel, “Marion Dexter Learned,” 292, Fn 18. Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 135. 
155 Goebel, Deutsche Element, 6. For a brief bibliography on Goebel, see 
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burdens of war, suggested a need of a record of the essential facts in their 
history.”156  
Noticeably, some authors also attempted to refute accusations by 
German writers, who criticized the absence of a cohesive German culture 
in the United States. And if they admitted that absence, they blamed it at 
least in part on Germans back home. 157  Again, Goebel: “It is 
incomprehensible that the children of the nation [des Volkes] that 
produced the greatest historians of the modern era did so little to foster 
the memory of its past in the world.” Interestingly, Goebel largely blamed 
this absence on the failures of German aristocracy to comprehend, protect 
and respect emigrants. “Too shortsighted and narrow-minded to 
comprehend the value of overseas settlements and unable to accompany 
the Auswanderer to America, they sought to characterize the 
Auswanderer as a criminal.” Goebel continues: 
Back then, the heinously ridiculous view may have 
developed and spread that is still widespread today, that the 
Auswanderer to America were forever lost to the fatherland. 
And since then Germany has burdened itself with the 
unforgivable guilt of not taking care of the weal and woe 
[Wohl und Wehe] of its emigrated children […].  158  
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transcend ethnic boundaries and argues for cultural pluralism, see Edward F. 
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By merging German middle-class values with well-known 
characteristics of American ideal types – the frontier, or self-made man; 
the soldier; etc – German American authors attempted to create a valid 
hyphenated identity that would allow them to celebrate the culture they 
loved while regaining the cultural capital to participate in the American 
public sphere. Or, in the words of Rudolf Cronau: “the reverent love which 
the Germans bear the land of their birth in no way tends to diminish the 
loyalty which they owe to the country of their adoption.”159  
3.2. German American Historiography after World War I 
 
World War I dealt a serious blow to all efforts to entrench historical 
German achievements in American national identity. Prior to the U.S. 
entry into the war, the NGAA, many of its members, and countless other 
German American organizations openly lobbied for American neutrality 
and called for a weapons embargo against the Allies, specifically against 
Great Britain.160 In the nationalist backlash that followed, many German 
American organizations yielded to the public pressures and disappeared 
from public view, as did the NGAA, which dissolved in April 1918 already 
under investigation from the federal government for its disloyal 
activities.161 The German-American Annals published its final two issues in 
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Child, German-American in Politics, 43-64;  
161 Johnson, Culture at Twilight, 157. “German-American Alliance Dead,” New 
York Times 01 Aug 1918, 6. Affirmed their loyalty: “GERMAN-AMERICANS 
  
 
65
1919 with a total of three contributions, none of which touched upon 
German culture in the United States.162 Some professional careers ended 
during the war, such as Detlev Jessen’s, who had once judged upon the 
best monograph in German American history and whose German classes 
at Bryn Mawr simply ceased attracting students in 1918. 163  At the 
University of Michigan, the Iowa native Carl E. Eggert and the German 
citizen Ewald Boucke, both of the German Department, were dismissed 
for allegations of “pro-German” activities, along with three other 
colleagues. Enrollment in the Germanic Studies programs subsequently 
plummeted from 1300 to 150.164 
Beyond such disparate and anecdotal instances, however, the 
academic careers of those involved in attempting to rewrite German 
American history continued largely undisturbed. For example, Alexander R. 
Hohlfeld (1865-1956), a constant board member of the Annals from its first 
to its final issue, remained on the faculty of the Wisconsin German 
Department from 1901 until he retired in 1936. While there, he supervised 
25 major works on Anglo-German literary relations, training scholars that 
“assumed leading positions in German departments and professional 
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organization” across the United States. 165  Kuno Francke (1855-1930), 
whose moderate affirmation of his German heritage was favorably 
reviewed by the New York Times in 1916, retained his position as the 
curator of the German Museum at Harvard until 1929, a year before his 
death.166 And Albert Bernhard Faust, the author of the German Element, 
stayed at Cornell until he retired in 1938 with his reputation intact – 
despite having received honors for his work in Germany as late as 1937. 
Upon his death in 1951, the university praised his work and bemoaned the 
loss of “a member who, by his personality, his writings, and his teaching, 
has contributed much to [the university’s] lasting distinction.”167 Like the 
ethnic leadership, most regional and local historical societies continued 
their work largely uninterrupted throughout World War I and beyond.168 
At the same time, the post-war era offered plenty of space for new 
voices in German American studies. The most influential was Carl Wittke, 
a second-generation American, whose research focused especially on the 
German-language press and the Forty-Eighters. As Don Heinrich 
Tolzmann noted in 1988: “Although affected by the assimilationist 
perspective of his time, his work contributed to reestablishing German 
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American history as an area of study and research, and it remains a point 
of departure for a number of fields."169 Wittke was indeed influenced by 
the historiographical trends of time – particularly the “Melting Pot” theory 
of immigrant assimilation and Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis.170 
But he argued that German Americans, though ultimately unsuccessful, 
fought assimilation much longer than other ethnic groups.171 
Wittke’s career – and many others – showed that even though the 
attraction of German language, history and culture as a field of study 
suffered during and immediately after the war, the 1920s offered plenty of 
opportunity for its resurgence. Weimar Germany and the United States 
edged much closer both politically and culturally during the decade. As a 
rising global superpower, the United States depended on Germany as an 
economic and political partner in the rebuilding of Central Europe.172 And 
New York still had the second-largest German population after Berlin, an 
important electorate to appease. As New York mayor Jimmy Walker, in 
office from 1926 to 1932, aptly concluded: “I don’t know who started the 
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Significance of the Frontier in American History, ed. Harold P. Simonson (New 
York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1963), 27. 
171 Carl Wittke, German-Americans and the World War; Carl Wittke, “Ohio’s 
Germans, 1840-1875,” Ohio Historical Quarterly 66:4 (October, 1957): 339-54; 
Carl Wittke, We Who Built America: The Saga of the Immigrant (New York: 
Prentice Hall, 1939). 
172 See Chapter 2, Section 4.  
  
 
68
war and I don’t know who won it, but what I do know is this: let’s forget it 
for once and for all!”173  
Many German Americans, however, did not simply forget the period – 
they strove for the full redemption of their ethnic group. To them, the war 
had shown that the United States did not appreciate its German element 
and those that had felt persecuted before the war had seen their worst 
suspicions become a reality. For them, now was the time to reestablish 
German immigrant culture as part of the American Way. At the same time, 
they were acutely aware they needed a change of tone to appease and 
appeal to the American public. When former members of the NGAA 
founded its successor organization, the Steuben Society of America (SSA) 
in 1919,174 they dropped the rhetorical belligerence, installed English as its 
operating language and only admitted American citizens.175  Instead of 
overstressing ethnic pride and separatism, the SSA crafted its public 
message in a language more palatable to an American audience. Its 
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official mission, for example, was merely “to arouse citizens of German 
descent to a greater sense of their civic and political duties and rights.”176  
Nonetheless, the focus on common roots and the “arousal” of ethnic 
awareness remained at the center of the SSAs activities. As did its 
mission “to keep alive the many noble contributions that persons of 
German birth and ancestry have contributed to [the] country.”177 Just like 
the NGAA, the SSA thus had its own historical association, the Concord 
Society (CS).178 Recounting the history of German achievement in the 
United States was, according to Victor Richter, its secretary, “the 
precondition of all political work by Americans of German heritage.”179 And 
Frederick Franklin Schrader, its first president, told the Journal in 
Milwaukee, where the CS was headquartered, that his organization aimed 
“to reawaken a feeling of pride in the achievements of great Americans of 
German extraction […]. A new spirit is ready to assert itself in reclaiming 
for the German race on this continent its just dues.”180  
Not surprisingly, then, the books and articles on German American 
history that were published during the 1920s largely pursued the same 
                                                        
176 Wala, “Reviving Ethnic Identity,” 331. FN 14.  
177 Mission statement of the Milwaukee Steuben Society. See: 
https://search.library.wisc.edu/catalog/999463650302121 (accessed February 18, 
2016). 
178 Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 305 and 367. The 
“Concord” was the ship that brought the first German settlers across the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
179 Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 313.  
180 Milwaukee Journal August 29, 1920, 10.  
  
 
70
arguments as those before the war. 181  They aimed to preserve the 
memory of the heroic deeds committed by German immigrants throughout 
American history and they strove to (re-)awaken the “justifiable race-pride” 
of German Americans in those contributions. 182  They also displayed 
immigrants in line with German expectations, as cultural preservers of 
“Germanness.” Take for example, this passage from Frederick Franklin 
Schrader’s The Germans in the Making of America (1924): “The Teutonic 
race is inherently a race of naturalists and of land and home seekers, and 
deep and abiding as is the love of the individual German for his native 
land, the romantic tendency of his nature […] has carried him to the 
remotest corners of the earth in his individualistic capacity, and accounts 
of traces of his presence in almost all early exploring expeditions.”183 In 
the interwar years, the idealized German immigrant as pioneer and self-
made man, always true to his German roots, increasingly served a political 
purpose, namely to invoke the common historical bonds between 
                                                        
181 Apart from the second editions of Cronau’s and Faust’s books, which 
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Germany and the United States, to rekindle that cooperation and, as a 
consequence, to defend the German right of self-assertion. As Hans-
Werner Retterath notes, historical events were selectively accentuated 
and exploited to comment on current political and economic affairs, for 
example by overemphasizing the historical cooperation between the 
United States and Germany’s predecessor states or the involvement of 
“German” soldiers in American wars, especially the War of Independence 
and the Civil War.184   
However, when U.S. and German politics once more drifted further and 
further apart in the late 1920s and 1930s, it became near impossible for 
individuals and organizations to navigate this treacherous mélange of 
conflicting national interests, whether they focused on history, language, 
culture, or politics. Those that attempted to do so were inevitably 
confronted with a political backlash that threatened careers and, in the 
case of ethnic organizations, their mere survival. In Philadelphia, the 
Deutscher Klub und Technischer Verein (“German Club and Technical 
Association”), struggled to arbitrate between its moderate and its 
increasingly radicalized ethnic-nationalist members (see also Chapter 4). 
Another example of such transnational conflict is that of the Carl Schurz 
Memorial Foundation (CSMF), a heavily endowed organization devoted to 
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German language teaching, education exchange and cultural preservation, 
which produced several historical works,185 cultivated connections to the 
Weimar Republic and, later, the Third Reich. The CSMF was, by all 
accounts, the only organization capable of driving a politically motived 
historiographical agenda during the late 1920s and 1930s. And it 
attempted as much, establishing its publication, the American-German 
Review, “as the central organ of publication for German-American studies 
[…]. Because of its slick format and popular style it attained a sizable 
readership consisting of the interested German-American public as well as 
scholars.”186 As Gregory Kupsky has shown, the CSMF’s members saw 
“closer intellectual relations between the United States and Germany” as a 
way to enrich their domestic program. Despite strong internal opposition 
against cooperation with the Third Reich, the CSMF eventually pursued a 
pro-German agenda and intended its publications, historical and otherwise, 
“to inoculate the American public against the ‘distortions’ of the 
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mainstream press.” 187  Ultimately, the CSMF lost many of its most 
influential members and much of its American support over its inability to 
sever its ties from Nazi Germany.188  
Beyond the pressures of American disapproval, German Americans 
found it difficult to divest from Nazism due to the aggressive involvement 
of the Nazis in German American affairs. Beginning in 1933, the new 
National Socialist government pursued geopolitical influence through 
cultural programs between Germany and the United States, particularly 
German America. According to the historian Cornelia Wilhelm, such plans 
included a historiographical agenda that aimed to make U.S. history 
appear more “German.” Attempting to create a strategic partnership 
between both countries, the Nazis wanted to “’educate’ […] the Germans 
in America of their supposed ‘Germanness’ and to win their sympathy for 
Germany.”189 Ignoring the heterogeneous origins of America’s Germans, 
the Nazis “imagined that they could rely on the exaggerated number of 20 
million ‘Germans’ in America.”190  
While such designs were doomed to fail, their success with many 
German Americans historians seriously damaged the reputation of the 
field – in the 1930s and beyond. A good example of this development is 
the engagement of Heinz Kloss, an amateur historian sponsored by the 
                                                        
187 Kupsky, The True Spirit, 204. 
188 Kupsky, The True Spirit, 205-207 
189 Cornelia Wilhelm, “Nazi Propaganda and the Uses of the Past: Heinz Kloss 
and the Making of a ‘German America,’” Amerikastudien / American Studies 47:1 
(2002), 55-83, here: 56 and 58. 
190 Wilhelm, “Nazi Propaganda,” 59. 
  
 
74
Nazis, who collaborated with various German American organizations, 
including the CSMF. In 1937 Heinz Kloss even suggested the foundation 
of an “American-German research institute” at the behest of the CSMF, an 
idea that was thwarted by the increasing tensions between Germany and 
the United States.191 Among German Americans there was little resistance 
to Kloss’ non-scientific approach. His work imbued German American 
historiography with a view of ethnicity that defined “Germanness” around 
racialized values and characteristics. 192  According to Wilhelm, Kloss 
claimed that “all German people shared a common essence, which united 
them and which was manifested in the traditions, folkways, crafts, 
language and relationship with the soil […].”193 Furthermore, following now 
familiar narratives, in his 1937 book Um die Einigung des 
Deutschamerikanertums, Kloss overemphasized the importance of 
German American organizations and achievements, and lamented the 
lack of appreciation thereof by mainstream American historiography.194  
All together, it was an approach that one reviewer rightfully dismissed 
as “wishful thinking” but too many others applauded.195 The inability to 
reject such racist views ultimately led German American historiography to 
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write itself into the margins of academia and American public life during 
the 1930s.  
Of course there were those who tried. In his review of John Hawgood’s 
book The Tragedy of German-America, quoted in the opening paragraphs 
of this chapter, Dieter Cunz196 criticized the absence of scientific, objective 
studies on German America. According to Cunz,  
the consistent attitude of most German-American historians 
is apologetic. Based on the feeling that the merits of the 
German element in America have always been unduly 
ignored, they elevate and push the contributions of the 
Germans in such an untenable and blatant tone that every 
decent German blushes as a consequence.197  
 
Indeed, it was hard not to notice the hyperbole and cultural chauvinism 
permeating the pages of German American historiography before World 
War II. Readers learned only, to quote Rudolf Cronau, “of the glorious past 
of the German element in America, of its well-nigh endless record of 
achievements and sacrifices on behalf of the nation, of its enduring 
patriotism when others failed of their duty or knew not where to turn.”198 
Instead of producing balanced accounts, which displayed the modesty 
they purportedly valued as characteristically “German,” German American 
authors created a mythical past that offered at best a fraction of the history 
it purported to represent and had little foundation in actual scientific 
                                                        
196 Cunz was himself a recent émigré to the United States. He eventually 
published several studies on Germans in Maryland.  
197 Dieter Cunz, “Die Deutsch-Amerikaner,” 343-348. 
198 Cronau, German Achievements in America, 7. 
  
 
76
research. Their work helped manifest a mythologized imagery of the 
devout German settler on the frontier – cultural, educated, religious, hard-
working – that may have inspired some readers. But it did not resemble 
the urban reality that many German Americans now experienced. In fact, 
life in the industrial city – which was the predominant reality for German 
Americans at the time, was hardly mentioned at all.199 To make matters 
worse, such ethnic-nationalist accounts could only meet with the 
resistance of most American readers during the late 1920s and 1930s. Not 
only did the United States and Germany drift towards a military conflict, 
the period was also marked by the cultural juxtaposition of the American 
Way and the totalitarianism of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany.200 The 
consequence, in short, was an almost complete submergence of German 
American historiography during the 1940s and 1950s. 
4. Ethnic Revival and the Continuities in German American Studies 
 
It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that the historiography 
of German America once more received a serious scholarly impulse from 
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academia. This was in part thanks to a renewed popular interest in the 
immigrant past. During the ethnic revival of the 1960s many European 
Americans began to search for and to celebrate their Old World roots.201 
In academia, immigration scholars of the new social history became 
interested in examining the story of their immigrated ancestors back in the 
old world202 as well as from a variety of new perspectives, including race, 
gender, and class. This period brought forth countless reinvigorating 
approaches to the history of German America from scholars like Kathleen 
Neils Conzen, Werner Sollors and Walter Kamphoefner, to name just 
three prominent examples. 203  Moreover, it coincided with a renewed 
interest in the study of migration in Germany, where academics had 
largely avoided the topic since World War II.204 The 1980s and 1990s thus 
saw a substantial increase of serious scholarship with special emphases 
on the history of German labor migration to the United States,205  the 
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unearthing of female migration histories as well as the role of gender in 
the migration process,206 and immigrant letters.207  
However, this did not lead to the rejuvenation of German American 
studies as an academic field. The reason for that failure is complicated, 
but part of it lies, I believe, once more in the inability of German American 
organizations to adequately address their complicated past. Unlike 
German society itself, which was forced to work through its involvement 
with National Socialism and the Holocaust, German Americans could 
ostensibly look back at their ethnic-cultural roots without too much regret. I 
suggest that the existence of countless grassroots ethnic historical 
societies, made up not only of professional scholars, but also of amateur 
historians with a personal stake in German American historiography, has 
done much to delay that process. More precisely, the persistent emphasis 
on immigrant contributions and achievements, on the same markers of 
“Germanness” – language, high culture, etc. – as well as the lack of 
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scholarly impulses from and exchanges with American academia as a 
whole, has left German American history on the sidelines. 
I want to briefly outline some examples of such continuities. First, there 
was a continued focus on “contributions” in too many influential histories of 
German America written in the United States that I reviewed for this 
chapter. Ubiquitous examples include Henry A. Pochman’s 800-page 
investigation of German Culture in America, published in 1961, which finds 
traces of German philosophical and literary influence everywhere in 
American life and in the works of many famous Americans, from Samuel 
Longfellow through Ambrose Bierce, Henry James and, of course, Mark 
Twain; 208  Richard O’Connor’s admittedly non-academic treatise, which 
attempts to discover “what social and historical impact the German-
American has made on the United States”; 209  and LaVern Rippley 
declaration in The German-Americans (1976), still a standard history, that 
he aimed to “demonstrate the tremendous impact which the German 
immigrants in the United States exercised on the cultural growth of 
America”.210  
Another continuity that I find troubling is the largely uncritical and 
persisting use of the term “German element.”211 Its origins in immigration 
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history have not yet been adequately analyzed, but it certainly predates 
Faust, who utilized it in the title of his 1909 history of German migration to 
the United States, The German Element in the United States. During the 
early 1900s, many ethnic historians applied the term to various different 
groups – it was part of the common academic vocabulary.212 However, the 
term suggests an essentialized, even racialized understanding of 
humanity that is not only completely outdated but should be treated with 
special care by those dealing with German history, whether “at home” or 
“abroad.”213 This is not to suggest that I believe any of the authors who 
used or use the term are beholden to the essentialized values of a bygone 
age. But I do think it signifies a certain resistance to critical thinking and 
innovation necessary to further and keep alive the study of an immigrant 
group.  
Finally, it is perhaps the survival of the “idealized immigrant” of turn-of-
the-century historiography that is most surprising and most troubling. 
Rather than questioning this trope utilizing the scholarly resources 
available on both sides of the Atlantic, author after author simply copied 
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the hard-working and diligent “German,” an archetype established more 
than a century ago by those still dreaming of an American way of life 
defined by its German immigrant minority. Take for example, Carl Wittke’s 
1936 history of German-Americans and the World War, which describes 
“millions of enterprising, thrifty, and law-abiding [German] settlers who 
came to the United States to make it their permanent home.” Wittke 
continues: 
Artisans, tradesmen, farmers, highly-trained professional 
men—they had been welcomed as valuable additions to the 
American population. The German-American element took a 
natural and pardonable pride in the phenomenal progress 
made by the Fatherland, especially after 1870, and tried to 
preserve their cultural heritage in the new country as long as 
possible by supporting newspapers and countless 
organizations which should keep alive their language, their 
music, their literature, and their entire German 
Lebensanschauung, in a new environment. But their real 
home was America. Here they established their families and 
often achieved the prosperity which the old Fatherland had 
denied them. They became American citizens and played, 
for the most part, an important and honorable and 
sometimes distinguished role in public affairs.214 
 
A decade later, Wittke again introduced German Americans as  
the patient, home-loving, philosophic, phlegmatic, plodding 
German peasant and artisan, who settled in the city to ply 
his trade and, by thrift and industry, acquired a home, or who 
went into the West to become a farmer in the prairie country. 
The German represented the plain, homely virtues of 
perseverance, patience, thrift, and respect for authority, with 
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just enough idealism to save and build homes in the New 
World.215 
 
In 1962, the historian John J. Appel built on Wittke’s model to portray 
German immigrants as those who merely “desired a secure, stable family 
life more than riches or adventure and who preserved, with inevitable 
modifications, many of the social, economic, religious and cultural patterns 
of the homeland.” 216  Paraphrasing Wittke, Appel argued that German 
migrants “resisted Americanization longer than most other European 
nationalities.”217 That same year, Theodor Huebener, then the head of the 
Department of Foreign Languages in the New York City public school 
system, published a book called Germans in America. In his 
acknowledgements, Huebener readily admitted that for a lack of better 
sources he relied heavily on Faust’s German Element and Wittke’s We 
Who Built America. Consequently, his narrative was built around the same 
stereotypical depictions of heroic, noble German settlers, who never forgot 
their German heritage. For example, in a chapter called “The German – 
The Fearless Frontiersman” Huebener writes:  
                                                        
215 Wittke, We Who Built America, 187. This is not to say that such arguments did 
not have their raison d’etre or lacked scholarly merit. Wittke, for his part, was an 
excellent historian with a long list of achievements. A professor at the University 
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Tragedy of German-America in this instance. 
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The German pioneers were a sturdy lot, their women 
working in the woods and fields together with the men. They 
were honest and thrifty, but because of the difference in 
language, they generally refrained from taking positions of 
leadership in the community. That may explain why they 
have not been given adequate mention in the average 
American history text. 
 
Huebener’s style was not quite as chauvinistic as that of his turn-of-the-
century predecessors, but the message is the same: Despite Hawgood’s 
findings that Germans had indeed rather preferred the safety of urban 
America, Germans once more appear as sturdy, honorable pioneers, who 
preserved their language abroad and paid the price with their secondary 
role in the United States and the amnesia of American history.218 
This brand of history as attracted its critics before me. As early as 1976, 
Patricia Herminghouse lamented that not only did early historians like 
Faust still provide the most definite accounts, unfortunately, “their 
[academic] approach has seldom been transcended either. With varying 
degrees of popularization, almost every book available today on the 
Germans in America is written in the same filiopietistic, positivistic vein 
with little serious analysis of the effects of the American experience on the 
                                                        
218 Consequently, Dieter Cunz reviewed the book unfavorably. Praising Huebener 
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immigrants.” 219  With the exceptions of some works, Herminghouse 
concluded, “it seems reasonable to assume that the ethnocentrism of 
most of the existing materials and the tainted past of some of the research 
contributed to a general shunning of the whole field.”220 
Perhaps worse, in recent years, there has been a deterioration of 
scholarly standards. In his review of two then recent works on German 
Americana between the two World Wars, historian Jeffrey Sammons had 
to realize the debate on German American internment during World War II 
was not only tainted by unscholarly representations and the willful 
misinterpretation of data but that other colleagues in the field, while 
similarly disconcerted, had resigned themselves to “a feeling of 
helplessness.” Sammons alerted his readers “to a deterioration of 
scholarly standards” in the discipline and warned: “If we do not maintain 
vigilance about standards and integrity, we run the risk of losing the 
respect of a constituency that I think we do not always sufficiently 
consider: our academic colleagues in other disciplines.”221 
                                                        
219 Herminghouse, “German-American Studies,” 5.  
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Sammons criticized what he deemed fabricated evidence of a 
widespread “campaign” that argued the German American community was 
the victim of persecution during World War II. In a similar case in 2001, 
Ron Robin attacked Stephen Fox, author of America’s Invisible Gulag for 
Fox’ pseudo-scientific attempt in “victimology” and criticized “the author’s 
inability or unwillingness to distinguish between the bearers of indignities 
and those who confronted existential threats.” 222  There is, in fact, no 
credible evidence of any widespread persecution or internment of German 
Americans in the United States comparable to the fate of Japanese 
Americans.  
Indeed, the comparison suggested in Fox’ title seems inappropriate, 
but the larger point here is a different one: There seems to be an 
unwillingness or a lack of serious scholarly interest in bridging the gap 
between victimization and vilification, between the “Good German” and the 
Nazi, in historical accounts of German Americana between the two World 
Wars. German American Studies has repeatedly failed to adjust to critical 
developments in modern academic scholarship or to come to terms with 
its convoluted past. An in-depth analysis of that failure would go beyond 
the scope of this chapter – indeed it seems to me that a critical 
examination of German American studies as a field is long overdue.  
                                                                                                                                                       
H-Ethnic, H-Net Reviews, December, 2003. Available online at http://www.h-
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222 Ron Robin, Review of Fox, Stephen, “America's Invisible Gulag: A Biography 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In a 2011 volume on the future of German American Studies, its 
editors Cora Lee Kluge and Mark Louden argued that in the past three 
decades the field had “reinvented” itself. Contrary to the 1980s, the 
authors argue, it now offered “a wide range of interdisciplinary 
perspectives […], community history, art history, historical geography, 
political science, law, immigration studies, literature, folklore, music, 
language, and linguistics.” 223  Looking back at more than a century of 
German American Studies in general, and specifically its historiography, I 
would suggest that this is not much of an improvement, not to speak of a 
“reinvention”. Literature, folklore, music, language, and linguistics have 
always been at the center of a discipline attempting to find a presence of 
“Germanness” in the United States strongly based on the characteristics 
proscribed a century ago by the proponents of Deutschtum on both sides 
of the Atlantic.  
The authors continue: “No longer seen as relics of an uninteresting 
past, the contributions and traditions of immigrants from German lands are 
now viewed as an integral part of our country’s fabric,” they write, once 
more reiterating a claim that is as old as German American Studies 
itself.224 The obliviousness is all the more startling considering the fact that 
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the volume itself includes chapters, whose authors criticize old narratives 
of “contributions” and victimization. Walter Kamphoefner’s excellent piece 
on “Elvis and other Germans,” for example, rightly demands research 
beyond characters that fit into existing patterns. Suggesting one route, 
Kamphoefner calls for more research into the roots of anti-Communism 
using such prominent characters as Joseph McCarthy, who grew up in 
and was politically supported by the Catholic German community in rural 
Wisconsin. There is a German contribution worth looking into.225 Moreover, 
Kamphoefner also suggests opening up the field to transnational 
investigations of American religious history and argues that German 
American Studies has much to learn from the blooming research on 
Hispanic Americans.226 In the ensuing chapters I will aim to transcend 
traditional boundaries of Germanness in the hope of developing new ways 
to talk about the historical and present-day traces of German migrants in 
the United States. 
 
                                                        
225 Kamphoefner, “Elvis and other Germans,” 43, see also: Kathleen Neils 
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Chapter 2: “[H]ere you are only a foreigner and a German one at 
that” - Immigration, Citizenship, and Belonging after World War I 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During and after World War I, many German Americans felt like 
second-rate citizens in the United States and a great number of them 
expressed frustration with their status as Americans of German descent. 
For example, Paul Schulze from Manchester, New Hampshire, who had 
immigrated in 1892, complained that “here, the German only counts, when 
he has to do his duty, but when he asks for his rights, he is only a 
foreigner.”227 Similarly, Käte Küchler from New York, a more recent arrival 
in the United States, lamented that “here you are only a foreigner and a 
German one at that.”228  
There were, of course, many reasons why German Americans felt 
rejected in the interwar period. Much of it had to do with the anti-German 
atmosphere caused by World War I and, later, the racist, exclusionary, 
and belligerent policies of the National Socialists. Another reason was the 
shared sense among German immigrants that they should be afforded a 
status superior to, for example, immigrants from Eastern or Southern 
Europe (see also Chapter 3). However, many Germans also struggled 
with the new realities of the interwar years, which forced them to negotiate 
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increasingly absolutist definitions of Americanness and Germanness. In 
the global order arising after World War I, states increasingly attempted to 
police and control populations around a set of new values and obligations. 
The respective national implications of this process were shaped not 
merely by lawmakers but in an ongoing public discourse, in which many 
Americans actively participated. I argue in this chapter that German 
immigrants to the United States weathered this storm – much like other 
ethnic groups – within a transnational framework that included the political, 
social, and cultural realms of old home and new home. By pushing back 
against nativists, who tried to force them to give up their religions, 
languages, and histories, German Americans helped transform the norms 
and values of the changing United States. However, while many 
successfully embraced key aspects of Americanization, such as English 
language and American history and simultaneously used the tenets of 
American democracy as a defense of their cultural differences, others 
were left frustrated with a sense of “inbetweenness” that was impossible to 
reconcile with such exclusive definitions of national identity. 
In this chapter I first lay out the global developments, which led to the 
manifestation of stronger boundaries between nation-states and the 
apparatuses designed to police them. Next, I discuss the respective 
implications of this process in the United States and Germany, focusing in 
particular on the increasing significance of “Germanness Abroad” during 
the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, I examine how immigrants could utilize 
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letters to organizations back in Germany like the VDA to navigate these 
two competing identities and stake out a space for their own transnational 
negotiations of belonging. 
2. The “Golden Age” of Identification: The Global Politics of 
Citizenship and Belonging 
 
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, during much of the 
nineteenth century, migration from Europe to the United States solved two 
interrelated problems: Overpopulation and hunger in the Old World and 
labor shortages in the New.229 Whereas local, regional and state laws had 
initially restricted migration, by the 1850s more and more states in Europe, 
and particularly in Germany, realized that such restrictions inhibited 
international trade and the growth of the global economy. “For the political 
elites, the integration of markets was more important than matters of 
security policy.”230 Consequently, during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, border controls as we know them today were almost non-existent 
for travel in North America and Central Europe and migrants needed no 
passports or visas to cross borders or stay abroad.231  
But by the late 1800s industrialization and urbanization had begun to 
transform traditional societies in Europe and the United States, resulting in 
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the development of massive urban centers, where hundreds of thousands 
of people lived in anonymity and, often, great poverty. Millions of migrants 
traveled around the globe in search for new opportunities, bringing in 
contact heterogeneous and disparate cultures. 232  Riots and strikes 
frequently disrupted the social fabric of cities on both sides of the Atlantic, 
while epidemics wreaked havoc among the urban poor and crime rates 
escalated. Amidst the chaos, social reformers in North America and 
Europe attempted to impose order through comprehensive social policies 
and municipal reforms.233 Equipped with an unwavering trust in “objective 
knowledge” and the emerging disciplines of modern science, these men 
and women were concerned with the ways in which diverse populations 
were to coexist and how to regulate that coexistence both externally and 
domestically. Some questioned the capability of minorities, immigrant or 
not, to participate in the democratic institutions of modern nation-states 
and there were systematic attempts to disenfranchise, marginalize, or 
simply exclude segments of the population along lines of race, gender, 
class and religion.234 Others devoted themselves to pedagogical reforms 
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or urban hygiene programs, realizing that educated, healthy citizens were 
needed to preserve the social peace and guarantee stability.235  
Though attitudes differed, the discourse on how to solve the problems 
of the time was a transatlantic one. Between the 1870s and 1940s “the 
North Atlantic economy formed […] a world mart of useful and intensely 
interesting experiments. […] These were the years […] when other nations’ 
social politics, in short, were news.” 236  This applied especially to the 
exchange of knowledge and experience between Germany and the United 
States. Both countries were ascending geopolitical powers with booming 
industrial centers in steady need of labor. Both were suddenly confronted 
with millions of migrants leaving, passing through, or permanently settling; 
both subsequently implemented major legal and social reforms that 
extended the reach of the national government into the private sphere. 
American scholars often studied at German universities and vice versa, 
developing extensive networks for the exchange of information.237  Not 
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surprisingly, both countries frequently found similar solutions to solve 
comparable problems. This is especially evident in the case of migration 
and citizenship. 
The United States, a frontrunner in the liberalization of global migration 
policy, was also a leading force to curb the global flow of immigrants in the 
late nineteenth century. As I will discuss in Section 3 of this chapter, the 
new immigration law of 1882 and the establishment of Ellis Island as a 
gateway for migrants in 1891 centralized a national immigration policy and 
redefined the ways in which states dealt with immigrants and cross-border 
travel. Almost simultaneously, the German Reich changed its policies of 
emigration, not least because American immigration authorities in Ellis 
Island sent back every migrant perceived to be destitute or carrying an 
infectious disease. Germany thus instituted a systematic control apparatus 
and determined migration paths, establishing for example Berlin’s 
Ruhleben train station and Hamburg’s emigration harbor for that purpose. 
There, migrants were checked for diseases – often discriminating against 
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some groups on a racial or ethnic basis and sometimes even for their 
political orientation. Other countries like Italy, the Netherlands, Great 
Britain or Norway, adopted similar policies. 238  It was during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, then, that the idea of policed 
borders around territorial nation-states became the ruling paradigm. 
Nations across the globe devised cultural narratives of their cultural, civic, 
or ethnic composition and from a contemporaneous point of view these 
narratives provided legitimacy to the argument that it was necessary to 
control cross-border movement. States also extended the rights and 
duties of citizenship beyond the national borders, remaking consulates 
and diplomatic services from trade hubs for merchants into places citizens 
could turn to for everything from lost luggage to legal advice.239  
There were, of course, critical differences between the United States 
and Germany that emerged in the years leading up to World War I. For 
example, the U.S. Expatriation Act of 1907 stipulated that naturalized 
Americans could lose citizenship after being abroad for five years and that 
American-born women would lose theirs upon marriage to a foreigner, 
whereas the 1913 German Nationality Law set forth that German 
citizenship was based on descent without regard for birthplace and 
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residence.240 But these differences were never as diametrically opposed 
as some scholars have suggested in the past. Pointing to critical cultural 
components of every national identity, even Rogers Brubaker – a well-
known proponent of the ethnic-civic divide in citizenship theory – recently 
conceded that such normative distinctions are “at best problematic.”241 
Creating a sense of separation and difference always depended on the 
creation and perpetuation of cultural narratives and many modern nation-
states thus realized the critical importance of a “national” education. 
Germany and the United States, for example, instituted agendas of 
nationalization – attempting to “Germanize” or “Americanize” the next 
generation – or set up juvenile courts (the United States in 1900, Germany 
in 1908) intended to police the behavior of children and adolescents.242  
World War I, unlike any other war before, depended on the loyalty and 
participation of its citizens. Unprecedented numbers of men were drafted 
into military service, while women supported the war effort from the “home 
front.” The war was no longer fought merely on local battlefields but 
affected the entire nation. When increasing instances of sabotage and 
espionage made the question of loyalty a matter of national security, many 
countries engaged in the war expanded policies to control the movement 
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of both their own citizens and foreigners. Great Britain, for example, 
adopted the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 to increase the government’s 
ability to police the movement of non-citizens, while France instituted an 
obligation for foreigners to carry an identity card in 1917. What had been 
designed as temporary measures soon became permanent policies, so 
much so that political scientists today refer to the interwar era as the 
“golden age of ‘identification practices.’”243  
In this context, we need to take a closer look at the consequences of 
the Versailles Peace Treaty that ended the war. For many observers 
World War I had signaled a collapse of the global order it deemed to 
protect. “It dealt a severe blow to the power and prestige of the leading 
imperial powers […]. The war strained the resources of European powers, 
exposed as hollow their claims to superior civilization, and decimated the 
image of Western military invincibility […].”244 The statesmen and policy-
makers that met in Paris in early 1919 not only set out with the goal to 
fashion everlasting peace but also to bring about a global civil society 
guaranteeing permanent political stability and economic prosperity. At the 
same time, activists from all over the globe – labor leaders, female 
suffragists, anti-colonialists, and spokespeople for oppressed nations from 
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Albania to Vietnam – arrived to plead to the conference on behalf of their 
respective causes and constituents.245  
But the contentious negotiations behind closed doors in Versailles paid 
little attention to these various interests and its result, the Versailles Peace 
Treaty, was “a symptom of [the negotiating parties’] disguised internal 
disunity.” 246  Most importantly, it produced a blueprint for the future of 
international politics by privileging irredentist nation-states and thus 
retroactively legitimizing the nationalist frenzy, which had started the war 
in the first place. Historians continue to debate whether the aims of those 
involved were nobler and the Peace Treaty simply an aberration, a 
falsification of those noble aims.247 The American delegation, in particular, 
sported the political clout of a moral cause, representing a system of 
government that was, for many, a model for the world. “[U.S. President 
Woodrow] Wilson explicitly cast himself and America as defenders of the 
weak against the powerful, of common folk against autocratic regimes, of 
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small nations against great powers.” 248  But the visible cracks in the 
American system – most notably the consistent discrimination against 
African-Americans – were already receiving global attention. And 
President Wilson, a Southerner, was not exactly known for his proactive 
stance on race relations.249 Consequently, what little consensus could be 
reached among a quarreling and divided group of Allies in Paris was 
based on the smallest common denominator produced by decades of 
“scholarship” on human differences: That some people had the capacity to 
govern themselves and others did not and that the stability of the world 
depended upon the guidance of those “civilized” enough to take control.250 
After all, Communist uprisings threatened stability in Eastern Europe and 
anti-colonial movements threatened imperial rule in Egypt, Indochina, and 
India. Rather than addressing the woes of the colonized and removing the 
“yoke” of foreign expression, the Versailles peace treaty thus proved to be 
the “apex of imperial expansion,” solidifying Western rule and deferring (if 
only temporarily) the cause of freedom and self-determination in favor of 
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stability. 251  Moreover, the Versailles Treaty established a new political 
logic in Europe by rooting the legitimacy of nation-states in ethnic origins, 
thus creating new political entities like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. 
“The principle of nationalism, which […] took the self-determining nation-
state as the sole legitimate entity in international relations thus became a 
central component of the new international order […].” 252  Ultimately, 
however, the new nation-states proved to be “too weak to project a clear 
national identity and they became breeding-grounds for mutually 
conflicting irredentist claims and for experiments in enforced nationalist 
regimentation.”253  
In fact, these “experiments” occurred all over the Western world 
throughout that period, as nation-states attempt to craft cohesive national 
populations by imposing a common language and culture. Migrants were, 
of course, particularly affected by that “national regimentation” especially if 
they attempted to preserve their cultural peculiarities in a foreign land. Not 
surprisingly, attempts to control migrant populations frequently prompted 
fierce resistance. Polish families, for example, protested pedagogical 
attacks against their native language in Germany, while Germans often 
viciously opposed similar attacks on their language and culture in the 
United States. As ethnic groups defended themselves against the 
increasing intrusion into their private lives, it became clear that state policy 
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frequently “produced agency rather than discipline.” 254  In other words, 
rather than succeeding in their disciplinary aims, state policies encouraged 
the resistance of those subjected to the measures.  
This urge to retain a connection to the homeland was particularly 
strong for both Irish and German Americans, who both underwent grand 
transformations in their hyphenated consciousness during the 1910s, 
stemming from World War I and the Irish revolution. “[B]are in mind that 
American citizenship means something more than rights; American 
citizenship includes necessarily the ideas of duty, the idea of 
responsibility,” reminded the Irish-American activist Daniel Cohalan an 
audience in New York City in 1921 (see also Chapter 3). “You have no 
right to withdraw yourselves as a class apart. The man who comes here, 
the woman who comes here, the race which comes here and which is not 
satisfied to be American, ought better never to have come.” Citizenship 
was a duty and it included “the duty of taking an active part in the public 
affairs of the country, the duty of helping to create a public sentiment by 
which the country is going to be swayed […].”255 As I will discuss below, 
German völkisch nationalists invoked similar ideals, reminding Germans 
abroad that their duties were to the German people – even if they were not 
citizens. It is one of the objectives of this dissertation to examine the 
discursive negotiations of these competing nationalisms by German 
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Americans still heavily invested, willingly or not, in the politics of the 
homeland.     
Germany and the United States also engaged in experiments in 
“enforced nationalist regimentation” and what these experiments meant for 
the migrants that traveled between those two nation-states. 
3. Immigration and Citizenship in the United States after World War I 
 
The debate about immigrants and their integration into the American 
body politic has received considerable attention by scholars who have 
examined themes of citizenship and belonging with a special focus on 
immigrant communities in the interwar period. During the 1920s, disputes 
about race, gender, and labor relations stirred up vicious debates among 
Americans about the social fabric of the nation. This section provides a 
brief summary of that history.256 
3.1. Restricting Immigration, Enforcing Americanization 
 
Chinese workers were an early prey of nativist agitation when the 
Exclusion Act of 1882 prohibited their entry and established legal 
precedence for the principle of exclusion.257 The act and the subsequent 
judicial quandaries “helped set the parameters of American immigration 
law and to establish the rights of all aliens.”258 The consequences of such 
legislation for European immigrants became clear, when a report by the 
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Dillingham Commission published in 1911 lamented the slow assimilation 
(particularly by immigrants from Eastern Europe) and recommended a 
new restrictive and ethnically discriminating immigration policy based on 
the presumption that some immigrants were inferior in education, ability, 
and genetics. Not coincidentally, an entire volume of the Report entitled, A 
Dictionary of Races or Peoples, was based in part on the German 
physician Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s scheme separating humans into 
“Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, Malay, and American,” which was 
critical to Germany’s own development of a model of citizenship.259 The 
report also proposed a quota for immigrant groups and demanded a 
literacy test (enacted in 1917), thus bridging the gap between ethnic/racial 
and civic qualifications for American citizenship.260 
 During and after World War I, the national mood towards immigration 
deteriorated further: Many Americans were highly skeptical, if not afraid of 
the ideological experiments currently at trial in Europe – such as 
Communism in Russia and Fascism in Italy – and felt that immigrants from 
those areas would pose a challenge to American ideals. Economic fears 
about the country’s own future thus paired with xenophobia and a rejection 
of European culture and civilization after the cataclysmic collapse of the 
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“Great War.”261  In many ways, then, the 1924 Immigration Act was a 
logical consequence of a national discourse that increasingly pushed 
aside alternating views such as the cultural pluralism of Horace Kallen and 
Randolph Bourne, who had stressed the qualities of a heterogeneous 
United States, arguing that “pluralism represented what was best not only 
for the individual, but for democracy and for American governance.”262 The 
Act set annual quotas according to national origins at two percent of the 
respective nationality’s total number in the 1890 United States census. It 
thus significantly impeded immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, 
which had reached its height between 1890 and World War I. Moreover, 
by defining nationality along racial lines, it shut down immigration from 
Africa and Asia all together.263 In 1929, a second version of the National 
Origins Act reduced the number of immigrants to 150,000 per year and 
further manifested Anglo-Saxon dominance by increasing the quota for 
Great Britain and decreasing the numbers for Scandinavia, Ireland, and 
Germany. The racist nature of the acts, writes Roger Daniels, 
“perpetuated old injustices and created new ones.”264 
It is hard to determine the exact consequences of the Johnson-Reed 
Act on German America. To be sure, German Americans recognized in 
the legislation the “shameless discrimination against Skandinavian [sic], 
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Irish and German elements in favor of a pauperized unemployed English 
proletariat,” 265  because it prohibited a new flow of immigrants from 
Germany after the war. And indeed, official numbers for immigration 
showed a significant decrease for the period between 1925 and 1933, 
from nearly 100,000 in 1924 to little over 3,000 in 1932.266 However, at the 
same time I would argue that immigration legislation was beneficial for 
German immigrants, because it appeased nativist anger and defined 
belonging by way of skin color. It was the Americanization campaign 
accompanying immigration reform, which ultimately proved to be most 
detrimental to the cause of German Americans, particularly for the 
“gatekeepers,” who had profited from ethnic divisions for many decades. 
For them, the pluralist doctrine was most appealing as it stressed the 
diversity of the American people as an essential characteristic of the 
nation as a whole and allowed them to balance political loyalty to the 
United States with cultural allegiance to the homeland.  
Unfortunately for many of these ethnic gatekeepers, whether German, 
Irish, Italian, or any group, the overwhelming political stream embraced 
“Americanization.” The concept held that those portions of the citizenry 
capable of attaining equal rights of full citizenship needed the necessary 
education to exercise those rights and to exploit their full potential. In most 
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views, this vision excluded African-Americans, Native Americans, and – as 
of 1882 – Asian Americans, who were not seen fit to participate in the 
American body politic. But immigrants from Europe were also increasingly 
singled out as targets of the Americanization campaign. In his famous 
speech on anti-hyphenation, for example, Theodore Roosevelt had 
specifically accused German and Irish immigrants of betraying American 
institutions, arguing “those hyphenated Americans who terrorize American 
politicians by threats of the foreign vote are engaged in treason to the 
American Republic.”267 After the war had ended, social reformers, who 
had identified poverty and social divisions as the main issues dividing the 
country, clashed with nativists and patriotic activists, who saw immigrants 
as the main carriers of socialism, bolshevism, and anarchism and wanted 
to erect “Americanism” as a bulwark of freedom against these ideologies. 
Though generally benefitting from their “whiteness,” German 
Americans were subjected to attacks that questioned their political loyalty 
and integrity. This was by no means self-evident. German Americans had 
long been presented as ideal immigrants: ambitious, zealous, and highly 
willing to naturalize. But immediately before and during the war, American 
nativists and interventionists accused German immigrations of disloyal 
behavior and portrayed them in racial iconography as the “Hun”. Hysteria 
followed the sinking of the Lusitania in early May 1915 along with 
increasing suspicions of fifth column activity after immigrants were 
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implicated in incidents such as the explosion of the “Black Tom” munitions 
depot in July 1916 and the purported radicalization of labor, such trends 
provided the ideological foundation for the popular embrace of 
“Americanization” and “100% Americanism” campaigns directed 
particularly, though not exclusively, against German Americans. German 
was no longer taught in schools and sometimes even completely outlawed 
in public, as in Iowa, which had a sizeable German population. But after 
the war, the image of the evil alien changed once more. If the “Hun” 
embodied the enemy during the War, this role was assumed by the 
(foreign) revolutionary after war’s end.  
What exactly nativists meant when they wrote and talked about 
“Americanization,” apart from the naturalization of its immigrants, 
remained unclear and was often vague and contradictory. The image of 
the “American” was mainly defined in the negative, as opposed to the lazy, 
disloyal anarchist revolutionary: Americans were hard-working and loyal. 
This provided an opening for German American activists, who stressed 
the historical contributions of German immigrants and demanded the full 
rights of American citizenship, including the right to criticize American 
participation in the Great War (see Chapters 3 and 4).268  
 
 
                                                        
268 Vorländer, Nationale Identität, 184. 
  
 
107
3.2. A new concept of citizenship: Rights vs. Duties 
 
World War I also marked a critical change in the relationship between 
state and citizen. Christopher Capozzola has shown that terms such as 
duty, sacrifice, and obligation entered the everyday language and public 
sphere of the United States during and because of the Great War, as 
Americans discussed whether or not to participate in the military conflict in 
Europe, how to oblige the population to participate and how to celebrate 
the war once it was over. “Political obligation,” writes Capozzola, 
“energized, mobilized, and divided Americans during World War I.”269 The 
structural changes that transformed citizenship during that time included 
military service and jury duty, a federal income tax, the Dillingham-
Hardwick Act, which legalized the deportation of (broadly defined) 
anarchists, and the infamous Espionage and Sedition Acts, which made 
disloyalty a crime and undermined free speech. In many ways, the rules of 
citizenship began to function as a “demarcation line between friend and 
enemy.” 270  These transformations had very real consequences for 
immigrants from Germany as the United States entered World War I on 
April 6, 1917 and roughly 250,000 non-naturalized German American men 
became “enemy aliens,” women followed in the Spring of 1918.271 
                                                        
269 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 6. 
270 Jörg Nagler, Nationale Minoritaeten im Krieg: “Feindliche Ausländer” und die 
Amerikanische Heimatfront während des Ersten Weltkriegs (Hamburg: 
Hamburger Edition, 2000), 13. 
271 Nagler, Nationale Minoritaeten im Kriege, 13. 
  
 
108
Countless voluntary associations across the United States enforced 
the unwritten rules of the new civic law. The roots of this enforcement 
dated back to World War I but persisted beyond its end. “America’s first 
world war marked an unprecedented mobilization of social institutions, 
human labor, and popular will.” The boundaries between the public and 
private, between social and personal responsibility began to soften. “Now, 
the private obligations were suddenly fundamental to war mobilization in a 
moment of crisis, prompting state intervention into American bedrooms, 
kitchens, and congregations, places where the federal government hadn’t 
always been before.” Doing one’s part in “the war effort thus became not 
just a good deed but a duty, and serious consequences ensued for those 
who failed to join in. People were, therefore, obliged to volunteer in a 
culture of coercive voluntarism.” 272 
As I have discussed above, German Americans were suddenly forced 
into an unbridgeable conflict. They wanted to show solidarity with both 
their old and new homeland and many of them pushed for a policy of 
isolation during the war. Incidentally, they often used voluntary 
associations like ethnic clubs and churches to resist militarism and 
coercion. Like other isolationist organizations in the country, these 
institutions “sheltered draft dodgers, gave voices to workers’ demands, 
[and] protected German Americans from the onslaughts of 100 percent 
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Americanism.”273 At the same time they experienced the violent hyper-
patriotism and coercive voluntarism directed against “draft dodgers, food 
hoarders, or subversive ‘Pro-Germans’.” Christopher Capozzola notes that 
it “was not a mere psychic aberration or a deviation from American 
political culture. Pervasive political violence, willingly undertaken, reflected 
politics as usual. Coercive voluntarism made America’s first world war 
both its most democratically mobilized home front as well as its most 
violent.”274 
At the ideological core of these changes was a strengthening belief in 
the duty “to work, to be loyal to the nation, to conform to the norms of the 
community.”275 The question was exactly how to define those norms, how 
to enforce conformity and where to draw the legal line between 
appropriate government intervention and overreach. During the war, 
wartime legislation allowed severe measures to silence dissent, such as 
wire-tapping or the monitoring of private mail.276 And, as the Palmer Raids 
to deport anarchists in late 1919 and early 1920 showed, these measures 
had been everything but temporary. In January 1902, the Bureau of 
Investigation (BI), a precursor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
had rounded up roughly 10,000 labor organizers, communists, and 
hundreds of innocent bystanders, many of them American citizens, in an 
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attempt to “[hunt] down […] enemies of the United States.” In close 
coordination with the Justice Department and the Immigration Bureau, the 
BI manufactured accusations, denied aliens legal counsel, and forged 
false confessions, revealing in the process “its hostility toward ethnic and 
religious minorities.” “Thus, the [BIs] reports insinuated that Irish-
Americans who favored Irish independence, Jews who advocated the 
establishment of a national homeland in Palestine, civil libertarians who 
defended the rights of dissidents, and anyone who argued that the United 
States should recognize the Soviet Union were engaged in ‘subversive’ 
activities.” Public support for the radical measures was strong and 
remained so even in spite of persistent organized initiatives protesting the 
treatment of those arrested. Those defending the rights of the accused in 
courts and public hearings risked being ostracized as unpatriotic or “un-
American.”277 
Germans, then, were by no means the only “victims” of the 
extraordinary mobilization of public and politics against ethnic pluralism 
that would became a prevalent element in the United States during the 
next decades; a blend of public and official sanctions created an 
atmosphere of submission among many groups of immigrants. Those 
unwilling to accept the political status quo as well as their new civic duties 
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were often treated harshly by neighbors, employers, and 
the state. Political radicals of a variety of faiths, including 
anarchism, socialism, and communism, were also 
vulnerable to ostracism, persecution, and the declaration 
that they were un-American. During periods of national 
crisis, nonassimilating immigrants and political radicals 
became the targets of state-sponsored coercive campaigns 
to strip them of their now alienable rights to free expression 
and free assembly.278 
 
In many ways, this was the legacy of World War I, a legacy that persisted 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The next section describes the changing 
conception of national belonging in Germany and its consequences for 
Germans abroad with a special emphasis on the United States. 
4. Emigration and Transnational Belonging in Germany after WW I 
 
I have discussed the relationship between migration, the nation-state, 
and national consciousness in Chapter One, emphasizing in particular the 
historical contingency of “Germanness.” While ethnicity and culture were 
always at the core of German nationalism, the idea of “ethnic” (and thus 
almost perpetual) belonging to the German nation, ius sanguinis, had only 
been uniformly codified a year before the outbreak of World War I in the 
1913 Nationality Law of German Empire and States (Reichs- und 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, short: RuStAG). Though based on older 
regional legal traditions, this law determined German citizenship according 
to blood lineage rather than membership in the territorial community of a 
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state and distinguished between citizens, non-citizens, and “ethnic” 
Germans living outside of the boundaries of the state. The latter group 
was provided with an “automatic right of entry to and citizenship of” 
Germany. 279  But what were the duties inherent in this ethnic form of 
belonging for citizens and ethnic Germans? And what was the duty of the 
state towards those not living under its auspices? 
The negotiation of these relationships entered a critical stage in the 
interwar period when the fate of Germans abroad – emigrated or 
displaced – became a dominant issue in the public discourse of Weimar 
Germany, not least due to the German political impotence after World War 
I. The terms negotiated in the peace accord at Versailles had placed the 
entire guilt and the upcoming burden in the form of reparations on 
Germany, which was forced to abandon its air force and reduce its military. 
More specifically, the Versailles Treaty "not only eliminated Germany as a 
major military factor by sharply limiting its armed forces, it also reduced 
the country's population, territory, and resources, and, through the 
mechanism of reparations, converted Germany into the world's major 
debtor."280 Millions of Germans were suddenly living outside of the new 
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boundaries of the post-Versailles Weimar Republic and hundreds of 
thousands emigrated, especially to the United States. No longer capable 
of simply flexing the country’s military and economic muscles, German 
statesmen and politicians had to look elsewhere for geopolitical leverage 
and this provided an opening for ethnic, so-called völkisch nationalists, 
whose activities had thus far been largely ignored by those in charge.281  
4.1. The Weimar Republic and the Politics of Self-Determination  
 
In his now famous “Fourteen Points” speech to the American Congress 
on January 8, 1918, U.S President Woodrow Wilson had suggested the 
principle of self-determination – though not yet verbatim – as a way to 
divide territory along lines of "nationality" without explicitly specifying, who 
was entitled to their own “nation” and who was not.282 His program later 
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became the foundation for the peace treaty negotiated in Versailles, even 
though many critics at the time noted the racial and religious hypocrisies 
that granted the right of self-determination to some while denying it to 
others. But for the defeated Germany, this emphasis on ethnicity provided 
a small opening in a dire situation for three important reasons: first, by 
stipulating that the nation-state be the base unit of international relations, it 
reestablished Germany as an important geopolitical player in Central 
Europe with “ethnic” legitimation; second, it provided a divided Weimar 
Republic with a powerful anti-narrative against the “shameful diktat” of 
Versailles, which had divided the ethnic community by placing Millions of 
Germans outside of the country’s territorial boundaries; and third, because 
the  
repulse of Russia and the division of central, eastern and 
southern Europe into a handful of small and medium-sized 
states […] gave Germany the chance to establish an 
informal hegemony in the region by expanding her economic 
and cultural influence through a policy of accommodation 
and co-operation with the new nations.283  
Many German statesmen and völkisch nationalists were keenly aware of 
the potential card they had been dealt and realized that cultural diplomacy, 
Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, would be a critical tool in future international 
negotiations.284 Consequently, it emerged as a systematic, state-funded 
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feature of German foreign policy in the 1920s and “was seen as a lever to 
extend German influence now that the Reich had lost the traditional assets 
with which it exercised power within the international system: a strong 
economy, a large army and reliable allies.” 285  However, the official 
government policy remained subdued and secretive, as diplomats realized 
the detrimental implications, should cultural diplomacy be misunderstood 
(or accurately recognized) as propaganda. 
The cultural diplomacy of the Weimar Republic pursued three 
overarching strategies largely aligned with the general objective to 
reestablish Germany as a global power: The first strategy was to stress 
the ethnic unity of the German nation in order to revise the borders by 
actively utilizing ethnic Germans abroad as instruments of foreign policy. 
The conventional wisdom during the 1920s was that roughly 25 Million 
Germans, a quarter of all ethnic Germans worldwide, lived outside the 
boundaries of Germany and Austria.286 These so-called Volksdeutsche (or 
Auslanddeutsche) were the target of both direct efforts to stir up 
discontent and initiate a process leading towards territorial reunification as 
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well as indirect efforts that aimed to utilize Volksdeutsche in order to 
change the policy of other countries towards Germany.287 In the words of 
Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann: 
Politically [Germans abroad] will be called upon, to shape 
the politics of the foreign state which they help sustain in a 
way that is beneficial to the German Empire; culturally they 
will serve as born mediators for the proliferation and 
understanding of German culture and German world view 
amongst the people of their state.288  
Stresemann’s statement applied particularly to German Americans, not 
least because German politicians like Stresemann “actively cultivated 
American goodwill and support” during the 1920s.289 
The second strategy attempted to exploit the global appeal of science 
and knowledge during the 1920s: By supporting new academic disciplines 
focused on the “folk,” German cultural diplomats hoped to support ethnic 
nationalism by providing it with a scientific foundation.290 Organizations 
like the Deutsche Ausland-Institut  (DAI) and the Deutsche Akademie (DA) 
collected a wealth of information on German settlements around the globe 
to examine and document “Germandom abroad in its origin and 
development, its character and achievements”. For example, scholars like 
the seasoned politician Otto Boelitz (1876-1951), the young economist 
Martin Lohmann (1901-1993), or the former Catholic bishop Franz Xaver 
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Geyer (1859-1943), a child of the colonial age, were sent to the United 
States to study the language of local communities in Pennsylvania and the 
Midwest and examine their critical role in the preservation of German 
culture abroad. 291  Historians like Gottfried Fittbogen and Heinz Kloss 
wrote volumes about the contributions of Germans in American history 
and helped initiate celebrations of historical characters with German roots 
like Baron von Steuben and Peter Minuit.292 The goal was to  
invigorate understanding for the deep meaning of the 
community in language and heritage, in spiritual life and in 
culture and thus strengthen the consciousness of common 
identity of all Germans; and finally to raise the meaning of 
German spiritual labor and German culture in the entire 
world.293  
In other words, it was to provide a scientific foundation for the belief that 
ethnic identity was worth preserving and that German language and 
culture provided a foundation for the many positive contributions Germans 
could make to foreign countries like the United States.  
Finally, the third strategy consisted of attempts to improve the German 
reputation and economic opportunities by praising German cultural 
achievements both at home and abroad, thus “making a good 
impression”.294 Using some of the same means discussed above, like the 
celebration of German history and language, scholars wanted to appeal to 
both the general American and the specific German American audience. 
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Celebrations of German culture were meant to renew pride in German 
heritage, generate a collective identity abroad and counter the 
“Americanism” and cultural propaganda dominating U.S. public 
discourse.295 The idea that this form of cultural propaganda could produce 
any results also went back to World War I, since “the legend went, 
Germany had failed to present her cause convincingly to the international 
public, whereas her adversaries had led a ruthless but effective 
psychological campaign which isolated the Reich.”296 
It is worth noting that while the overall goals of the political 
administration certainly changed in 1933, Katja Gesche has shown that 
the process of actual change in cultural diplomacy was rather slow. 
“Instead of a new, explicitly national-socialist cultural diplomacy many 
projects that had begun in Weimar and are still known today, simply 
continued [throughout the Third Reich].” Gesche lists, for example the 
Goethe Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service DAAD 
[“Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst”], and several international 
treaties. What changed, of course, were the messages that were sent 
through these programs and many countries were rightfully suspicious of 
the cultural foreign policy of both the Weimar Republic and, even more, 
the Third Reich.297 Therefore it was key strategy of German foreign policy 
in the interwar period to pursue an inconspicuous approach and support 
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groups that were ostentatiously neutral and independent. Among these 
groups was the so-called Verein [later renamed: Volksbund] für das 
Deutschtum im Ausland. 
4.2. Volksgemeinschaft and the VDA 
 
Before taking a closer look at the VDA, it is necessary to discuss the 
Volksgemeinschaft – or “community of the people” –, an ideological trope 
that gained prominence in the political discourse of Weimar Germany 
throughout the 1920s. More amorphous than tangible, the concept itself is 
somewhat hard to define. Similar to the völkisch movement, which 
popularized it, the ideology supplementing the Volksgemeinschaft was 
disparate and heterogeneous. To be sure, belonging to the 
Volksgemeinschaft meant being part of a large community that 
transcended the boundaries of the German nation-state, whether in its 
current, past, or imaginary manifestations. Being German was defined as 
a kinship that transcended generations and was certainly not lost when 
transferred across the Atlantic. It was a “community of blood and history” 
that came with rights and duties.  
According to a paradigmatic article published on the eve of World War 
II in the Thüringische Landes-Zeitung, Germans vowed “to realize their 
greatest good, for which they will stand up with life and limb, in the 
German Volkstum 298 , in the conservation and consolidation of the 
                                                        
298 Lit. “folkdom.” But the meaning of the term escapes easy definition. It is, in 
fact notoriously elusive. The German dictionary Duden defines it briefly as 
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unadulterated character [Wesensart].” The article did specify the duties 
entailed in this ethnic-national identity. Apart from vowing to defend the 
German Volkstum with life and limb against “influences of foreign peoples 
and foreign blood” [fremdvölkische und fremdblütige Einflüsse], 
nationalists appealed to Germans to cultivate “German virtues” and 
German culture in order to preserve them for the future.299  And even 
though German citizenship became increasingly defined in ethnic terms, 
membership in the ethnic community was not defined as such: 
“participation in the Volksgemeinschaft was independent of citizenship in a 
state. […] A citizen of another state could remain loyal to his state yet 
consider himself part of the German Volksgemeinschaft.”300  
In essence, then, the historical significance of the Volksgemeinschaft is 
to be found in the fact that “large portions of the German population saw in 
the Volksgemeinschaft a desirable social goal, even though they 
connected quite disparate contents with this term.” 301  Moreover, even 
though a great number of political parties in Germany adopted political 
programs based on the Volksgemeinschaft, historians agree that it 
                                                                                                                                                       
“essence, character of the people, as it finds expression in its life, its culture” 
[Wesen, Eigenart des Volkes, wie es sich in seinem Leben, seiner Kultur 
ausprägt]. I would argue that Volkstum is in essence an attempt to record and 
perpetuate the values and traditions of a people, which are constantly in flux. 
299 Uwe Puschner, Handbuch zur völkischen Bewegung (Munich: KG Saur, 1996), 
XVII-XVIII. 
300 Allen Thomsen Cronenberg Jr., The Volksbund für das Deutschtum im 
Ausland: Völkisch Ideology and German Foreign Policy, 1881-1939 (PhD diss., 
Stanford University, 1970), 50-51. 
301 Frank Bajohr and Michael Wildt, eds. Volksgemeinschaft: Neue Forschungen 
zur Gesellschaft des Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2009), 9. 
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remained a myth and that its descriptive historical value for the period 
between 1919 and 1945 is low. If anything, it was the “promise, the 
mobilization, not the detection of an actual social condition [which] was 
crucial to the political power of the talk of the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’.”302  
As noted above, for völkisch nationalists, the collapse of the monarchy 
was an opportunity to further manifest German notions of belonging on 
culture, custom, language, and heritage that transcended the borders of 
nation-states. Throughout the 1920s, organizations like the VDA were 
pivotal in popularizing their own vision of the Volksgemeinschaft. The VDA 
was the first and foremost important organization devoted to Germans 
living in the United States, not least because it was “the largest 
organization concerned with the cultural, economic and political status of 
ethnic Germans outside the Reich” during the 1920s.303  
Founded as Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein [“General German 
School Association”] in 1881 to promote and fund German-language 
schools for ethnic German minorities outside of the Reich, the VDA304 
profited immensely from the nationalist upswing during and German 
geopolitical impotence after World War I. “At the very moment when we 
                                                        
302 Bajohr and Wildt, Volksgemeinschaft,  8 and 26. “In der Verheißung, in der 
Mobilisierung, nicht in der Feststellung eines sozialen Ist-Zustandes lag die 
politische Kraft der Rede von der ‘Volksgemeinschaft‘.“ 
303 Cronenberg, Volksbund, iv. 
304 It was renamed Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland [“Association for 
Germans Abroad”] in 1908. See: Sächsiche Heimatbriefe 2 (December, 1934), 
368. See also: Tammo Luther, “Erfolgsgeschichte VDA – 125 Jahre 
Landesverband Sachsen”, Ceremonial Address, Dresden, 11/08/2008.  
http://www.vda-sachsen.de/Inhalte/referat-luther-2008.htm (retrieved: March 15, 
2016). 
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lost our former state, we won our people,” wrote VDA president Franz von 
Reichenau in 1919. 305  World War I had been a moment of collective 
“rediscovery” and “reawakening” as Millions of German soldiers, nurses, 
and others involved in the war effort returned home with stories of ethnic 
Germans who had retained language and culture abroad. Building upon 
these experiences, the VDA exploited the social and political 
fragmentation of postwar Germany by romanticizing the sense of 
belonging experienced in these ethnic communities, thus enforcing “the 
notion that all Germans formed a wider Volksgemeinschaft.” 306  They 
supported a pluralistic, classless interpretation of that concept, 
nonetheless in its racialized rhetoric, the VDA “did much to contribute to 
the attitude of racial superiority already held by many Germans and to 
soften the reception of violent anti-Semitic view enunciated by National 
Socialists throughout the 1920s.”307 
The VDA portended to be above partisan politics after the National 
Socialists took control in 1933. The organization welcomed the rise of the 
Nazi Party and once more changed its name from Verein to a more ethno-
nationalist Volksbund. For the first years the VDA enjoyed the protection 
of some high-ranking Nazi officials like Rudolf Heß and received major 
financial support from the new administration, partly because of 
                                                        
305 Cronenberg, Volksbund, 44. 
306 Cronenberg, Volksbund, 47. 
307 Cronenberg, Volksbund, 56. 
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overlapping goals such as the revision of the Versailles Treaty.308 In 1933, 
the major ideological difference between National Socialism and the VDA 
was that the latter stressed the allegiance to all ethnic Germans around 
the globe, whereas the Nazis mainly looked to ethnic Germans abroad as 
pawns in their geopolitical games.309 And even though some conflicts with 
competing organizations like the NSDAP-AO arose, the VDA was able to 
continue their work until at least 1937, when efforts to reach Germans 
abroad were centralized in the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.310 
While the VDA’s geographic focus lay mainly on the “lost territories” 
and ethnic German minorities in Eastern and Southern Europe, it always 
cultivated good ties to the United States, if only for financial support.311 
When the victory of National Socialism ushered in “a new era,” the 
organization could increase its efforts across the Atlantic thanks to 
generous state support. The VDA hired an official representative in the 
United States, Carl Günther Orgell, sent speakers on continental tours, 
and acquired the addresses of countless German Americans around the 
country.312 Starting in October 1934, it also increased its emphasis on 
publications and began sending out the Heimatbriefe, a newsletter 
                                                        
308 Cronenberg, Volksbund, 93-101. For the VDA, the Treaty had torn apart the 
German national community against the will of the people. 
309 Cronenberg, Volksbund, 113. 
310 Valdis O. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and 
the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1993). 
311 Klaus Kipphan, Deutsche Propaganda in den Vereinigten Staaten, 1933–1941 
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distributed by the VDA’s regional chapters under different names, for 
example as Buten und Binnen (“Outside and Inside”) from a branch in 
Lower Saxony, as Thüringer Heimatbriefe from a branch in Thuringia, and 
as Sächsische Heimatbriefe from the chapter in Saxony.313  
The very first issue of the Heimatbriefe defined its role in the new Nazi 
state: “to suffuse the entirety of the German people of all classes with 
understanding and sacrificial spirit for the pan-German task.” The VDA 
thus presented itself in line with the SA or the Hitler Youth as participating 
in a common struggle for “the protection of the German borders and the 
German territory in the Baltics, in Upper Silesia, on the Ruhr and in 
Carinthia.”314  Editorials in the Heimatbriefe were written in the form of 
letters and attempted to establish a personal connection with the readers 
by using the informal Du as opposed to the formal Sie and by explicitly 
soliciting responses, which were featured prominently in subsequent 
issues. The Heimatbriefe were, as one editorial argued, more than just a 
magazine but “a private letter between comrades, worthy of your personal 
response.”315 Rather than pressing an openly partisan agenda, the VDA 
purported to be apolitical, emphasizing emotional representations of the 
homeland and imagery of industry and improvement. Beneath that thin 
layer of political neutrality, however, the VDA was part of the Nazi 
propaganda machine. Racial Darwinism and notions of ethnic unity 
                                                        
313 Kipphan, Deutsche Propaganda, 33-34. 
314 Sächsische Heimatbriefe, 2 (December, 1934), 368. 
315 Sächsische Heimatbriefe, 4 (April, 1935), 3. 
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permeated the Heimatbriefe: “The war against the German people”, one 
editorial argued, 
against German culture, German character and life is being 
continued; German school, language and education, 
German territory and economic power are extremely 
endangered. The de-Germanization [Entdeutschung] of 
Millions of Germans is the goal of countless […] forces.316  
German Americans would both embrace and reject this assessment. 
Given the “anti-German propaganda” that many detected in newspapers 
and the anti-immigrant legislation that discriminated against Germans just 
as it did against Irish, Italians, Poles and other groups, their sense of 
cultural superiority was injured. However, especially in the context of the 
United States, talk of assimilation and de-Germanization always took on 
an accusatory tone, suggesting that German migrants had somehow 
“given in” to Americanization and assimilation. The following section will 
show how the recipients of the Heimatbriefe crafted transnational 
responses that reflected the interstitial nature of their own position 
between Third Reich and “American Way.”  
5. German migrants between Third Reich and American Way 
 
Throughout the next chapters I will be examining how German 
Americans participated in the transnational discourse of national belonging 
by negotiating in the United States. I will show how old world conflicts and 
consensuses along lines of class, race, gender, and religion were 
                                                        
316 Sächsische Heimatbriefe, 2 (December, 1934), 368/9.  
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transported to the new world and how some of them were transformed or 
pervaded to divide or unite German Americans and many other ethnic 
groups in the multicultural space of urban life. The letters to the VDA in 
response to the Heimatbriefe cannot capture the entire German American 
experience in all its heterogeneity. Nevertheless, they speak to a larger 
trend among migrants who had left Germany during the late nineteenth or 
early twentieth century. These letters associate the idea of German 
Volkstum and heritage both as an emotional reference to explain who the 
migrants were and how they felt about their place in U.S. society. It should 
be noted that the Heimatbriefe portrayed an overly optimistic image of 
National Socialism and respondents generally viewed Hitler’s rise and the 
“New Germany” positively. Moreover, they evidently accepted the VDA as 
sufficiently trustworthy to describe their experience in the United States. 
Built on ethno-cultural theories of human history, the narrative presented 
in the Heimatbriefe provided a nationalized legitimacy to the sense of 
dislocation, exploitation, and disillusionment widely shared among 
German Americans. Nonetheless, writers often offered nuanced 
perspectives on migrant life in the United States and complex views about 
the intersection of class, race, and national heritage. Though some 
responded warily, not knowing who stood behind the publication, many 
accepted the Heimatbriefe as a medium to express their views about the 
“New Germany,” including criticism and, in some rare cases, outright 
rejection. Moreover, the men and women who wrote the letters often used 
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their origins to reassert their position in American society, defying both 
dominant U.S. discourses that frequently stressed a fundamental 
dichotomy between the two nations as well as German appropriations of 
their fate for political purposes. The letters offer a fascinating glimpse at 
the discursive negotiations of Germanness during the 1930s. As such they 
are certainly not comprehensive, but – as I hope to show in this section – 
might well be paradigmatic. 
*** 
German nationalists had frequently singled out German Americans for 
their lack of devotion in preserving German culture abroad. Subjected to 
repeated accusations of assimilation, cowardice, or treason from various 
representatives of the fatherland, the respondents immediately turned the 
argument against the German state upon receiving the Heimatbriefe. An 
overwhelming number of those who responded from the United States 
expressed satisfaction that they had not been forgotten back home. For 
example, Rudolf Blumentritt of Troy, Alabama expressed his gratitude to 
the VDA for taking up the cause of Germans abroad: “It is a joy to know 
that, finally, the Heimat is remembering those who still feel German and 
are voicing their Germanness on an advanced post.” 317  In the past, 
Blumentritt suggested, “you would have to be a half-starving Volga-
German […] before the Heimat remembered those that often left not light-
                                                        
317 Rudolf Blumentritt to VDA, HSTA 12460-45, 1934-25. 
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heartedly and under pressure of the circumstances.”318 If the Heimatbriefe 
served in part to remind Germans all over the world of their duty to the 
fatherland, Blumentritt and others like him proposed mutual responsibility 
between the German nation and its people: “Those of us who are doing 
well abroad can contribute much to the defense of the fatherland against 
encroachments. Greetings from home like yours will help to revive flagging 
courage and fighting strength.”319 If the Heimatbriefe were indeed a call to 
duty, Blumentritt was ready to act, though he never made it clear for whom 
he was fighting exactly and how he intended to contribute. But his letter 
was also a reminder that many migrants were not doing well, particularly 
in the United States, where unemployment and disillusionment still reigned 
in 1934, at the height of the Great Depression.  
Hertha Winkler of Buffalo, New York similarly described the cultural 
vacuum that had been filled by the Heimatbriefe in 1937. Many times, she 
writes, she had heard her compatriots complain: “Why did former German 
governments never care for Germans abroad [Auslanddeutsche] and their 
problems? How much value has been lost to the Heimat in this manner – 
but for decades we were only looked on as pariahs!”320 Perhaps Winkler 
was masking her own thoughts behind the opinion of others, but post-
World War I immigrants repeatedly expressed a general sense of neglect, 
betrayal, and alienation, paired with new hope in the future. Fritz Spindler 
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319 Blumentritt to VDA, HSTA 12460-45, 1934-25. 
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described the near-decade he had spent in the United States as “nine 
years of foreign service [Auslandsdienst].” 321  And Paul Herchert in 
Cleveland, Tennessee asserted that “[the heart] may be in the second 
fatherland for the longest time, but the Heimat stands strong and true in 
the heart […] We, too, are sticking to our Führer, even though we are not 
under his care.”322  
Pre-World War I immigrants generally felt more settled in America, and 
felt more loyal to the United States than more recent migrants. 
Nonetheless, they also responded to the Heimatbriefe in great numbers 
and voiced a similar blend of joy and indignation. “We were lost to you, 
forgotten,” wrote Otto Köhler in December 1936, 32 years after he had 
arrived in the United States. A builder by trade, Köhler had established 
himself as a prominent member of the German American Lutheran 
community in Staten Island and in many ways exemplified the “assimilated” 
immigrant. Köhler, too, applauded VDA efforts and affirmed his connection 
to the Heimat: German Americans, he wrote, were “Amerika verpflichtet, 
Deutschland verbunden [obligated to the United States, tied to 
Germany].”323  
The slogan Amerika verpflichtet, Deutschland verbunden, as Cornelia 
Wilhelm has shown, was popularized by the German American Bund, a 
                                                        
321 Fritz Spindler to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-319. Another example of such 
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(HSTA 12460-45, 1937-1033). 
322 Otto Köhler to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1936-1492. 
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pro-Nazi organization of ethnic Germans living in the United States. The 
Bund’s members admired the achievements of the “New Germany” and 
propagated an ideology of anti-Semitism, anti-Communism, and, later, 
isolationism, which aimed to prevent the United States from joining World 
War II on the Allied side. Their self-proclaimed purpose was to combat the 
“missing conscience among German-Americans regarding their cultural 
and völkisch roots in Germany.” Organizations like the Bund, Wilhelm 
argues, functioned as a space in which migrants could “for the first time 
experience the real Volksgemeinschaft.” 324  Köhler did not claim 
membership in the Bund, but his use of the slogan suggests at the very 
least some loose affiliation. The slogan’s repeated appearance in 
numerous letters testifies to its success.325 The Bund soon attracted the 
attention of American authorities, which became increasingly nervous 
about the proclamations of common “blood and race” that supposedly 
united all Germans, trumping political loyalties and citizenship.326  
Nevertheless, the letters show that German Americans did not simply 
“buy into” the message of National Socialism, whether propagated by the 
Bund or the VDA. In a particularly striking instance, Fritz Strecker of 
Staten Island recalled the “German Day” on 1 August 1937 with great 
joy.327 He described the constant pressures to shed all German “layers” in 
                                                        
324 Wilhelm, Bewegung oder Verein?, 65. 
325 For another example, see M. Haenel to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1937-1088. 
326 Wilhelm, Bewegung oder Verein?, 65. 
327 Annual “German Day” festivities were regarded as among the very few 
successful manifestations of unequivocal National Socialist ideology in the United 
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public and expressed his satisfaction with the possibility to “shed all 
American ‘layers’” during the German Day. There “we enjoyed our 
Frankfurters and Sauerkraut and beer […]. The German national anthem 
was well received and gladly sung.” But, he added,  
it was different with the Hitler salute. Heaven knows, we are 
all Americans here, after all, and not Hitlerians. Maybe most 
of those present, naturalized German-Americans, felt the 
same way. The Hitler flag and so on next to the American 
flag is “all right” in my opinion. There are many Germans in 
this country. But still, I must ask you: Has anyone here ever 
seen masses of British or French flags fly in celebration of 
British or French festivities? – And if the Italians do it, and 
the Bolsheviks, the German should feel like the Brit: 
Nobody challenges German rights, because the USA is as 
German as it is British. Or is not?328  
 
Strecker had arrived in the United States in 1927 and had made a new 
home for himself and his family. And even though his own letter had 
alluded to the challenges of being German in the United States, Strecker 
remained certain that Germans had their rightful place in American society. 
Moreover, he felt that celebrations of German heritage, such as the one 
that took place on the “German Day,” reaffirmed his position as an 
American: his German “stock” put him on equal terms with other “white” 
Americans. Italian politicians like New York mayor La Guardia, he argued, 
would remain the exception, since “Southern Humanity” belonged to the 
Southern hemisphere of the Americas. “North America will remain, if God 
                                                                                                                                                       
States, as a “Yes for NS-Germany” (see especially: Kipphan, Deutsche 
Propaganda, 54). 
328 Fritz Strecker to VDA, 12460, 41-1937-1156. 
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permits, Nordic, Saxon! Well, let’s say Germanic; the Anglo-Saxons are a 
part of it, Scandinavians and Dutch, too.” As such, the homeland 
nationalism expressed at “German Day” celebrations reflected Strecker’s 
pragmatic belief in the redemption of German America. He also echoed 
the nationalist racialism of Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard and other 
proponents of a “white” United States, thus underlining his belief in the 
racial privilege of German Americans (see also Chapter 3).   
Strecker was optimistic that the United States would accept a certain 
amount of old-world patriotism among its migrant population. In the United 
States, he argued, “man stands above the state that he constitutes to 
protect his freedom.” And despite the fact that the freedom may have had 
some shortcomings, Strecker rejected German reproaches about German 
American assimilation: 
In Germany one tends to call that cowardice, weakness or 
treason against Germandom, against Germany. But in the 
end to every German the fatherland means just as much, 
as the Germans means to the fatherland. […] In other 
words: May the fatherland serve the German! If the 
fatherland serves the German, then, maybe the German 
abroad will also serve the fatherland.329 
 
Strecker’s letter thus articulated a complex relationship between German 
migrants and the Nazi state. Strecker had attached a note to his letter, 
writing that he had long hesitated to send it, because it contained “political 
opinions.” But, he added, “I believe that every man has a right to have his 
                                                        
329 Fritz Strecker to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1937-1156. 
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own opinion and soul.” Moreover, in yet another note attached to the letter, 
Strecker’s wife apologized for her husband’s harsh words: “He has not 
fully recovered from his nervous breakdown.”330  
Despite acknowledging the benefits of the United States, however, 
many writers voiced a general sense of loss and unhappiness, 
denouncing the United States as a corrupt and heartless country. Käte 
Küchler, who lived on New York’s Upper East Side, for example, praised 
the American health care and education systems, food and electricity 
prices, the radio, and the availability of consumer items, such as electric 
washing and sewing machines. Even though her husband, a painter, had 
trouble finding steady employment, a union salary ensured that all bills 
were paid. “I don’t know how a worker scrapes by a living in a Berlin 
tenement,” Küchler ruminated, “maybe he envies me.”331 At the same time, 
life in New York and the recent economic crisis had left her with a bitter 
sense of disappointment. “Often, I keep a yearning watch for the rays of 
sunshine that have long left us in our street shafts […] but are cheerfully 
reflected in the windows of the high elegant residential hotels that are 20 
stories high or more.” 332 Life back home may have been hard, Küchler 
continued, but  
on Sundays we packed our backpacks and off we went into 
the wonderful nature with our wonderful folk songs. What a 
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happy wanderer my husband was and I tippy-toed next to 
him in good spirits, oh and that gave us strength for the 
whole long workweek.333 
 
Küchler concluded her letter with a lament: “We are uprooted, that is the 
tragedy of our life here, never will I take roots here, from the Heimat we 
are weaned […] and here you are only a foreigner and a German one at 
that.”334  
With the Heimatbriefe, the VDA appealed to emotions of loss and 
disappointment, prevalent in many German American attitudes towards 
both Germany and the United States. The editors connected the plight of 
individuals and the national community to global changes threatening the 
economic, cultural and, ultimately, racial survival of Germans and 
Germanness across the globe. By invoking the Heimat, they spun a web 
that promised to alleviate the metaphysical sense of loss with 
transnational solidarity but also exploited economic and cultural fears by 
playing into omnipresent notions of social and racial Darwinism, which 
depicted Germany in a dramatic struggle for survival with its enemies. 
Nazi visions of the Volksgemeinschaft propagated collectivism over 
individualism and freedom from the bonds of global capitalism at a time 
when capitalism was experiencing its largest crisis to date. The letters 
show that many migrants accepted such “old world propaganda.” 
Paradoxically, however, the exchange also helped German migrants to 
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imagine and assert their position in American society. Shifting perceptions 
of racial and civic belonging to the American body politic were 
simultaneously undermined and reinforced by transnational exchanges 
between German America and the Heimat: the Heimat back home helped 
German Americans find a Heimat abroad.  
6. Conclusion 
 
As the above examples show, German-language migrants continually 
re-imagined their position in American society through a prism that 
included both a retrospective memory of the migratory experience and the 
Heimat and a projective consideration of contemporary political, social, 
and economic events. The relationship between migrant, homeland, and 
host society depended on individual assessments of inclusion or exclusion, 
of opportunity or the lack thereof. Many migrants had left Germany for 
pragmatic reasons, and used the same criteria to judge their presence and 
future prospects in the United States. Strecker or Küchler may have 
agreed on defining Germanness in terms of racial heritage, but they chose 
their loyalties in ways that reflected their experiences. In judging the 
present through the lens of the past, they integrated into and became a 
part of the diverse, heterogeneous United States. The next three chapters 
will discuss different manifestations of that process. 
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Chapter 3: The Campaign Against the “Black Shame” - 
Race and Whiteness in German America 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On March 1, 1921, most New York newspapers, and many others 
around the country, had the same big story on their front page, describing 
an event that highlighted the political fault lines dividing the city: “Probably 
the greatest meeting New York City has known,” noted the New York 
American, “was held in and around Madison Square Garden last night.” 
“Fifteen thousand persons crowded into Madison Square Garden,” 
reported the New York Herald. And even though the New York Times had 
counted only 12,000 that night, it also devoted front-page coverage to a 
controversial event, the apex of a vicious debate that had divided the 
United States in the weeks before: The “Horror on the Rhine Mass 
Meeting” on February 28, 1921. 335  Organized by a diffuse group of 
individuals – appropriately named “The New York Campaign Committee 
Against the Horror on the Rhine” – the meeting was the result of months of 
public protest against the presence and purported crimes of black African 
occupation troops from Northern Africa, Senegal, and Madagascar against 
                                                        
335 The campaign against the “Horror on the Rhine” in the United States has 
escaped historical scrutiny almost entirely so far. One exception that mentions 
the American context of the campaign in passing is: Keith L. Nelson, “The ‘Black 
Horror on the Rhine’: Race as a Factor in Post-World War I Diplomacy,” in: 
Journal of Modern History 42(1970): 606-627. 
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the local German population during the French occupation of the 
Rhineland following World War I. 
This chapter explores the politics of race that permeated the “Horror on 
the Rhine,” thus offering a new angle into the persistent presence of 
German America in the political discourse of the United States in the 
interwar era. I argue that a coalition of German and Irish Americans 
coalesced around this transnational cause to reaffirm their right to speak 
and participate in the American public sphere, from which they felt unjustly 
excluded. As one speaker at the event, the distinguished veteran Colonel 
Alexander Edward Anderson put it: as Americans, “we have the duty to 
protest against such kind of occupation. (Applause.) You would not be 
loyal to your own blood, you would not be loyal to humanity, and not being 
loyal to humanity, you could by any manner of chance be loyal to the 
traditions of America.”336 The participants thus reaffirmed a familiar pattern 
of claiming whiteness to earn civic and material inclusion in the United 
States. Moreover, looking back at a Germany that many participants had 
“never seen […] except through the eye of imagination”337 this diverse, 
heterogeneous group of Americans employed a transnational lens, which 
allowed them to redefine their heritage as cultural and racial credit in the 
struggle against “Americanism” and for participation in the American public 
sphere.  
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New York Campaign Committee Against the Horrors on the Rhine, 1921), 14. 
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This chapter will discuss the origins of that history by reinserting the 
debate of race and belonging in the history of transatlantic migration. Race 
and national identity converged in discursive negotiations of hyphenated 
belonging among German Americans during the early 1920s. These 
intersections also implicated questions of class and gender, but those will 
receive more attention in the following chapters. After summarizing the 
historical importance of race and racial thought – particularly as it 
pertained to questions of immigration and immigrant rights – I turn to the 
events in Germany. The “Horror on the Rhine” caused a socio-political 
wave of protest and indignation large enough to cross the Atlantic to the 
United States, where it provided the context that highlighted questions of 
belonging and that left a permanent impression on German American 
identity abroad. Finally, the chapter briefly explores implications of such 
transnational negotiations of whiteness and belonging upon the German 
American interwar experience. 
2. Race, Whiteness, and German America 
 
The plight of African-American slaves and their descendants as well as 
central structures of exclusion, violence, and inequality have left indelible 
marks on U.S society. They have defined the country’s history from the 
day European settlers and their slaves arrived on North American shores. 
For almost as long, countless scholars and scientists have attempted to 
justify, criticize, or simply explain the discrepancies between the American 
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promise and its reality as well as the asymmetrical relations of power 
among the nation’s heterogeneous populations. Race, in its various 
theoretical manifestations 338 , has been frequently invoked, not least 
because “white” settlers legitimized conquest and slavery based on the 
inherent superiority of Anglo-Saxons. Though notoriously intangible, race 
has thus become “the lingua franca of American society and politics.”339 
Ironically, even though the founders of the Republic practiced slavery 
while preaching freedom, and preached peace while unleashing war on 
the continent’s indigenous populations, the metaphorical blame for the 
contentious conflicts that followed has often been shifted to its victims. 
White explanations for racial strife typically assailed people of color by 
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emphasizing not the contentious history of white racism but the mere 
presence of blacks in the white United States. Thus, post-Civil War 
Southern lore romanticized its antebellum history as an era of stability and 
order, while Northerners unfamiliar with conditions in the South frequently 
blamed the seeming lack of civic engagement among African-Americans 
on their innate inferiority rather than realizing the impact of violent 
intimidation and continuous suppression. In other words, the “race 
problem” became the “Negro problem”.340 
In recent years, however, scholars have deconstructed the scientific 
myth of whiteness as well as the cultural narratives that enabled and 
enforced it. 341  As Matthew Frye Jacobson writes, “[t]he contest over 
whiteness—its definition, its internal hierarchies, its proper boundaries, 
and its rightful claimants—has been critical to American culture throughout 
the nation’s history, and it has been a fairly untidy affair.”342 Whiteness, in 
that sense, never simply equaled race and signified more than merely skin 
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color. Instead, it represented power and social capital. 343  In the U.S. 
Northeast, for example, where more established Americans frequently 
defended their cultural and social advantage vis-à-vis European 
immigrants from Ireland, Germany, Italy, and Eastern Europe, “race was 
marked by language, nationality, religions, and social status, as well as by 
color.”344 Many of the new immigrants of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century faced challenges to their whiteness and were only 
accepted as “white” over time.345 Race, Jacobson explains, “is a theory of 
who is who, of who belongs and who does not, of who deserves what and 
who is capable of what.”346 The struggle over race and whiteness was 
thus part of the larger cultural competition between disparate and 
heterogeneous populations that met, and often clashed, in the United 
States. And while it frequently intersected with religious and political 
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discrimination, by the early twentieth century it emerged as the staple of 
the xenophobic nativism that attempted to regulate immigration and close 
the “Golden Door” for most of the world’s population.347 
During the 1920s, Americans discussed questions of racial belonging 
in the context of emerging political threats, particularly Bolshevism, which 
anti-immigration activists described as a “condition” rather than a mindset, 
thus questioning not only the loyalty of immigrants, but their “racial” 
compatibility with the institutions of American democracy.348 Americans 
with ethnic backgrounds in Northern and Western Europe viewed 
immigrants, especially from Southern and Eastern Europe, “as white but 
inferior to northwest European ‘Nordics’.” 349  Even Progressives, who 
aimed to educate the newcomers questioned immigrants’ inherent ability 
to participate in American civic society. They embodied, writes Matthew 
Guterl, Richard Hofstadter’s “classic description of the Progressives as 
conservative anti-Semites, paranoid fascists, and zealous rivals of the 
upstart robber barons. […] The growth of the cultural institutions in the 
early twentieth century was an integral part of patrician efforts to resolidify 
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cultural authority and social status.” 350  Immigrants often responded 
indignantly by showcasing their ability to blend and assimilate into white 
America.351 
At the same time, however, other newcomers were unwilling to simply 
submit themselves to that logic. Irish and German Americans especially 
resisted the “Anglo-Saxon argument,” which emphasized the kinship of the 
United States and England. They felt left out of and excluded from the 
narrative that established a normative American national identity as British 
derived. An Irish newspaper thus once complained about school curricula 
teaching “each rising generation of Irish, German, French, Scandinavian, 
Polish, Italian and other children that they were the descendants of a class 
of commercial marauders in England styling themselves the great ‘Anglo-
Saxon race.’”352 This resentment conflicted with immigrants’ definition of 
their own destinies in the United States and ran afoul of their treasured 
heritage as Irish or Germans (or French or Italians). Irish Americans in 
particular could not overlook the cruel irony of living in a country 
dominated by Anglo-Saxons, whose rule they had tried to escape by 
coming to the United States in the first place. Why would they shed their 
history at the request of the old colonizer? 353  Many other Americans 
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agreed. Progressive era proponents of cultural and ethnic pluralism like 
Horace Kallen and Randolph Bourne thought that American democracy 
was well suited for a diversity of sorts: “Democracy,” wrote Kallen, 
“involves not the elimination of differences,” but their “perfection and 
conservation.”354 Similarly, Bourne argued that an American “cosmopolitan” 
ideal should draw on the various immigrant traditions to serve a 
democratic culture – he even called for “dual citizenship.”355 Supporters of 
ethnic nationalism went even further: they wanted to nurture old world 
identities in the United States, fighting for the homeland’s future on the 
American front.356 
The racial discourse in the United States entered a new age when 
millions of African-Americans migrated to the urban North to escape the 
vicious and violent racism of the South. It was during the 1920s that the 
“Negro” began to be perceived as the “utmost social threat” and whiteness 
brought an opportunity for recent immigrants, particularly from Eastern 
and Southern Europe, to remake themselves into members of the white 
establishment.357 When race riots broke out in cities across the United 
States in 1919, it signaled that the line between white and non-white had 
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finally begun to blur. Race, a term still frequently used to signify national 
heritage (i.e. the German “race,” the Irish “race”) increasingly came to 
mean color.358 For European immigrants living in the very cities that were 
the final destination for most African-Americans – such as Chicago, New 
York, and Philadelphia – the differences between Italians, Irish, Germans, 
Czechs, Poles and countless others slowly disappeared and after the 
1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act foreclosed immigration, “the 
development of a racialized consumer society speeded the absolute 
assimilation of immigrant groups (previously understood as racially 
distinct) into the singular ‘white race.’”359   
The discourse about race and belonging cannot be accurately 
captured without pointing to the complex history of global 
imperialism/colonialism. The supremacy of the “white race” was an 
essential ideological trope to legitimize all colonial conquests. In the 
United State, it, too, helped justify the displacement of Native Americans 
under the ruse of “Manifest Destiny.” And race certainly played a critical 
role during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when both 
Germany and the United States reached out for colonies beyond their 
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immediate continental neighborhood. 360  Colonial settings provided 
opportunities to assert white masculinity in the context of imperial war and 
this was especially true for immigrants lingering on the boundaries of 
whiteness: As colonial soldiers they could prove their virtue and civilization. 
The colonial context gave immigrants the opportunity to include 
themselves in the “white race” while simultaneously excluding the 
“savages.” 361  Imperialism “fostered a pan-European, pan-white political 
sensibility that countervailed the otherwise divisive logic of Anglo-Saxon 
supremacy dominating other arenas of public discourse.”362 Moreover, it 
“left a heritage of race-feelings that enriched the emotional appeal of 
Anglo-Saxon nativism.”363 
For German immigrants arriving in the United States during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the imperial arena provided a 
transnational logic to explain human hierarchies. Germany, after all, had 
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recently engaged in colonial adventures of its own, and narratives of white 
supremacy permeated the fabric of German everyday life. It was no 
wonder that German Americans fought in America’s imperial wars in great 
numbers.364 In the colonies, the coexistence of whites and blacks was 
never a problem as long as no one transgressed social hierarchies 
between colonizers and colonized. In that sense, U.S. imperial endeavors 
also added another complicated layer to debates on American citizenship 
and belonging. American discourse alternated between self-confidence 
and a sense of cultural crisis, “between a belief in the superiority of the 
Anglo-Saxon race and a fear that ‘the race’ could be corrupted through 
miscegenous [sic] relations with immigrants and ‘Negroes,’ and through 
the mere fact of overlordship in tropical climates.” 365  A broad anti-
imperialist movement used the racial logic to paint a dooming picture of 
the “post-colonial” age, when the United States was to accept “the peons, 
negroes, and Indians of all sorts, the wild tribe of Comanches, the bug-
and-lizard-eating ‘Diggers,’ and other half-monkey savages […] as equal 
citizens of the United States.”366 In fact, the notion that these “savages”, 
Native Americans, African Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, Mexicans, etc., 
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were not suited for American citizenship was one of the very few matters 
that both imperialists and anti-imperialists could agree on.367 
Colonial settings reinforced the notion that race was a defining factor in 
human history and that the purity and dominance of the “white race” 
needed to be preserved. “The policing of sexual boundaries—the defense 
against hybridity—is precisely what keeps a racial group a racial group. 
[…] Thus sexuality is one site at which all the economic advantages, 
political privileges, and social benefits inhering in a cultural invention like 
Caucasian converge and reside.”368  Sexuality, then, was precisely the 
area where critics of both German and American colonialism, saw the 
“barbarizing repercussions.” In other words, contact with uncivilized 
peoples, especially sexual contact, threatened the racial purity and 
integrity of the colonizers. Germany and the United States shared a 
colonial experience in that sexuality and miscegenation played critical 
roles in the making of “race” and the protection of the boundaries thus 
established.369 
In this context, it is important to note that a transatlantic “scientific” 
community provided the logic of racial difference, which defined the ways 
in which Americans and Germans thought about human hierarchies. 
                                                        
367 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 103; Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different 
Color, 211; Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 27. 
368 Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 3. 
369 Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-
Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 19-54; Gisela 
Lebzelter, “Die ‘Schwarze Schmach:’ Vorurteile – Propaganda – Mythos,” 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 11 (1985), 40 FN 9. 
  149
Academic racism and eugenics were part of a dominant belief system 
among a populace ready to trust “scientific” explanations. Madison Grant 
(1865-1937), an influential American eugenicist, argued that “Members of 
the Nordic race, if they hoped to secure their tenuous grasp on world 
domination and genetic magnificence, needed to recognize the 
transnational, transreligious, translinguistic, and transatlantic nature of 
their racial identity.”370 For many observers, World War I was the catalyst 
of a more forceful argument. If increasing immigration, crime, and (for 
some) alcoholism had not already been ample warnings of the impending 
decline of white civilization, World War I certainly amounted to a racial 
suicide of global proportions. “From a race point of view,” wrote Grant in 
his influential 1916 work The Passing of the Great Race, “the present 
European conflict is essentially a civil war and nearly all of the officers and 
a large proportion of the men on both sides are members of [the Nordic] 
race.”371 His point was that instead of killing each other, Europeans should 
collaborate with their white American kin to defend their continents against 
the onslaught of a (perceived) non-white aggression.   
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Such theories also reached German America during and immediately 
following the “Great War.” The Philadelphia Tageblatt, a Philadelphia-
based German-language newspaper published in cooperation with the 
German unions, positively reviewed the publication of the 1920 treatise 
The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy by the journalist 
and historian Lothrop Stoddard (1883-1950). Stoddard had predicted the 
weakening of the white race due to immigration and miscegenation and 
warned of an impending racial war between whites and non-whites. The 
difference between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Tageblatt 
wrote, was that “now white people are more or less in a defensive role 
against a dreadful wave, which rolls against it and that will be especially 
dangerous, now that the yellow races [sic] have learned so much in the 
World War.” 372 This particular Tageblatt piece made no mention of the 
Great Migration, but as Russell Kazal has shown, the newspaper 
constantly reported on the increasing presence of African-Americans in 
Philadelphia’s German districts and it progressively moved towards a 
position that identified black migration as a threat, showing a stance that 
shifted “from indifference to concern and, at times, pronounced fear and 
hostility.” 373  
This shift reflected an overarching trend among German Americans. In 
fact, by the end of World War I, many felt threatened by the presence of 
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blacks in traditional white neighborhoods like Philadelphia’s Germantown 
– as did other white Philadelphians. They responded with exclusion, 
intimidation and sometimes outright violence, while others began fleeing 
the city for the suburbs. In doing so, they joined forces with other 
immigrant groups – Poles, Russians, Italians and especially Irish. 374 
During the 1920s and 1930s, many German Americans in Philadelphia, 
particularly those of working-class and Catholic backgrounds, 
“increasingly saw themselves as sharing identities in common with other 
European-Americans, including the ‘new immigrants’ entering their 
neighborhoods and parishes.” Their “common denominator,” writes Kazal 
about Philadelphia-Germans, was their whiteness: 
Their touchstone was the Great Migration, which brought 
tens of thousands of black Southerners to Philadelphia in the 
late 1910s and 1920s, and saw large numbers of African 
Americans settle, for the first time, on the edges of 
traditionally German neighborhoods. These changes gave 
such ‘not-black’ identities, including white identity, greater 
salience for German Catholics and workers, at precisely the 
moment they were starting to mix with Slavs, Italians, and 
the Irish.375 
While this may seem like a convincing argument for assimilation, the 
answer is more complex. To be sure, whiteness was a solidifying factor in 
the “Americanization” of German America. At the same time, however, for 
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many migrants their Germanness was constitutive of their whiteness. In 
other words, by celebrating their German roots, German Americans could 
place themselves among the ranks of America’s established elites.  
3. “Black Horror on the Rhine”  
 
In the months after the Armistice in November 1918, Germany was in 
chaos: small and large revolutions erupted across the country while the 
population confronted the collapse of the Second Reich and the 
unconditional surrender of its troops to allied forces. The Versailles Treaty 
furthered German humiliation in its insistence that Germany alone was 
responsible for World War I. 376  Many conservative elites, who had 
enthusiastically supported the war and had dreamt of a global empire, now 
needed to explain and to escape the crisis. Driven by a blend of nationalist 
ire and anxiety, these elites soon singled out a number of scapegoats to 
blame for the current crisis, including the “dishonorable French,” “Jewish 
press scoundrels,” “the “November criminals,” who had signed the 
Versailles Treaty and thus subjected Germany to its harsh conditions.377 
Perhaps the gravest provocation occurred in the winter of 1918/19, when 
between 25,000 and 45,000 French colonial soldiers from Northern Africa, 
Senegal, and Madagascar entered the Rhineland – an area west of the 
Rhine bordering the Netherlands and Belgium – as part of the French 
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occupation forces. They became known as the “black beasts.”378 To many 
Germans, and as we shall see to many others, the presence of these 
black troops signaled the fulfillment of the worst fears voiced by Stoddard, 
Grant and others: African occupiers on hallowed German grounds. It was 
one thing to be at war with whites – to be occupied by black colonials was 
quite another. 
The presence of these troops as occupiers became a critical rallying 
point to reestablish the faltering power base of German conservatives and 
reunite a divided German populace around a reactionary ideology.379 They 
inspired a campaign anchored in the discourse of self-victimization and 
self-pity, which dovetailed with a broader narrative of duty and obligation 
that appealed to the “national honor” of the German people in the face of 
“national catastrophe”. During its height, from early 1920 to late 1922, a 
wide coalition of public officials, including Secretary of State Adolf Köster 
and Chancellor Gustav Stresemann, activists, politicians, and journalists 
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bitterly complained about the alleged sexual and violent transgressions of 
African soldiers against the German population – especially women and 
children. While the German government quietly supported and 
coordinated private activities, such as independent civic initiatives, against 
the “Black Shame,” newspapers ensured that horror stories about rape 
and murder reached all corners of the country.380  
To be sure, the press and authorities either exaggerated or plainly lied. 
Even German observers asserted that African troops381 were often more 
disciplined than their French counterparts and that there was no evidence 
of systematic transgressions. In other words, the stories were a campaign 
of fabrication and myth, which played into the racist prejudices of both 
elites and many “average” Germans. 382  Individual cases of sexual 
transgression and violence against the German population, especially 
women and children, were used to argue that African soldiers were, by 
their very nature, sexual predators. “The image of a white (often naked) 
German woman raped by a black soldier endowed with dangerous, 
                                                        
380 Roos, “Nationalism, Racism, and Propaganda,” 51. Nelson, “Black Horror,” 
615. 
381 Interestingly, even though some debates about the boundaries of blackness 
ensued among the Allies, since the troops not only originated from Senegal, and 
Madagascar but also from Northern Africa, no such thing occurred in Germany. 
In fact “the Germans never tired of pointing out, that many of the North Africans 
were so ‘black’ as to be indistinguishable from Negroes.” Nelson, “Black Horror,” 
611. Americans frequently shared that opinion. Senator Gilbert Hitchock (D-
Nebr.) argued a few years later that “there is no need to make a distinction 
[between the Senegalese and the Algerian and the Moroccan]. They are men of 
an inferior, half-civilized race. They are brutes when stationed among white 
people, as the evidence shows.” (quoted in: Nelson, “Black Horror,” 623.) 
382 Lebzelter, “Schwarze Schmach,” 41-47.  
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‘primitive’ sexual instincts lies at the heart of the ‘Black Shame’ discourse,” 
writes Iris Wigger, who recently published the most exhaustive account of 
the period thus far.383 However, if there ever was any concern for the 
putative victims, it was marginal at best. After all, “German women on the 
Rhine were predominantly not physical victims of black troops, but 
symbolic victims of a campaign which peddled racist, sexist and 
pornographic imagery and manufactured a nationwide crisis where one 
did not exist.” Wigger argues that such figurative victimization and 
humiliation reflected patriarchal anxieties and repressed sexual fantasies 
projected onto a context of national crisis. Mistreated female bodies, in 
that sense, became symbols of a defeated, powerless German nation and, 
equally important, a threatened white race.384 More than merely insulting 
Germany, campaigners argued that the black troops weakened the 
whiteness of the German people. By sending them to Germany, the Allies, 
and particularly the French, metaphorically excluded Germany from 
membership in the white world and undermined the “political solidarity of 
Europe.”385  
From a contemporary perspective, it is hard to miss the cruel irony 
behind such statements only months after the military tactics of the “Great 
War” had contemptuously abandoned the morality and human dignity of 
“civilized nations” – let alone solidarity among Europeans. This irony did 
                                                        
383 Wigger, “Black Shame,” 38 and Wigger, “Schwarze Schmach am Rhein”. 
384 Wigger, “Black Shame,” 38. 
385 Lebzelter, “Schwarze Schmach,” 40-43. 
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not escape everyone, but the protests against the “black shame” 
nonetheless enjoyed popular support from the German public and nearly 
all political parties. 386  It seemed as if the simultaneous international 
discourse on eugenics and “racial purity” that I have discussed above 
remade female German victims into a “suitable metaphor for [the] idea of 
the nation, grounded in blood.”387 The ideology behind the notion of “white 
civilization” was, after all, transnational in scope. As the campaign against 
the “Black Shame” took off, German nationalists quickly realized that 
many former enemies shared the same commitment to uphold racial 
hierarchies. Support for the campaign came from all over the globe, 
including Great Britain, the United States, and even France and it became, 
according to historian Julia Roos, “one of the most important propaganda 
efforts of the Weimar period.” 388  In England, the well-known British 
journalist E.D. Morel drafted a pamphlet, in which he protested against the 
“colored outrages,” while the American feminist Ray Beveridge actively 
lobbied for the cause in Germany.389 The case became an “international 
cause célèbre“ when more and more public figures – politicians, scientists, 
                                                        
386 Roos, “Nationalism, Racism, and Propaganda,” 46-47. See also: Lebzelter, 
“Schwarze Schmach,” 39. Notable exceptions were the Communists and the 
Independent Social Democrats. It is also worth noting that some politicians, 
especially those from the far left, challenged the racist discourse, but were either 
ignored or ostracized by their moderate and conservative colleagues. (Lebzelter, 
“Schwarze Schmach,” 43) 
387 Wigger, “Black Shame,” 39. 
388 Roos, “Nationalism, Racism, and Propaganda,” 45. See also: Nelson, “Black 
Horror,” passim. 
389 Nelson, “Black Horror,” 616. Nelson writes: “Fifty thousand Swedish women 
signed a statement supporting [E.D. Morel’s] views, and similar expressions of 
opinion were organized in Norway, Italy, and France itself.” 
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activists – joined the cause and various government agencies organized 
and sponsored demonstrations and protests, particularly with the support 
of women’s groups.390  
After the Allies rejected initial attempts to discourage the stationing of 
black troops in the Rhineland,391 campaign organizers realized that the 
United States was their most likely ally, not least because of the large 
German American community. As I have discussed above, the United 
States was hostile towards its own minorities; the race riots of 1919 had 
their roots in white hostility to their own black troops in the American 
Expeditionary Forces. It is hard to ascertain whether or not German 
activists adapted American “race tactics” in order to combat occupation 
and French domination. But groups like the Deutsche Studentenschaft 
(DSt), a German student organization, whose overtly racist message 
included a warning that “[t]hese coloured beasts covet the fair, blueeyed 
daughters of the Moselle,” 392  seized the opportunity and sent a large 
number of pamphlets across the Atlantic as early as Spring of 1919. 
Though the exact organizational structure behind these international 
efforts, if one ever existed, remains unclear, there can be no doubt that 
groups like the DSt specifically targeted German American organizations 
                                                        
390 Nelson, “Black Horror,” 614-616. 
391 Nelson, “Black Horror,” 608-609 and 614. 
392 “Coloured Beasts in Trier,” Veröffentlichungen der wahren Absichten und der 
unerhörten Uebergriffe Frankreichs, No. 24, English version, undated, page 1. 
GSP Philadelphia, German-Americana II, 501, Folder 2. The pamphlet was 
presumably published in early to mid-1919 since no. 33 lamented “Six Months of 
French Administration in Ruhr and Rhine District”. French colonial troops had first 
moved into Germany in the winter of 1918/9 (Nelson, “Black Horror,” 608-609). 
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like the German Society of Pennsylvania to spread their message.393 This 
strategy was completely in tune with the official line of German foreign 
policy at the time, which – though incapacitated – had finally begun to 
understand that culture would be a viable political argument in the years to 
come. A positive image of Germany could bring great political and 
economic advantage, and Germans abroad became an important factor, 
especially in countries were they could wield significant political influence 
– like the United States, which rapidly emerged as a global leader.394 
Accordingly, those behind the “Black Horror” activism attempted to rally 
Americans of German heritage group around a common cause. 
Pamphlets, which were often sent in both English and German,395 usually 
contained the appeal in bold letters: “Give this paper to every body 
[sic]!”396 Similar pamphlets regularly reached the German Society in 1919 
and 1920. These publications frequently contained images that depicted, 
for example, black French troops guarding historical castles on the Rhine 
River.397 [Fig. 1+2, see end of chapter] They also demanded that Germans 
abroad heed their duty to support the fatherland: “We remind you of a 
great duty: Respond to lies and canards of the enemy press with all 
certainty. Report to us and send us the articles for or against our work, so 
                                                        
393 One indication is that multiple pamphlets specifically addressed to the 
German Society have survived in their Philadelphia archives. See previous 
footnote. 
394 See Chapter 2, Section 4.1. 
395 Some German pamphlets also contained an appeal to translate them. 
396 Veröffentlichungen der wahren Absichten, loc. cit., No. 24, 2. 
397 Veröffentlichungen der wahren Absichten, loc. cit., No. 33.  
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that we can rip off this world’s mask of lies and deception.” Listing the “lies” 
of the allied presses, the same pamphlet proclaimed in bold letters: “The 
whole world is against us.”398 Later editions of the pamphlet contained 
reprints of similar articles and cartoons from around the world, particularly 
the United States. [Fig. 3]  
To be sure, we do not know enough about the motives, goals, 
strategies and impact of the plans of those behind those pamphlets. 
However, the point of this chapter, as noted above, is not to provide a 
complete history but rather to establish a novel storyline, a way of 
transnational storytelling that opens up a new historiographical realm for 
future research. In order to do so, we must now turn to the enactment of 
the “Black Horror” in the United States, or, in other words, its 
Americanization.  
4. The Americanization of the “Black Horror” 
 
The news of a potential conflict in the Rhineland reached the White 
House almost immediately after the Armistice. President Woodrow Wilson, 
a fierce and aggressive defender of white supremacy and segregation, 
pressed the French Premier Georges Clemenceau on the matter of black 
African troops as occupation forces: “I have been told that the French 
government has the intention of sending Senegalese into the left bank [of 
the Rhine]. Is this true?,” he asked Clemenceau in early 1919. The French 
                                                        
398 Undated pamphlet, GSP Philadelphia, German-Americana II, 501, Folder 2. 
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Premier responded that he planned to withdraw the one battalion currently 
in the Rhineland, “for I believe as you do that it would be a grave error to 
occupy the left bank with black troops.” 399  A few weeks earlier, an 
American official had warned a French colleague that the presence of 
black occupation soldiers could be exploited for political purposes: “One or 
two cases of rape, committed by your blacks on the German women, well 
advertised in the southern states of America, where there are very definite 
views with regard to the Blackmen [sic], would likely greatly reduce the 
esteem in which the French are held.”400  
First reports reprinted from German newspapers – a common practice 
during the time – appeared in the German American press in the spring of 
1920; by early June enough letters from angry American citizens had 
reached the State Department to prompt President Wilson to investigate 
the matter. He solicited reports from several officials working in Europe, 
among them the American commissioner in Berlin, Ellis Loring Dresel, and 
the American commander in Coblenz, General Henry T. Allen. Both 
reports concluded that the German claims were vastly exaggerated. But 
while the Wilson administration consequently did not further pursue the 
issue, German American nationalists like George Sylvester Viereck 
                                                        
399 Recounted in: Nelson,”Black Horror,” 610. 
400 Nelson,”Black Horror,” 610. In his American Monthly, George Sylvester 
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easy complaisance of French grisettes. What dangerous fires may not be kindled 
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negroes, may, with impunity, terrorize and assault white women?” See: 
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increased their public pressure. His magazine Viereck’s American Monthly 
reported extensively on the issue, arguing that “French niggers rape, slay 
and mutilate German women,” 401  and favored a proactive German 
American response to defend German purity both in the United States and 
in Europe: “German-Americans Organize!”402 Viereck allowed other writers 
to use his magazine as a platform for similar agitation. For example, in its 
November 1920s issue, the conservative American actress Ray Beveridge, 
who had spent almost the entire war in Germany, warned the Monthly’s 
readers of a “Negro Reign of Terror in Germany.”403  
                                                        
401 “International Blackmail,” VAM 12:1 (March, 1920), 5. See also: “French 
Bestiality in the Saar District,” VAM 12:2 (April, 1920), 60; “French Reign of 
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(April, 1921), 43-44; “The Negroid in the Woodpile,” VAM 13:3 (May, 1921), 77. 
402 “German-Americans Organize!” VAM 12:1 (March 1920), 18. See also in the 
same issue: “Mob Rule in America,” 27. And: “Organize! Organize! Organize!” 
VAM 12:2 (April, 1920), 47; “America’s Moral Duty,” VAM 12:3 (May, 1920), 69; 
“Are We An English People?” VAM 12:5 (July, 1920), 148-149; “Deutsche 
Heraus!” VAM 12:6 (August, 1920), 167; “What We Expect from President 
Harding,” VAM 12:11 (January, 1921), 325; “The Black Hand of Paris Spurned by 
German Americans,” VAM 13:1 (March, 1921), 6-7. 
403 Ray Beveridge, “Negro Reign of Terror in Germany,” VAM 12:9 (November, 
1920), 264-5 and “Black Terror in Germany,” VAM 12:10 (December, 1920), 301-
302. 
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One particularly appalling example of German American activism 
appeared in the December 1920 issue of the Monthly. Viereck reprinted 
an open letter by the playwright, poet, and protégé of Ambrose Bierce, 
Herman George Scheffauer (1878-1927) to James Weldon Johnson 
(1871-1938) of the NAACP: “You yourself, sir,” Scheffauer wrote 
addressing Johnson, “as an enlightened and cultured man of color must 
surely be aware that it is an unforgivable crime to introduce these savages, 
fresh from the wilds […] into a community of highly-cultured white people 
[…].” Scheffauer noted that “the orderly and educated American negro” 
was surely above “these savages,” but warned Johnson that the atrocities 
“will irreparably damage the just cause of the American negro and alienate 
all European sympathies for the wrongs and tortures inflicted upon him.” 
Thus, Scheffauer concluded, the “National Association must denounce in 
the most unsparing terms the bestialities of theses savages, and put the 
blame where it belongs—upon the white French.”404 Apparently, Viereck 
had taken it upon himself to forward the letter – along with a copy of the 
Monthly – to Johnson, who wrote back to Viereck on December 11, 1920. 
His letter was a polite and firm response to a type of racism that Johnson 
was surely familiar with – a type of racism that drove the ideology 
contained in terms such as “civilization” and “culture.” The NAACP 
believed, Johnson wrote,  
                                                        
404 “American Negro’s Opportunity,” VAM 12:10 (December, 1920), 300; 
emphasis in original.  
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that crime is crime and is no whit worse when performed by 
Africans on Europeans than it is when committed by 
Europeans on Africans.  
We therefore strongly condemn in unmeasured terms such 
passages in your propaganda as imply or seem to imply that 
the heinousness of these alleged crimes lies principally in 
the color of the accused. 
On behalf of his organization, Johnson refused to participate in the 
activism against the presence of black troops. But, he added, turning his 
response into an anti-colonial critique, “we would gladly join you and 
anybody to ask for the removal of all troops from all parts of this war-sick 
world.”405 Viereck, of course, did not recognize (or ignored) the references 
to colonialism and racial injustice. For him, it was a missed opportunity for 
African-Americans to join ranks with German Americans. His ethnic group, 
Viereck argued, supported African-American demands for legal, political, 
and social equality. But the fact that Johnson and the NAACP now 
declined to take a strong position against such sexual breaches of the 
social contract regulating the coexistence of black and white in the United 
States, was reason enough for Viereck to issue a stern warning:  
BUT ONCE LET THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SUSPECT 
THAT BEHIND THE COLORED MAN’S DEMAND FOR 
SUCH EQUALITY THERE LURKS A FUTURE PURPOSE 
TO CLAIM RIGHTS ALSO TO WHITE WOMEN—AND THE 
FIRES OF BLIND, IRREPRESSIBLE, RACIAL CONFLICT 
WILL BE LIT IN AMERICA.406 
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Viereck surely hoped for broad support from the American public for 
his strong position. And indeed, Viereck’s activism must be seen as an 
attempt to steer German America back into the political and cultural center 
of U.S. society. During the presidential campaign of 1920, Viereck and his 
co-editor Edmund von Mach, one of the founders of the Steuben Society, 
thus juxtaposed the issue of racial purity and political equality in a quest 
for ethnic cohesion among German Americans and their acceptance 
among other Americans. They enlisted other prominent members from 
within and without the migrant community in an effort to mobilize public 
opinion against the “traitor” Wilson, who was deemed responsible for the 
terms of the Versailles treaty and thus the presence of the African troops 
on German soil.407 Supported by wealthy donors from the German and 
Irish American communities they established “The New York Campaign 
Committee Against the Horror on the Rhine” and printed thousands of 
pamphlets, which were distributed across the country.408  
                                                        
407 “The Treason of Versailles,” VAM 12:1 (March, 1920), 8-9. The article 
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By October, hyphenate newspapers across the East Coast and the 
Midwest printed agonizing accounts of the purported and largely unproven 
crimes committed by African soldiers, while also introducing various 
activities organized on a local level. In leading publications like the New 
Yorker Staatszeitung 409  and the Philadelphia Tageblatt, the Schwarze 
Schmach – the “black shame” – became a leading topic. The Tageblatt 
published eleven lengthy articles on black African troops in Germany in 
October and early November 1920, denouncing the “severe crimes 
against morality [schwere Sittlichkeitsverbrechen]”410 committed by French 
colonial troops. Usually reprinting or paraphrasing articles previously 
published by German newspapers, the Tageblatt listed specific details of 
the crimes and even names of the victims. Comparing the incidents to 
scenes from Dante’s Inferno, one report described the “dreadful agonies, 
which constantly, hourly threaten reputable German women, innocent girls 
in the spring of their lives and boys, still in their delicate childhood”. The 
“wild, African soldiers,” the article continued,  
indulge in their bestial appetites, uninhibited, even protected 
by their superiors. […] Blacks, […] savages from the darkest 
                                                                                                                                                       
George Sylvester Viereck, vice chairman Reverend Dr. William Popcke, a 
Lutheran clergyman who later served as the president of the United German 
Societies of New York and vice chairwoman Frida Muller Spiering, the wife of 
renowned violinist Theodore Bernays Spiering. (Addresses Delivered at the 
Horror on the Rhine Mass Meeting, passim). 
409 The Staatszeitung published a report by E.D. Morel in seven installments 
between October 7 and October 14, 1921 and published a number of articles and 
editorials on the topic. For example: “Mariannes Schmach,” Staatszeitung, 
October 17, 1921, 6; “Eine unbewußte Ehrenrettung,“ October 18, 1921, 4; see 
also: Nelson,”Black Horror,” 617/8. 
410 “Die schwarze Schmach,” Philadelphia Tageblatt, Oct. 3, 1920, 4. 
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Africa are dragged to the banks of the Rhein, to the heart of 
Europe, where they are to guard a white nation in a country 
of European culture a thousand years old. The black man, 
fetched from his clay hut from Africa’s Ivory Coast, to guard 
and threaten like slaves in Bonn and Mainz, in Worms and in 
Speyer, the descendants of those, who built the soaring 
Romanic and Gothic cathedrals there. The life and health of 
the members of a white Kulturnation at the mercy of the 
stupidity and wildness of black barbarians!411  
 
The outrage against the presence of black soldiers, manufactured as it 
was, transcended the social boundaries that otherwise divided the 
readership of Tageblatt and Staatszeitung. If there were any differences in 
reporting, they could be found in the stronger anti-French sentiments 
voiced in the latter. “The France of today,” one editorial on October 17th 
argued, “can no longer uphold the pretense that it will lead civilization to a 
good end and it shakes the current social order. The France of tomorrow 
will be barbarism [sic].”412  
By early 1921, the purported crimes of African soldiers in Germany 
were the dominant topic in the Tageblatt, while ranking second in the 
Staatszeitung, where the aid for hungering children in Germany attracted 
the greatest attention. In February, during the last four weeks before the 
mass meeting in New York City, 32 articles appeared in the Tageblatt, 
including six that were prominently displayed as national news on page 
one. On February 22nd, for example, the Tageblatt featured an article on 
the “Senegal-Neger” on its front page, two editorials on the topic and a 
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lengthy article critical of the American Legion’s attempts to mark the 
movement against the “black shame” as disloyal.413  The Staatszeitung 
published the same number articles, 32 in total, in less than two weeks 
before the mass meeting in New York. It even specifically called on its 
readers to attend the meeting, for example on February 20, 1921 on page 
1 [See Fig. 4]. 414 
German Americans uttered the same fears of black violence. For them, 
the presence of black troops was an affront to German culture and 
civilization and as such encapsulated the experience of many Germans 
around the world, whose self-confidence was shattered after World War I. 
After all, the years of the Great War had arguably been the period of 
German America’s largest humiliation to date. Moreover, activists 
repeatedly pointed out that public outrage was not directed against the 
black soldiers themselves but against the French government, who aimed 
to humiliate and, ultimately, erase the German nation. While German 
American leaders were not responsible for the defeat in World War I, they, 
too, had to explain why the German American community was subjected 
to such persecution and scrutiny during the war. The American fear of 
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German American disloyalty was, after all, not entirely unfounded.415 Just 
like in Germany, then, this discourse of victimization replaced self-critical 
reflection and an analysis of one’s own shortcomings.416 
Beyond these seemingly similar debates, however, the American 
campaign had developed into a distinctly unique discourse on the future of 
U.S. society. The climactic meeting at Madison Square Garden on 
February 28th provided the space where the national implications of this 
international discourse were pronounced in a public setting large enough 
to capture the entire nation. Why was it important for the campaigners, to 
bring, as they proclaimed, “the whole question of the Horror on the Rhine 
to the attention of the American people”?417 Was it simply another case of 
propaganda instigated by the German government, as the American 
Legion, a veteran’s organization, and other critics alleged? Or were the 
campaigners merely “concerned” – in the racist dictum of the time – about 
the wellbeing of their German cousins abroad? 
Of course, leaders like Viereck und von Mach had recognized that the 
issue resonated with many German Americans, not least because racial 
hierarchies also thrived in an American context. The organizers hoped that 
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the issue would become a rallying point for German Americans. The “chief 
reason” for the meeting’s success, they wrote in a pamphlet published 
after the meeting, was  
the growing sense of strength and dignity of American 
citizens of German blood. By them the meeting had been 
arranged, they bore the brunt of the attacks—and they stood 
firm as honest Americans of German blood should stand.  
As American citizens they feel the moral responsibility for the 
use which is being made of the victory won by America. 
They feel the shame which the presence of uncivilized 
French colored troops on the Rhine brings to the fair name 
and the honor of America. Knowing conditions on the Rhine 
to be as they are, these American citizens would be 
unfaithful to their duty if they did not do everything in their 
power to awaken the conscience of their fellow-citizens to 
the Horror on the Rhine.418 
This passage points to the transnational identity that German American 
leaders attempted to cultivate after World War I. Resisting the “attacks” of 
the preceding years, they wanted to be able to speak up as “honest 
Americans of German blood” and to gain respect for their heritage and for 
their achievements. Owing loyalty to the United States, they thus felt 
entitled to claim its ideological foundations for themselves. Countering 
allegations of disloyalty and treason, Dr. Joseph Rummel, a New York 
Catholic priest, argued that if their protest was treason  
then it is the treason of George Washington. (Applause.) It is 
the treason of Abraham Lincoln. (Applause.) It is the treason 
of William McKinley. (Applause.) Or even the treason of the 
two million sturdy boys who under the flag that knows no 
stain or dishonor, and that has no greater mission than the 
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defense of the innocent and helpless, crossed the seas to let 
the world know where America stands on the question of 
civilization, and what it can do when innocence is assailed. 
And if this be treason, I say in your name and in the name of 
all decent Americans, make the most of it. (Applause.)419 
 If they had been pushed to the periphery of society during World War I, 
German Americans now aimed for their complete rehabilitation. In this 
regard, the narrative created around the “Horror on the Rhine” allowed 
them to achieve a critical objective: instead of divorcing their fate as 
Americans from the German homeland – as many commentators 
demanded at the time – they could reemphasize the European roots of 
American culture. If the war had been about the freedom of all people, as 
President Wilson had claimed, they should be entitled to express their 
opinions as well as pursue their own rights and ends, especially in the 
United States. 
The speakers at the mass meeting belabored these points time and 
again. For example, Colonel Alexander Edward Anderson, a veteran of 
America’s imperial adventures in the Philippines and a member of the 
American Legion,420 argued that the meeting was “American in scope, in 
that it calls upon the people to recognize and acknowledge the purpose for 
which we went to this war: in the interest of all of humanity.”421  And, 
Anderson continued, Germans were no different from Americans, they 
                                                        
419 Addresses Delivered at the Horror on the Rhine Mass Meeting, 42. 
420 Anderson was expelled from the legion a few weeks later precisely because 
he had spoken at the mass meeting. See “Anderson is Guilty, Expelled by Legion 
for Rhine Protest,” The New York Times, March 23, 1921, 1. 
421 Addresses Delivered at the Horror on the Rhine Mass Meeting, 11. 
  171
were not the “Hun” of World War I propaganda. To emphasize that point, 
Anderson drew a telling comparison: “If we choose to be liberal and fair-
minded and just, we must realize that the occupation of the country 
inhabited by those God-fearing, liberty-loving people is no different that 
would be an occupation of our own glorious country inhabited by a like 
people.”422 The blame, for Anderson, lay not with the black troops, who 
were simply “dragged and coddled and inveigled out of the wilds of 
darkest Africa”, but with the French, “the people responsible for putting 
them there”. The French, he argued, had undermined one of the central 
foundations of Western civilization at the time: The rule of the white race. 
Addressing the audience directly, Anderson argued that as Americans, 
“you have a duty to protest against such kind of occupation. (Applause.) 
You would not be loyal to your own blood, you would not be loyal to 
humanity, and not being loyal to humanity, you could by any manner of 
chance be loyal to the traditions of America. (Applause.)”423 America was 
built on the tradition of a white racial order and it was the duty of 
Americans to protect it.  
Transcending previous definitions of whiteness, many of the speakers 
used the term “race” to evoke race as skin color, which reflected 
contemporary scientific opinions around the globe. But the discussion 
always had a uniquely American twist: Otto Stiefel, an attorney from New 
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York and co-founder of the Steuben Society, believed that America had 
not been created “by one race and for one race,” but by God, “and he [sic] 
didn’t even ask the help of one Englishman in the performance of the task. 
(Great applause.) My friends, those blessings exist for the people who 
inhabit America, all of them—all children of Europe—all are equally 
entitled to the benefits which God has bestowed, without distinction.”424 
The distinction that all “people” equaled “all children of Europe” was critical. 
The speakers at the event agreed (and probably many of its critics as well) 
that whiteness signified privilege. While they were not specific on where 
exactly the boundary between white and non-white lay, it was very clear 
that African-Americans were by definition not white, and thus had no place 
in the American body politic. “I am very glad that the issue we are raising 
here tonight is not a race issue,” proclaimed the feminist Sara Bard Field, 
pointing to the complex and shifting meaning of race during the time. “We 
have no quarrel with the black people as a people,” she continued:  
When I consider how America and other nations have 
treated the black people, bringing them here in the past 
under all sorts of promises [sic!], to make them slaves, and 
then keeping them enslaved for so long, I feel that we have a 
great obligation to the black people, and therefore I am very 
glad that this is not a matter of race prejudice, but is a matter 
of knowing that you cannot bring people of a primitive 
civilization into touch with a people of higher civilization 
without the most menacing results ensuing. And, therefore, I 
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am making this protest on the ground of morality and not on 
the ground of race prejudice. (Applause.)425 
Stiefel even spoke of the “human race” when he evoked his German 
heritage as the foundation for his call for racial order in the United States: 
“I am proud of my German origin because events have demonstrated that 
the creative energies of the Germanic people are unsurpassed in the 
history of the human race.”426  
The cultural sense of superiority voiced by Stiefel prefigured the fine 
line that German American ethnic nationalism would tread throughout the 
1920s. Negotiating the increasingly exclusionary definitions of national 
identity in both Germany and the United States was a balancing act. After 
all, if Germans were “unsurpassed” in their achievements, how should 
they stand on equal terms with other white Americans? For now, however, 
Stiefel settled for equality, nothing more and nothing less, when he 
proclaimed that American citizenship “has been hideously outraged, 
hideously debased by the influences that have controlled the destinies of 
this nation for the past four years.” Now, he continued, it had to be 
“restored to its full heritage, the full development of its power. (Applause.) 
Of citizenship by tolerance we have had enough! (Applause.) Of 
citizenship by effacement we have had enough. (Applause.) Of citizenship 
by the grace of a dominant race we have had plenty and enough. 
(Applause.)” Germans did not simply want to be tolerated or, even less, 
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dominated by more established Anglo-Americans. They wanted equal 
rights and access to power. And Stiefel was certain that “a new 
consciousness is sweeping slowly over America.”427  
The new consciousness envisioned by Stiefel was a blend of Horace 
Kallen’s pluralism, which stressed the diversity of the American nation, 
and the ethnic nationalism that German immigrants shared with Irish, 
Polish, or Jewish immigrants.428  As an American of German heritage, 
Stiefel believed he should be entitled to the same pride and 
connectedness that Anglo-Americans felt for the British Isles:  
Köln, Koblenz, Heidelberg, Mainz—all the beautiful 
Rhinepfalz, and the Rhine […]. My friends, I have never 
seen them; I have never seen them except through the eye 
of imagination. I have never seen the majestic river, the 
smiling valleys, the vine-clad hills; by I hope to see them 
some day (applause), and when I see them may they be free 
from the Black Horror!429 
By invoking these historic German cities and the mythic Rhine River, 
Stiefel grounded his own Anglo-Saxon heritage in the German homeland, 
included Germans in the narrative of white progress and stressed the 
necessity for solidarity among the European civilizations. “What idea can 
contain more virulent corruption than that any race should bring about the 
pollution of its own women?” Stiefel asked. “That is the lowest step to 
which humanity can sink.”430 By endangering German women, the French 
                                                        
427 Addresses Delivered at the Horror on the Rhine Mass Meeting, 15. 
428 Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues, 201-219. 
429 Addresses Delivered at the Horror on the Rhine Mass Meeting, 16. 
430 Addresses Delivered at the Horror on the Rhine Mass Meeting, 18. 
  175
were endangering the survival of the entire white race. To Stiefel, the 
policies of the French – Stiefel also placed the blame squarely with the 
French and exculpated the African soldiers – violated “every instinct that 
[Nature] planted in the breasts of man for the preservation of his race. The 
men who [pollute their own women] are traitors to the whole white race, 
and foes to every other.”431 
*** 
Generally, the Irish-American speakers adopted a similar message. 
They, too, argued that the presence of African occupiers on German soil 
“is a problem, that every true American every true man [sic] in the world 
should make his own.” 432  Nonetheless, it became clear that the Irish 
based the discussion on their own peculiar discourse of race and 
belonging, which had historically evolved in the century of Irish 
immigration to the United States. Like the Germans, their nationalism had 
developed in part as a reaction to American nativism as well as the 
developments back home, in particular the movement to liberate Ireland 
from British rule. Like many of the German speakers, they assumed a 
biological and cultural difference between Irish and Anglo-Saxons. They 
were also convinced that they had been forced away from their homeland 
because of the hunger and poverty caused by British imperialism. If 
German nationalism was anti-French, Irish nationalism was anti-
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English.433 Still divided from “white” America by a “razor-thin line,”434 the 
Irish had held conventions to voice their nationalist dissent as early as 
1916. It is very likely that the organizers of the German mass meeting in 
February 1921 had consulted with Irish activists like Daniel Cohalan, a 
leading organizer of the Irish-American cause, who spoke for the German 
Americans at their event.435 Cohalan argued that there “is no group in this 
country […] who are [sic] entitled to rule over the rest of us. There is no 
strain of blood in this country that is in any way superior to any other 
strain.”436 He also reminded his audience as an Irishman “that you have 
put up for too long a time with this thing of permitting one group of men to 
step on you as if you were not American citizens. (Applause.)” Their 
service for the country had translated into a right of being American, this 
was not a matter of privilege: 
But bare in mind that American citizenship means something 
more than rights; American citizenship includes necessarily 
the ideas of duty, the idea of responsibility. You have no 
right, as you have done for too long a time, to give over your 
judgment to another group of people. You have no right to 
withdraw yourselves as a class apart. The man who comes 
here, the woman who comes here, the race which comes 
here and which is not satisfied to be American, ought better 
never to have come. 
This duty included “the duty of taking an active part in the public affairs of 
the country, the duty of helping to create a public sentiment by which the 
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country is going to be swayed, the duty of examining every question.”437 
Irish-Americans like Cohalan were prepared to lead that fight, especially 
against the Anglo-American establishment. “Do you realize, those of you 
who are of German extraction,” the Reverend Patrick Mythen asked the 
audience,  
that if we who are of Irish extraction and you will come 
together in this land […] – as we have the right to do, we are 
the majority here, and we act as the majority should act – 
that we would mighty quickly banish into the mists when it 
came this phantom of Anglo-Saxonism? […] And this, my 
friends, shall be our work, and this shall be our endeavor, 
that we Americans shall decide what it means to be 100 per 
cent Americans. We shall decide that […]. We are 
Americans.  
The crowd responded with enthusiastic applause and “three cheers for the 
Irish Republic.” 438  
But immediately after Mythen had finished his speech, von Mach, who 
acted as a moderator, quickly reminded the audience that it should not 
forget that “a few unfaithful American citizens of Anglo-Saxon blood do not 
give us the right to overlook the splendid qualities of the broad-minded 
and open-hearted members of that race.” 439  Von Mach was far less 
interested in building a German-Irish front: he, like his fellow organizers, 
wanted that German culture and achievements would be accepted by the 
Anglo-Saxon elites who ran the country and that these elites invited 
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German Americans into their midst. His vision of the “white ethnic,” after 
all, included all white people, however broadly defined.  
Many listeners must have agreed. There had always been a sense of 
disappointment, of hurt feelings in the complaints about the injustice done 
to German immigrants during World War I, about the apparent indifference 
and disregard that the American public showed towards the achievements 
of its German “element.” When critics again attacked the activists as 
peons of the German government and the meeting as “organized chiefly 
for the purpose of creating discord and ill-feeling between the people of 
this country and the people of France,”440 many German Americans were 
surely reminded of World War I. Yet, there was also hope for redemption. 
In the days after the meeting the German American press celebrated the 
“voice of the people” [Des Volkes Stimme] and reiterated the argument 
that the attendees had not simply followed the call of German propaganda, 
but that they had aimed to awaken the “national conscience” 
[Volksgewissen] of the entire United States and to protest the “crime” 
against the German nation, which “constitutes a crime against the entire 
civilization.”441  
Nonethless, in the weeks after the meeting support dissipated in the 
face of criticism mounted by the media, the American public and from 
public officials (who prohibited similar events, for example in 
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Philadelphia).442 With memories of fifth column activities during World War 
I still fresh, many Americans felt the protests against the “Black Horror” 
were based on German propaganda and consecrated the service and 
sacrifices of American soldiers during the Great War. In mid-March, an 
event organized by the veteran’s organization American Legion drew 
about as many as 15,000 supporters to Madison Square Garden in a 
demonstration of patriotism. “Loyalty is demanded to America and to 
America alone; and he who seeks under the protection of the American 
flag to make this country a brew house of sedition and revolution and 
probable war is endangering the peace and welfare of the nation that 
protects and defends him,” said Senator Frank Willis of Ohio at the event. 
“He whose chief interest is in a foreign land is not a whole-hearted 
American.”443 The event showed that Americanism was a powerful force in 
the 1920s and those who wanted to remain invested in old world culture 
and traditions were well served to do so privately. 
Over the next several years the issue occasionally resurfaced. For 
example, during a November 1922 visit of the former French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau, senators Robert L. Owen (Oklahoma) and 
Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska renewed the charges, arguing, as the 
New-York Tribune reported, that the sole purpose of the black troops on 
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German territory was “to exasperate Germany into resistance in order that 
France might have an excuse for dismemberment of Germany.”444 But the 
German American press largely stayed away from the matter and adopted 
a markedly subdued tone. The Tageblatt, for example, always made sure 
to distinguish between the French government and the French people, or 
in other words, protest a policy but not an entire nation. Internal divisions 
among German Americans took over once more and the Tageblatt 
attempted to divest itself from any bourgeois influence – especially after 
Social Democrats and Communists came under increasing attack in 
Germany and conservative German Americans like Viereck and von Mach, 
“the German Philistine elements of America [deutschspießerischen 
Elementen Amerikas],“ threw their support behind the reactionary and 
undemocratic elements in the homeland.445 Moreover, women – as I will 
discuss in more detail in Chapter 5 – had become a driving force in 
German American life during the 1920s and felt misrepresented by a 
discourse that saw them merely as victims.   
5. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
If silence had helped German Americans walk the fine line between 
loyalty and disloyalty during the First World War I, they had erred in their 
belief that challenges to their cultural citizenship, to their rights to speak 
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and argue, had been temporary. World War I changed the relationship 
between the American state and its citizens, and profoundly so. A “culture 
obligation” had evolved that was directed in particular against ethnic 
particularism and political radicalism and that was enforced by both the 
state and the public through a blend of state coercion and civic 
voluntarism.446 The German American campaign to resist the culture of 
conformity and obligation447 by stressing white ethnic pluralism set back 
attempts at reconciliation, since many Americans saw in their activism a 
continuation of World War I disloyalty. Especially among more 
conservative Americans, who strongly identified with the Allied cause, few 
bought into the “rotten black troop propaganda” 448  and leading 
publications like the New York Times, the Nation and New Republic 
distanced themselves quickly from the movement.449 Yet, even though the 
erosion of socio-political connections to the homeland was unstoppable, 
many migrants – and this was certainly true for German Americans – 
would earn their rights as “Caucasians.” This chapter has attempted to 
show that the white ethnic – a coalition that transcended ethnic and 
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religious boundaries – was molded in part in racial discourses like the one 
discussed here.  
In the years to come the migration of African-Americans increasingly 
took center stage in the struggles over public space and belonging in the 
American city. Whiteness became “a monolith of privilege” and the “racial 
differences within the white community lost their salience, as they lost their 
reference to important power arrangements of the day.” 450  It was no 
coincidence that Lothrop Stoddard, who had so viciously demanded 
immigration reform in his 1920 book The Rising Tide of Color against 
White World Supremacy refined his argument only seven years later in 
Reforging America: “[M]ost of the immigrant stocks are racially not too 
remote for ultimate assimilation.” Stoddard was talking specifically about 
European immigrants. On the other hand, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans 
and particularly African-Americans, he concluded, would remain unable to 
become full members of the body politic: “Here,” he wrote, “ethnic 
differences are so great that ‘assimilation’ in the racial sense is 
impossible.”451  
The 1924 Immigration Act further reduced the immigrant threat and 
signified a critical step towards a monolithic acceptance of whiteness as 
the norm for Americanness. Ethnic differences became less significant, 
and the notion of the Caucasian “brought the full authority of modern 
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science to bear on white identity, and it did so in a way that challenged the 
scheme of hierarchically ordered white races […]. The idea of a 
‘Caucasian race’ represents whiteness ratcheted up to a new 
epistemological realm of certainty.” 452  If there had been “white races” 
before, now there was simply a “white race.”453 At the same time, however, 
the Immigration Act signaled a critical point of departure, in which German 
and American understandings of race and belonging drifted apart. 
Whereas Americans would soon no longer consider race and nationality 
as equal, discourse in Germany steered more and more towards that 
conclusion. Whereas race came to signify skin color in America, it signified 
nationality in Germany. And in Germany, a different skin color was 
tantamount to being alien.454  
For German migrants it was not always easy to navigate both worlds. 
When hundreds wrote to the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland 
more than a decade later, many of the tensions between race and 
nationalism were still unresolved. Writers commented on the “hodgepodge 
nation” [Misch Masch Nation] USA and wondered about the implications of 
miscegenation that were hard to overlook, especially in America’s cities: 
“All nations are here, from all over the world. And all of them are 
intermarried. How many half-blacks [Halbschwarze] are running around 
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here, with veritable jew-faces [Judengesichter].”455 As for other European 
immigrants, Fritz Strecker of Staten Island believed that Italian politicians 
like New York mayor La Guardia would remain the exception, since 
“Southern Humanity” belonged to the Southern hemisphere of the 
Americas. “North America will remain, if God permits, Nordic, Saxon! Well, 
let’s say Germanic; the Anglo-Saxons are a part of it, Scandinavians and 
Dutch, too.”456 And F.J. Ehrhardt considered moving from the Bronx to 
Minnesota, the Dakotas or Montana, “because the temptation of getting 
involved with a Jewish girl [Judenmädchen] or worse a Negress (Mulatto) 
is especially big in this part of town. But so far I have been mindful of my 
German blood and will continue to do so.”457 All of them participated in 
discourses defining the intersection of race and nation in the United States 
– and they did so through a transnational perspective that is essential to 
understanding the history of American society in the twentieth century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
455 Osterwalder to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-89, 2. 
456 Fritz Strecker to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1937-1156. 
457 F.J. Ehrhardt to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-765. Ehrhardt also asked the 
VDA for financial support to travel out west and “protect his German blood.” For 
similar expressions, see Hans Doelling to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1937-519; M. 
Haenel to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1937-1088; 
  185
[Fig. 1:] Front page of a pamphlet distributed by the Deutsche 
Studentenschaft (DSt). Date: Presumably in the Spring of 1919. (See Fig. 2 for 
detailed view of image; source: Horner Library, German Soc. of Pennsylvania) 
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[Fig. 2:] Detailed view of image on front page. The image shows two French 
African soldiers guarding the ruins of a medieval castle, presumably on the 
Rhine. (Source: Horner Library, German Soc. of Pennsylvania) 
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[Fig. 3:] Undated pamphlet, approximately between 1919 and 1921 (Source: 
Horner Library, German Soc. of Pennsylvania) 
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[Fig. 4:] “Auf zum Protest!” From the New York Staatszeitung, February 20, 
1921, page 1. 
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Chapter 4:  “Deutsche Arbeit,” the American Way – Transnational 
Negotiations of Social Belonging in German America 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the New York Staatszeitung on May 4, 1920 an anonymous writer 
using the alias Alpendorn summarized his thoughts on the present state of 
German America in a letter entitled “Regarding the Chapter: Unity.” The 
author stressed the importance of the historical lesson learned during 
World War I and the new “trust” and “love” many migrants had discovered 
for their native Germany. “It is possible that the war evoked an invigorating 
homesickness among the Germans,” wrote Alpendorn. Before the war, the 
author argued, German Americans were dismayed by the arrogance and 
self-righteousness of upper-class elites who policed immigrant behavior in 
ethnic organizations. Alpendorn, for example, recalled being rebuked by 
an “older German woman, belonging to the better class and well 
educated” for the use of a German word in an English conversation. In the 
German clubs, Alpendorn had observed, “the Germans are more pro-
American than the natives themselves. Discord and sarcasm ruled. […] A 
new member was treated so arrogantly that he quickly wished for its 
exclusion.” But during the war, German Americans had learned their 
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lessons: “The war had its good side after all. It showed the stubborn 
Germans that they have to be unified once more.”458  
This chapter explores the role of social and political boundaries in 
German America between World War I and World War II. I argue that the 
persistent investment of many immigrants in competing ideas of 
Germanness at home contributed to the ways in which they viewed and 
responded to the interwar experience in the United States – nativism, anti-
immigration legislation, the Great Depression and the rise of the Third 
Reich. As I discussed in Chapter 3, there had always been a social bias in 
middle-class accusations of assimilation and decline, which were directed 
– to a large degree – against less affluent members of the migrant 
community. Like Alpendorn, many of these “yankeeified” Germans were 
repelled by the condescension directed against them by wealthier and 
more educated representatives and they rejected the argument that they 
were any less “German.” On the other hand, they often utilized the social, 
racial, and cultural undertones of Germanness, as propagated by the 
middle-class, to improve their own situation in the United States.  
To explore that ambiguity through a transnational lens, I use the trope 
of Deutsche Arbeit – “German Work” – as an instructive example. Dating 
back to the nineteenth century, the idea that there was something unique 
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and exceptional about the German work ethic was an important 
component in the larger development of German nationalism – and it was 
an integrative element in the migratory experience to the United States. In 
fact, many German migrants of all social backgrounds relied on their 
heritage and on the reputation of Deutsche Arbeit abroad, to master the 
challenges of life they encountered there. At the same time, many 
working-class migrants rejected the idea that the middle-class had a 
peculiar role to play in the preservation of these qualities. This ambiguity 
resurfaced in many of the letters written to Volksbund für das Deutschtum 
im Ausland (VDA), which had presented migrants with a new vision of 
work that leveled social boundaries and promised an alternative vision to 
the alienating experience of American capitalism. Rather than simply 
buying into this ideology, however, respondents attempted to reconcile 
their attraction to and at times admiration for the achievements of the 
Third Reich with past experiences and present realities. Moreover, rather 
than simply accepting the notion that as German workers they had a duty 
to the Third Reich, they incorporated the ideals of Deutsche Arbeit into 
their sense of belonging to the “American Way.”  
After discussing the origins of Deutsche Arbeit in the middle-class 
imaginations of German national identity during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, I examine how the idea sustained a persistent strategy 
to idealize Germans in the United States. Next, I point to some instances 
that exemplify how transnational negotiations of ethnic identity shaped the 
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history of German America between the two World Wars, followed by a 
discussion of such negotiations in the letters the VDA. 
 
2. Imagining Germanness: Deutsche Arbeit Before World War I 
2.1. Class and the Origins of Deutsche Arbeit  
 
During the nineteenth century, millions of individuals and families left 
their rural villages in Central Europe to find stable jobs and new 
opportunities in growing industrial centers or overseas. 459  Those that 
ended up in German cities soon learned that industrial life could not keep 
many of its promises. Being a wage earner had its advantages, especially 
during periods of economic prosperity, when industrial labor provided 
consistent occupation with competitive wages. However, at least until mid-
century many laborers – men, women, and children – were forced to work 
14 to 17 hours a day, six days a week with no insurance against 
unemployment or sickness. Their livelihoods were threatened by illnesses, 
accidents, and – worse – economic downturns, which resulted in reduced 
hours (and thus wages) or mass layoffs. With little money to spare, 
workers were forced to live in overcrowded neighborhoods that could 
hardly manage the overbearing rush of new arrivals and lacked clean 
water or any medical infrastructure.460  
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With opportunities for individual advancement almost non-existent, 
urban workers were permanently caught in a vicious cycle of hope and 
desperation. For the factory owners, they were little more than replaceable 
parts of a machine aiming to produce profit, and until 1867 they had no 
voice in the political process. Sharing that experience with countless 
others, however, the “proletariat” began to develop a social consciousness, 
one formed by the hierarchies and injustices of the factories where they 
worked and the cities where they lived. After early successes of working-
class activism were revoked following the Revolution of 1848 and 1849, 
the labor movement resurfaced with full force during the early 1860s. 
Workers’ goals included not only improvements of working conditions 
(such as reduced hours and better pay) but also their recognition as equal 
members of the polity.461 However, German states (and after 1871: the 
German Empire) greeted such ideas with hostility and force. State police 
and military often violently disbanded meetings and demonstrations; 
workers retained only a tangential role in the political process. 
Consequently, an increasing number of industrial workers from German 
cities joined the flow of migrants across the Atlantic, believing that the 
United States offered better opportunities and greater political freedoms. 
By the 1870s, industrial workers replaced artisans and skilled craftsmen 
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as the largest social group among German-speaking immigrants to the 
United States.462 
At the same time, middle-class German intellectuals began 
investigating possible solutions to what they termed “the social question.” 
Some like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels realized that the exploitation of 
workers was part of the fundamental logic of capitalism and envisioned a 
proletarian society, which worked not for profit but for the common good. 
To overcome the alienation of the industrial process, the proletariat was to 
experience individualism through social community.463 Incidentally, many 
radical nationalists like the journalist Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl found similar 
answers to the same questions. Riehl initially dreamt of a classless 
community as well, though not one of the workers, but of the people, the 
Volk. He, too, abhorred the mere profit-oriented approach of capitalism 
and emphasized that workers should joyfully toil for the German nation. 
Ultimately, however, there was no room for the collectivist ideas of Marx 
and Engels in the nationalist approach. Riehl wanted to dissolve the 
international proletariat and answer the “social question” by providing a 
“national” counter-narrative. He aimed to define “German” in opposition to 
and as a protection against the influences of a globalizing world and was 
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convinced “that Germans possessed a special, and indeed superior, 
approach to work, one centered on the idea that work is its own best 
reward, and is alone capable of giving meaning to human existence.”464 
By making workers aware of these rewards and their duty to perform for 
the fatherland, Riehl and other nationalists later who adopted his 
arguments hoped to solve the problem of proletarian alienation through a 
sense of fulfillment and joy in work. In his book Deutsche Arbeit, published 
in 1861, Riehl valorized the supposedly unique work ethic embedded in 
German society and the qualitative superiority of German labor and 
industrial production. To him, the idea that there was something unique 
and traditional about the ways in which Germans performed their daily 
tasks, whether on the field or in the factories, provided historical continuity 
in a time of uprooting social transformations.465  
For themselves, Riehl and other members of the educated middle 
class – educators, academics and artists – envisioned a mediating 
position between labor on the one side and industrialists as well as the 
government on the other. Their role was to be in the education of the 
people by “teaching” workers and peasants about the values and morals 
of the German work ethic. Consequently, their narrative proscribed 
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traditional middle-class values, such as frugality, cleanliness, timeliness 
and hard work as the norm to be imitated by the Volk. “Correct table 
manners, sartorial codes, the emphasis placed on cleanliness and 
hygiene, the importance attached to timetables, whether in the school, on 
the railway or at mealtimes,” writes David Blackbourn, “all are instances of 
the way in which bourgeois values informed everyday life.” Bourgeois 
writers also stressed stability and restraint, rejected social mobility and 
polemically criticized the pursuit of “Mammon” (to be found especially in 
the United States).466  
The ideal of Deutsche Arbeit was propagated in advertisements and 
pamphlets as part of a national discourse, defining what it meant to be 
“German” both at home and in the world. It was part of a grand narrative 
that attempted to establish the unique qualities of the German nation – a 
nation that was not yet an empire like France; a nation with no grand 
history of global trade and maritime hegemony like Great Britain; a nation, 
furthermore, that lacked a frontier like the United States. “In the global 
context of the beginning of the twentieth century,” writes Sebastian 
Conrad, “the notion of ‘German work’ can be understood as a typical 
latecomer discourse, a form of protest against the underprivileged role 
Germany appeared to play in the international arena.”467 Simultaneously, 
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Deutsche Arbeit became a symbolic justification for Germany’s desire to 
assert itself among the likes of Great Britain, France, and the United 
States. “It was a foundational term, suggesting that Germany’s position in 
the world was the product of her own efforts and achievements.”468  
Although initially expressing admiration for folk culture, nationalists like 
Wilhelm Riehl increasingly dismissed peasants and workers, finding the 
greatest value in the work ethic and culture of the Protestant urban 
middle-class. The more the division of labor became the norm, and the 
louder the working-class protested against its exploitation, the further the 
intellectual middle-class drifted into an antagonistic relationship with 
workers and closed ranks with industrialists and government aristocrats.469 
The theologian Heinrich Lhotsky became well-known for his popular 
diatribes against workers. The historian Joan Campbell writes that 
according to Lhotsky the bourgeoisie retained “what the proletarian had 
lost, namely belief in the German idea of work.” If the German Empire was 
to rise up among the echelon of empires, Lhotsky insisted, “the masses 
must once more be taught that work is at the heart of a meaningful 
existence, because it alone enables people to experience, and therefore 
comprehend, the world, their fellows, truth, God.”470 Not surprisingly, such 
chauvinism and arrogance contributed to the social and political 
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fragmentation of the German nation. Between the 1880s and World War I, 
a permanent divide opened up between the middle-class and the people 
whom they purported to represent: the working class.  
2.2. Deutsche Arbeit, Migrants and the United States 
 
While predominately used to explain the German experience at home, 
the concept of Deutsche Arbeit was also employed to analyze 
manifestations of industrialization elsewhere – especially in the United 
States. For many Germans, the burgeoning power across the Atlantic 
Ocean was the epitome of modern capitalism and perceptions of 
American industrial life greatly impacted the ways in which they thought 
about work (and themselves) well into the twentieth century. “America,” 
writes Philipp Gassert, “was considered the Mecca of the rationalization 
movement and was seen as the exact opposite of a traditional agrarian, 
static, and hierarchically organized society. The terms Americanism and 
modernism were therefore used almost synonymously.”471 For some, the 
United States thus became a model, a prototype to be emulated in order 
to overcome the constraints posed by a traditional society like Germany, 
which was organized precisely around such hierarchical social structures. 
But for others – including the proponents of Deutsche Arbeit, who profited 
from those very hierarchies – the United States was a nightmare, one 
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which threatened the status quo and the stasis they preferred.472  The 
soulless nature of American capitalism, they argued, was demonstrated by 
the superficial pursuit of profits and consumer goods, of individualism and 
self-interest. American capitalism stood as the antithesis of Deutsche 
Arbeit, which emphasized community and culture, not individualism and 
profit, even while upholding inequality, social hierarchies and privilege of 
the few.  
Migrants were crucial to German views of the United States. They 
wrote letters and frequently returned home to talk about their experiences 
in Amerika. But the ideology of Deutsche Arbeit also shaped the ways in 
which they interpreted their experiences. Workers, for example, who may 
have rejected the bourgeois culture at home, often internalized what it 
meant to be “German” abroad – ideas about their superior skills, about 
their work ethic and workmanship. Already profiting from their “whiteness” 
473  in the United States, they additionally drew on such qualities 
propagated as German since their employers – many of them of German 
heritage themselves – preferred workers with the “correct” heritage. At a 
time when character was equated with race and nationality, the ideal of 
Deutsche Arbeit thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts: In the 
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competitive world of industrial America, German workers gained respect 
by aspiring to ideals, which ultimately made them stand out. Paul Buhle, 
an historian or American radicalism, found that even among German 
socialists in the United States, there was a strong sense of national 
identity. “Quoting in bold and rebellious style some of the greatest German 
writers, emigré [sic] Socialists laid claim to the best of their country’s 
national culture as they tried to build a viable tradition in America.”474 
Meanwhile, socialist newspapers “dripped with nostalgia for German 
culture.”475 Moreover, pride for the unity of the German Empire, finally 
achieved in 1871, and for its military and economic prowess was rampant 
among many Germans, even though they had escaped political 
restrictions and military duties of the German Empire and accused the 
middle-class of “the most submissive, expiring royalism and veneration of 
Bismarck.”476  
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Bourgeois immigrants to the United States, on the other hand, often 
came to the United States to explore working-class immigrant lives across 
the Atlantic. The journalists who published their works in popular 
magazines like Die Gartenlaube were especially interested in learning how 
migrants fared under the reign of American capitalism and their findings 
embodied many of the ambiguities present among Germans about the 
United States. Descriptions varied between romanticized representations 
of ideal Germans abroad, who diligently cultivated the land and preserved 
their heritage, and more pessimistic accounts that noted a general 
absence of German culture among these emigrants and worried about 
“yankeeification.” 477  Meanwhile, scholars of industrialization like Hugo 
Münsterberg (1863-1916) and Max Weber (1864-1920) came to the 
United States in order to study the implications of rationalization and 
scientific management and find ways to attenuate the alienation that many 
workers experienced on a daily basis.478 Often fascinated with the ideas of 
innovators like Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford, they wanted to reconcile 
the American way of work with the German approach. Münsterberg, who 
came to Harvard University in 1892 and stayed until his death in 1916, 
attempted to combine the best of both worlds in his approach to applied 
psychology, which incorporated scientific management while remaining 
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committed to the goal that “mental dissatisfaction in the work, mental 
depression and discouragement, may be replaced in our social community 
by overflowing joy and perfect inner harmony.”479  
This desire to remain true to the ideals of Deutsche Arbeit while 
simultaneously embracing the American way was a defining element of 
the German migrant experience in the United States. As I have discussed 
in Chapter 1, the turn-of-the-century chroniclers of German American life 
set out with the explicit objective to emphasize the peculiar qualities of 
German settlers on the frontier (and of German soldiers on the 
battlefields). Using the theme of Deutsche Arbeit, German ethnic 
nationalists attempted to unite Germans in the United States, while also 
partaking in American public discourse as full-fledged members of the 
polity: Celebrating the extraordinary qualities of German settlers was in 
line with German nationalist thinking, compatible with the American logic 
of capitalism, and it homogenized a diverse group of migrants according to 
a set of norms that could be proscribed and regulated by the German 
middle class – by them. By merging German bourgeois values with well-
known characteristics of American ideal types – the frontier, or self-made 
man; the soldier; etc. – the ethnic nationalists who came together in the 
National German American Alliance wanted to create a valid hyphenated 
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identity that would allow them to celebrate the culture they loved while 
earning the cultural capital to participate in the American public sphere.  
But the world they described never mirrored the reality of German 
American life. Despite their joint interest in Deutsche Arbeit, an “intimate 
alliance” between workers and the middle-class never developed.480 To 
the dismay of the German middle-class, German working-class 
immigrants immediately gained a reputation for political radicalism as 
many of them participated in the conflicts between industrialists and the 
working class. Most infamously, a group of German anarchists was 
accused of (and eventually executed for) the bombing on Chicago’s 
Haymarket Square on May 4, 1886. 481  The “Haymarket Affair,” as it 
became known, significantly impacted American public opinion of German 
immigrants – and it prompted almost immediate responses by worried 
German American leaders, who had already been concerned about the 
status of the “German element” in the United States. “Especially now, 
when a few German socialists and anarchists violate the laws of the 
country,” wrote the German-language newspaper Der Long Islander in 
1886, it was “important to show the nativists, already encouraged to new 
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activity by such acts of a minority, that the German immigrant has always 
provided his patriotism, nay, often has surpassed the native in love of his 
adopted country.”482  
The disconnect between reality and imagination manifested itself in a 
persistent, underlying mistrust of the lower classes, which, German 
American leaders argued, stained the image of the entire community. In 
fact, the literature produced by members of the NGAA or German 
American Historical Society483 abounded with cultural chauvinism, which 
was frequently directed against the very readers it was trying to motivate 
and unify: German Americans. For example, the Lutheran pastor Georg 
von Bosse complained about Americanized descriptions of German 
culture such “Sour Crout Kitchen,” which apparently spoiled his enjoyment 
of the food. Von Bosse thus concluded that “German-Americans cared 
little about the glories of German culture, [and] that socialists among them 
had abandoned the God of their fathers along with the Reich and 
Kaiser.”484 His remarks epitomize the fundamental and persistent inability 
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of wealthy middle-class observers to relate to the everyday exigencies of 
lower-class immigrants, of those trying to make a living by marketing “Sour 
Crout” – or any other product – to an American audience. Selling a 
traditional product an Ocean away from Germany preserved communal 
ties to the homeland in a way that was equally effective – if not more so – 
than the publication of academic literature about the qualities of mythical 
frontiersmen. Selling “Sour Crout,” in other words, was the reality of 
Deutsche Arbeit – not a myth imagined by the middle-class.485 
Such divisions defined the history of German America and were an 
important reason for the continuous disunity among German immigrants in 
the United States before World War I. The “conflicting material interests, 
which divide German culture into various camps of battling interest groups, 
make themselves apparent in all areas,” an article in the Chicago Vorbote 
summed up a raging debate about the future of German America during 
the 1890s. It continued: 
The fragmentation of German culture can only be prevented 
by drawing those interests into the foreground which would 
offset the social and economic class conflicts within German 
culture. But since a stunt like this is impossible in modern 
society, we will have no other choice but to let matters run 
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their course, until the victory of socialism makes possible 
tomorrow what is impossible today.486 
If German culture was to represent the interests of all Germans, it needed 
a more accommodating ideology to support it. And that included a more 
inclusive vision of Deutsche Arbeit. Those who agreed saw their 
opportunity arise once the carnage of World War I had led to the collapse 
of the German Empire. 
2.3. A New Message: Deutsche Arbeit after World War I 
 
After World War I, the politics of Deutschtum entered a new phase that 
redefined Deutsche Arbeit. The collapse of traditional power structures, of 
monarchical rule and aristocratic leadership opened up new possibilities 
for those who believed that different interests in the nation needed to find 
common ground to solve current problems and rehabilitate Germany in the 
eyes of the world. But amidst recurring crises, the new Weimar 
government struggled to gain legitimacy. Critics from the left and right 
viciously attacked its inability to put people back to work and restore 
economic wellbeing. In this context, the meaning of work was once more 
widely discussed. Conservative defenders of social order appropriated the 
terminology and emphasized “German” character of labor to undermine, 
for example, the transnational socialist movement. At the same time, 
nonpartisan organizations like the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland 
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(VDA) used the discourse of work to present a vision of national 
community that transcended all social boundaries – a Volksgemeinschaft, 
united in work. It was this vision, among others, that provided a common 
ideological foundation for a divided country and eased the transition into 
the successor regime of the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich.487 
The movement to refocus German nationalism on the wellbeing of the 
people, the Volk, was led in no small part by a new generation of activists, 
whose voices had carried less weight prior to the war. Traumatized by the 
experience of World War I and its aftermath, this new generation was 
much more devoted to reconciling the social differences, which had thus 
far prevented a popular appeal for the movement. 488  The VDA, for 
example, owed its success during the 1920s and 1930s in part to a group 
of writers and journalists like Hans-Christoph Kaergel (1889-1946), 
Herrmann Ullmann (1884-1858), and Max Hildebert Böhm (1891-1968). 
All hailing from modest backgrounds, they challenged the existing 
structures of the organization, which had always been led by aristocrats 
and upper-class intellectuals. During the early 1920s, Ullmann, Böhm and 
others successfully asserted a more pluralistic agenda, whose principal 
aim was non-political, cultural assistance of all Germans – including those 
living in areas outside of immediate political interest. 489  The VDA’s 
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message refocused on the utopia of the Volksgemeinschaft, a classless 
society without party divisions, in which every member worked for the 
common good. Crucially, this community transcended national boundaries 
and was independent of citizenship – even beyond Europe. However, like 
many of their older compatriots, Ullmann and Böhm found democracy 
inimical to the development of the Volksgemeinschaft and were hostile to 
some basic principles of capitalism, such as individualism and even 
private property.490  
Under the influence of these new voices, the VDA reached out with 
particular zeal for workers at home and abroad. For example, in its 1922 
yearbook the VDA published a “Letter to a Worker” [Brief an einen 
Arbeiter], which attempted to reconcile old divisions between conservative 
elites and the working class, because “it is, to speak in your [the workers’] 
language, not customary for a worker to sit down at a table with professors 
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and businessmen.”491 Appealing to national solidarity the VDA called on 
German workers to overcome their own social prejudices and inhibitions in 
favor of national community, stressing neither civic nor social but ethnic 
belonging. In light of what the writers perceived to be continuing attacks 
on German language, culture, and economy, the article argued, it was 
“simply very necessary that you and your brothers put as much value on 
your German nature as other people put on theirs and that you, just like 
others, are not merely conscious comrades of class [Klassengenossen], 
but also comrades of people [Volksgenossen], that is Germans.”492  
This vision of a new community of people was in many ways an 
alternative model to American capitalism. Germans continued to feel 
ambiguous towards the United States, at once admiring the efficiency of 
American industry and fretting about labor conditions and alienation in 
American factories. 493  Some, like Herrmann Ullmann, also feared that 
Germany was threatened by “American world capitalism” and argued that 
“Dollar imperialism” endangered German national sovereignty. The most 
vicious criticism, however, was leveled against the impending invasion of 
American culture, which would destroy German Kultur. 494  Believing 
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strongly in the constitutive role of culture in the process of protecting and 
preserving Deutschtum, these activists were concerned about the 
excitement among German consumers for American music, dance, film 
and many other cultural phenomena imported from the United States. 
Many of them took it upon themselves to explore the situation in the 
United States first-hand. These trips often helped manifest the idea that 
the corrupted democracy of the United States and its “hodgepodge” of 
peoples was no model for Germany’s own future. In the countless books 
and articles495 produced from these trips, writers claimed a fundamental 
dichotomy between Germany and the United States: American capitalism 
was like a machine that bred materialism, artificiality, largesse and greed, 
while the German counter-model cultivated organic simplicity, idealism, 
and spirit. If the United States promised civilization, Germany promised 
Kultur.496 
For many, the key difference between both models was the work ethic. 
Joan Campbell has shown that a demand for quality in production and 
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community (as opposed to individualism and quantity) were common 
elements among otherwise disparate political movements during the 
Weimar Republic. Influenced by the harrowing experience of mechanized 
warfare and indiscriminate killing during the war, almost all utopian 
movements in post-war Germany shared a vision of communal “joy in 
work” as a solution to the nation’s economic and political woes. The idea 
was appealing to a generation of young Germans, who embraced the idea 
that work could level social boundaries and bring about the “reconciliation 
of intellectual with manual labor” – that is, of bourgeoisie and proletariat.497  
The popularity of the idea that a German work ethic could provide a 
common ground may help explain the immediate appeal of the National 
Socialist idea of the Volksgemeinschaft, which was conceived around the 
dogma of national salvation through work. The global economic crisis that 
had its origin on New York’s Wall Street in 1929 hit Germany hard, but 
affected especially white and blue collar workers: Entire factories were 
closed, unemployment was rampant, and poverty raged across the 
country. Even worse were the psychological consequences of long-term 
unemployment and exclusion from the production process, which left 
many workers hopeless for a better future. 498  For many, the crisis 
solidified the idea that democracy led to chaos and that capitalism led to 
ruin. It opened the doors to the ideological arguments of the political fringe 
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on both left and right, which proposed increasingly extreme remedies for 
the chaos. Most successfully, of course, the National Socialists catered to 
the prevailing anti-Capitalist atmosphere and “espoused a ‘German 
socialism’ designed to restore joy in work and to reintegrate the workers 
into the body of the nation. A class-free Volksgemeinschaft would save the 
nation thanks to an altruistic work ethic.”499 The model of communal work 
promoted by the Nazis was at times diametrically opposed to American 
capitalism – for example in its endorsement of the common good rather 
than individual success – but also showed some intriguing similarities with 
rationalized modes of industrial labor, which hailed efficiency and made 
status contingent upon performance.500  
For the writers of the Heimatbriefe, who reached out to a global 
audience in late 1934, Deutsche Arbeit “explained” the success of the 
“New Germany.” The Nazis, they argued, had leveled social hierarchies, 
resurrected the failing German industrial landscape and brought prosperity 
to its people. Especially in its initial phase, between 1934 and 1936, 
rhetoric describing the special qualities of German labor pervaded the 
magazine, which frequently displayed images of bustling cities and towns 
with smoking chimneys and praised “German honesty, […] German 
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industry [Fleiß], German cleanliness and German self-respect.”501  One 
editorial mirrored an interior monologue of a German worker and thus 
connected individual labor – intellectual or physical – to the collective work 
of the nation: “I am serving the community, - my work, my ploughing and 
building and saving, as well as all my recreation, my reading and 
wandering, all that does not only serve my self, but constitutes work in the 
chain of generations that stretch from the eternal past into the eternal 
future – [it] is service to the Volk.”502 The National Socialists, so the letter’s 
implicit argument, had erased boundaries instead of dividing society into 
social categories. It had reconciled intellectual with manual labor – 
everyone now was a worker and everyone contributed equally to the 
success of the nation, “all of us equally as workers, as workers of the 
monumental construction, planned and handed to us for execution by 
providence: Germany.”503 
This was a twentieth century version of Deutsche Arbeit, one that 
included peasants, workers, and emigrants. Instead of lambasting 
emigrants, the VDA showed a great deal of understanding for those who 
had left the country before and after World War I. Migrants had left, one 
editorial argued, at a time when  
not the products of our workmanship [“Wertarbeit”] left but 
the German workers [“Arbeitsmenschen”] themselves and 
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that is why you have the deepest understanding for the 
entire German fate. That is why you are called upon to do 
your part for the construction of the new Germany, which no 
longer allows the unconscionable waste of its people’s 
power [Volkskraft] and includes all of you.504  
This inclusive vision was expressed in a very appealing way: Editorials in 
the Heimatbriefe were written in the form of letters forging a personal 
connection with readers by using the informal Du as opposed to the formal 
Sie and by explicitly soliciting responses featured prominently in 
subsequent issues. The Heimatbriefe were, as one editorial argued, more 
than just a magazine but “a private letter between comrades, worthy of 
your personal response.” 505  Rather than pressing an openly partisan 
agenda, the VDA purported to be apolitical, emphasizing emotional 
representations of the homeland and imagery of industry and 
improvement.506  
The message of reconciliation and inclusion appealed to many, 
particularly in the United States. In 1934, many German Americans were 
still traumatized by the impact of the great depression. For example, 
Richard Stelzmann, one of the thousands of German migrants who wrote 
back to the VDA, only sarcastically referred to the United States as “the 
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land where milk and honey flow”.507 While he observed that industry had 
recovered from the Great Depression by and large and that the number of 
“sitdown-strikes” had decreased, he noted a “real American tragedy. 
There are still Millions unemployed.” Having emigrated to the United 
States in 1906, he had seen more than two decades of almost 
uninterrupted economic growth. Now, however, the impact of a corrupt 
political culture became clear: “But that’s how it goes in a country ruled by 
unscrupulous politicians.” 508  Similarly, Helene Bemmann of Pikesville, 
Maryland described a country “rich in products but poor in heart and soul”. 
She and her husband Fritz had immigrated to the United States in 1923, 
but were still yearning for “our beloved Heimat.”509  
Indeed, many immigrants, who had hoped for a better future in the 
United States, were disillusioned by the economic impact of the Great 
Depression on the land of “milk and honey” – for them the American 
Dream had collapsed. “The magic that surrounded America in the years 
1919-1929 is gone,” wrote Felix Altenkirch, who worked in a mill in Union, 
South Carolina.510 “Along with the economic crisis, many – erroneous – 
ideas have disappeared from the minds of the people in this land. […] 
Nowadays is the best time to make many Germans at least conscious of 
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their peoplehood [Volkstum].”511 This was especially true for those, whose 
lives had been impacted by the Great Depression. Among them was 
Albert Helmer of New York City, who wrote of his constant search for work. 
Although he had just recently landed a job, he could not feel at home in 
the United States. “Even though I am a U.S. citizen I cling to the dear, old 
Heimat with every fiber of my true German heart, and especially here in 
New York, where one only hears and reads in the newspapers bad things 
about the New Germany.”512  
The Heimatbriefe sent a somewhat subdued political message 
throughout the first years – as did the early foreign policy of the Third 
Reich, which pursued a public campaign for peaceful reunification 
throughout the 1930s and attempted to convince in particular the United 
States that Germany’s demands were justified and legitimate. 513 
Nonetheless, the writers always showed great admiration for Nazi 
ideology and admiration for its leader Adolf Hitler, who was referred to and 
quoted with increasing frequency as the decade progressed. With regard 
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to attracting the working-class, for example, the February 1936 
Heimatbriefe, enthusiastically called the “world issue,” argued that the 
number of emigrants under Hitler had decreased to 9600 and proclaimed: 
“The Germany of Adolf Hitler is capable of captivating514 especially those 
[farmers and workers], many of which did ‘not know a fatherland named 
Germany’ in the past.” 515  After the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle had 
subsumed the VDA in 1937516, the message did become more aggressive, 
shifting from a focus on the Volk as the foundation of Nazi ideology to a 
focus on Hitler as the supreme leader. For example, the spring issue of 
1938 was devoted to showcase the improvements made under the new 
leadership and stressed how “not only the people of the Third Reich but 
also their deeds are concentrated on one goal, to serve the will of the 
Führer.”517  
In order to contextualize the responses of those who actually explained 
themselves and their situations to the VDA in the 1930s, a closer look at 
the social relations in the United States in the interwar era is necessary. 
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3. Class and German America During the Interwar Era 
3.1. The “Social Question” in the United States 
 
As much as German migrants retained a connection to the homeland 
and continued to stay invested in its political transformations, they still 
lived in the United States and dealt with challenges to the social order very 
similar to those experienced in Germany. Social coexistence within the 
capitalist economy was a primary concern in public debates across the 
United States immediately after World War I. During the war, there had 
been protests by workers, socialists, women, and many other groups 
demanding equal political rights, but it was the 1917 Revolution in Russia, 
which alerted many Americans. “Lenin’s Bolsheviks were radical 
opponents of capitalism, offering the downtrodden communism […] as a 
far more equitable and just social system than the private-property system 
prevailing in the United States and other capitalist citadels.”518 Although 
American radicals never reached the numbers and influence necessary to 
pose an actual threat to the status quo, they were strong enough to instill 
a sense of urgency among American elites – both in corporate 
headquarters and the White House. Industrialists and politicians shared a 
growing sense that the government needed to step in and ensure the 
long-term stability of American, even global capitalism. President 
Woodrow Wilson, for instance, was greatly worried about the impact of 
Communism and his internationalist vision for a more equitable global 
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order after World War I – manifested in his support for the League of 
Nations and national self-determination – aimed to undermine its 
appeal.519  
In the United States, countless domestic initiatives targeted 
Communism and other transnational anti-capitalist movements. During 
and after the war, corporations and patriotic associations launched 
Americanization campaigns, while the government-sponsored Committee 
on Public Information utilized a variety of visual tools – films, advertising, 
posters, and even cartoons – for propaganda against political dissent.520 
Immigrants bore the brunt of these attacks. Working predominantly in 
industrial jobs, in mines and factories, they were most visible to a national 
audience during strikes and “in the minds of many Americans the fear of 
communism commingled with the fear of the new immigrant.” 521  The 
strong racial component contained in this fear (see Chapter 5) had 
beneficial consequences for many German Americans, who had suffered 
from nativist attacks and some government persecution during the war. 
Indeed, by the 1920s the focus had shifted away from the “German 
element” towards those hailing from Southern and Eastern Europe – areas 
of the world many Americans believed to be the cradles of radical thought. 
However, many of the new legislative innovations aimed to protect social 
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order in the United States had consequences for German Americans as 
well: Prohibition, which robbed many workers of their favorite pastime and 
destroyed public spaces for the congregation of the working-class like 
bars and breweries (not to speak of the economic livelihood of many 
immigrants); the Espionage and Sedition Acts that legalized the immediate 
deportation of troublemakers and undermined free speech; coercive 
Americanization campaigns, which made English the required language in 
schools; and, of course, a series of immigration laws that culminated in the 
infamous 1924 Immigration Act, which introduced a quota system and 
closed the door on immigration. German American activists correctly 
assumed that the legislation would aversely affect immigration from 
Germany and that the lack of new “blood” from the homeland would 
undermine their efforts to maintain and preserve a coherent and 
numerically strong ethnic community.522 
Despite these measures, however, the 1920s were also a period of 
national reconciliation. Many of the laws and prohibitions, which targeted 
ethnic particularism and political dissent, such as the Espionage and 
Sedition Acts and Prohibition, proved ephemeral. And immigration reform, 
though staying in place until the 1960s, took European immigrants out of 
the line of nativist fire and allowed them to partake in the Americanism 
campaigns of the interwar era with a more casual sense of belonging to 
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and being a part of “America.” “By limiting the influx of foreigners to 
America’s ethnic communities, the 1924 act accelerated the process of 
acculturation.” 523  Moreover, during the 1920s three consecutive 
Republican presidencies replaced the progressive ideology that had 
dominated the prewar years with a pro-business atmosphere that 
withdrew the influence of the government and celebrated the paternalistic 
relationship between boss and worker – the image “of the responsible 
capitalist protecting his employees’ welfare.”524 In a process not unlike the 
parallel discourse on Deutsche Arbeit in Germany, the “mystique of 
Americanism,” the idea that in the United States owners and workers were 
all devoted to a common cause, provided the ideological foundation of this 
political rapprochement between capital and labor as well as between 
bourgeoisie and proletariat. “Welfare capitalism” had, as Lizabeth Cohen 
acknowledges, some real impact on the ways in which workers felt about 
the companies they worked for: “They came to expect benefits along with 
the job. And they judged a good company, in contrast to a bad one, by 
how close it came to meeting welfare capitalist standards, offering the 
steady, well-paying, decent work that workers could reward with their 
loyalty.” 525  Many workers, Cohen argues, believed more strongly in 
capitalism – American capitalism – and were more willing to admit that it 
could serve society well. By the 1930s, proponents of American socialism 
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– among them many of German heritage – had begun to come to terms 
with cultural Americanism and consumer capitalism. “No longer would a 
major thrust in American socialism be ‘alienated’ from the American world 
(as it appeared to many to be in the 1920s). […] American socialism had 
joined Americanism with a vengeance.”526  
But Americanism itself had changed, too. Many ideas, which 
Americans would have rejected as “socialist” only a few decades before, 
had become reality. 527  Frank Tannenbaum, a socialist who had 
immigrated to the United States from Austria in 1905, found that American 
socialism and American capitalism had greatly influenced each other and 
that the successes of the former were quite remarkable.  
We have socialized things as water, public highways, 
education, lighted streets, bridges, medical service for the 
sick through public hospitals, dental services for children in 
public schools, parks, museums, books through libraries, 
and information services of various kinds…To this must be 
added sickness insurance, unemployment insurance, care 
for the old though old age pensions and for the young 
through maternity pensions, factory and mine inspections, 
and legal enforcement of protection against dangerous 
machinery.528 
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At the same time, the working-class never lost sight of persistent 
inequalities within the American system: Throughout the 1920s roughly 40 
percent of workers remained stuck in poverty. Many could not afford the 
consumer goods of the “Roaring Twenties” – the washing machines, 
vacuum cleaners, and cars – and they remained crowded in urban 
neighborhoods, where unemployment, seasonal instabilities and 
hopelessness loomed large.529 Consequently, the bonds among workers 
from different ethnicities grew in strength along with awareness that only a 
multiethnic (even multiracial) front could adequately protect the working 
class. This significant change in political orientation among workers, away 
from the disparate and often antagonistic ethnic communities of the 
prewar era, eventually led to successful collective action during the 
1930s. 530  Whereas ethnic particularisms and urban fragmentation had 
prohibited unified action before, strong post-war nativism, the immigration 
reforms of 1921 and 1924 as well as the global financial crisis after 1929 
set in motion a process that resulted in the retreat from European 
nationalism among immigrant workers: “The struggle for nationhood had 
long provided the focus for ethnic activity. Now, those who wanted to claim 
their new European citizenship could return home. When most ethnics 
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realized that they preferred to remain here, new questions about the 
meaning of nationality arose.”531   
However, the financial crisis of 1929 posed a fundamental challenge to 
the ways in which Americans thought about their nation. Many Americans 
had been convinced that despite crises and individual failures the nation’s 
capitalist progress towards abundance was unstoppable. Especially for 
the middle-class, the collapse was not only a financial but also an 
ideological disaster. The Great Depression was the first crisis that 
permanently disrupted the upward social movement of skilled artisans, 
small businessmen, white-collar employees and many others, who had 
been thoroughly optimistic about the potential of the American way and 
the power of capitalism.532 The financial collapse of 1929 demolished that 
belief. “It will be many a long day before Americans of the middle class will 
listen with anything approaching the reverence they felt in 1928 whenever 
a magnate of business speaks,” wrote the historian Gerald Johnson. “The 
whole pantheon of their idols has been demolished. The Big Business 
Man, like Samson, has pulled down the pillars of the temple…and he is 
pretty well buried under the ruins.”533  
3.2. Social divisions in German America 
 
How exactly German Americans navigated the turbulent decade and a 
half between the end of World War I and the ascent of Nazism is still 
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largely unknown. The very few studies of that subject dealt largely with the 
educated middle-class. 534  The experiences of wartime persecution, 
nativism and anti-immigrant rhetoric produced an indignant response from 
German American leaders, who believed they could reunite the entire 
migrant community around the common cause of post-war rehabilitation 
and political equality. During the 1920 presidential campaign they strongly 
supported the Republican presidential candidate Warren G. Harding and 
urged all German Americans to vote based not on their social background 
but on their national heritage. They persistently denounced the outgoing 
Democratic President Woodrow Wilson as a “traitor,” because he had led 
the United States into war and had been responsible, at least in part, for 
the Versailles Treaty, which had brought so much misery to Germany.535 
This argument carried some weight in the early 1920s, when memories of 
anti-German campaigns were still fresh. Working-class papers like the 
Philadelphia Tageblatt followed suit and accused the Democratic 
Candidate James M. Cox of leading the fight against the German 
language and culture in the United States. Reprinting an article from the 
influential Cincinnati Freie Presse, the Tageblatt echoed a popular 
argument among German Americans after the war that “no differences of 
class and race can be permitted in this country.”536  
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Despite such proclamations of equality, even the Tageblatt was 
sufficiently enraged by the collective shame brought upon the German 
fatherland at Versailles to engage in continuous ethnic confrontation and 
the occasional race bating.537 After all, the editors believed, the qualities of 
the German worker had thus far driven German industry and had 
contributed to the overall grandeur of the Second Reich prior to the war. 
One exemplary article, entitled Deutsche Arbeit, discussed the differences 
between Polish and German labor through a racial lens, which 
incorporated many of the elements prevalent in the rhetoric of German 
racial and cultural superiority. The article compared German cultural 
achievements to Polish Unkultur, “un-culture,” using the pre-war imagery 
of the poet Max Hecht:  
There is no bigger difference than the image of the [River] 
Vistula on German and Polish soil! Here, it debouches wild 
and untamed across the wide plains of Poland, while [in 
Germany] one can see the obvious imprint of high cultivation. 
The difference between the Polish and the German Vistula is 
the same as between a raw son of nature and highly 
educated human being.  
After the Versailles Treaty had turned over some of these former German 
territories to Poland, the article argued paraphrasing Hecht, hundreds of 
years of German diligence and labor were destroyed in a process 
tantamount to rape.538 
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But this was not to say that a German working-class paper like the 
Tageblatt, one devoted to ideals of socialism and committed to its cause in 
the United States, would simply embrace the ideology promoted by their 
bourgeois compatriots. In fact, much of the ostensible “pro-German” 
rhetoric employed by the writers was directed against American nativist 
vigilantism and anti-radical activism immediately after the war. The 
Tageblatt editors simply rejected the argument that every dissenter or 
isolationist was “pro-German.” 539  With the much-despised President 
Woodrow Wilson out of office, the Tageblatt quickly turned back to its old 
foes and resorted to social tirades against the “capitalist class” as well as 
the “Ku-Klux-Organization of the steel capital.” Much criticism was also 
leveled against the “German-bourgeois elements of America,” whom 
editors criticized for their support of industrialists in the United States as 
well as the reactionary and undemocratic elements in the homeland.540 
The latter point is important: Despite their commitment to ideals they 
shared with other ethnic activists, German American socialists – at least 
those that wrote for the Tageblatt – never abandoned their investment in 
German politics. “When,” one poignant editorial asked, “will the socialist 
proletarians and the free-thinking German citizens in our country [i.e the 
United States] finally remember their moral duty and testify in front of the 
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entire world for the German Republic […]?” 541  Americans of German 
heritage, the editors argued, had a moral duty to support the success of 
the Weimar experiment and the middle-class failed to fulfill that duty. The 
persisting, even strengthening differences among German Americans 
were in great part rooted in disagreements over Germany’s future.   
The Tageblatt writers had a point. Despite an ostensible commitment 
to national unity, many German American organizations old and new, like 
the established Pennsylvania German Society (founded in 1891)542 or the 
Steuben Society (founded in 1919), continued to make social background 
a prerequisite for leadership and rarely permitted working class members 
to rise up the ranks (or even denied them membership).543 In Philadelphia, 
the Deutscher Klub und Technischer Verein (“German Club and Technical 
Association,” short: DKTV) required new members to be recommended 
and vouched for by at least two other members and only permitted 
educated professionals.544 The support among leading bourgeois German 
Americans for the democratic institutions back home was not as 
unequivocal. The rise of National Socialism during the late 1920s and 
early 1930s further testified to that tendency, as many middle-class 
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German Americans failed to distance themselves effectively and were at 
best ambivalent about the Nazis.545 
Political conflicts at home thus greatly affected the ways in which 
German Americans interacted with each other in the interwar period. Of 
course, publications like the Tageblatt or the New York-based Neue 
Volkszeitung strongly opposed the rise of fascism in Germany from the 
start. The Nazis were the main enemy and fascist ideology directly 
antithetical to everything they stood for.546  The further the situation in 
Germany deteriorated in their eyes, the more many of them believed in a 
better future in the United States. Throughout the 1920s papers like the 
Tageblatt retained “a socialist commitment to an international working 
class,” which was based upon the joint “experience with fellow unionists of 
Polish, Italian, and Russian Jewish background.”547 However, they also 
remained invested in the fates of those who were still in Germany – family, 
friends, and comrades. Fashioning themselves as the “true bearers of 
German culture,” socialists (and many others who disagreed with the 
politics of the Third Reich) vowed to defend the image of their fatherland in 
the United States.548 
Interestingly, many of the respondents to the VDA used the same 
rhetoric as those on the political Left, namely the notion that it was their 
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particular political point of view that represented the “real” Germany, that 
they were “the true bearers of German culture.” This similarity is 
remarkable and important. It testifies to the parallel constructions of 
Germanness, which were mutually exclusive, yet often utilized the same 
nationalist tropes. Deutsche Arbeit was one of them. Workers, which 
made up the political base of both the Left and the Right, believed that 
their efficiency and diligence made them exceptional among the workers 
of the United States. Those who considered themselves middle-class, 
such as skilled artisans and educated white-collar workers, believed that 
those same qualities were the foundations of their economic wellbeing and 
protected them from potential decline. They may have embraced their 
American citizenship and seen their future here, but many of them 
retained the belief that their German heritage was a fundamental part of 
their Americanness. When the economic crisis hit in 1929 and especially 
in the years after, however, this narrative, which had been a consistent 
companion in the years and decades before, faced a major challenge.  
4. German Americans Respond to the VDA 
4.1. Integrative Germanness 
 
Reconciling the expectations contained in the rhetoric of Germanness 
with the reality of the Depression-era United States posed one of the 
biggest challenges to the respondents when writing to the VDA. Many 
migrants had gone or were still going through some hard economic times 
and reported of lost jobs and forced relocations. Others were employed, 
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but could no longer find occupations in the trades they loved and knew.549 
"My husband simply can’t find any work,” wrote Käte Küchler, who had 
recently moved from Detroit to New York, “for five years I have not even 
known what that is, a permanent job for the husband!”550 After explaining 
their situation in great detail, Küchler added a post scriptum:  
Don’t think that my husband is incapable or not resolute 
enough for this country. I want to tell you that he has already 
swept the streets here, worked as a poster painter, as an 
ordinary painter, also as an art painter, worked in an Italian 
restaurant. Likewise for a time as a cabinet worker and 
finally he painted silk scarfs.551 
By pointing to her husband’s willingness to take on various positions, 
Küchler – whether deliberately or not – stressed the family’s resilience and 
self-reliance as well as their determination to succeed. Living only blocks 
away from Fifth Avenue on New York’s East Side, Küchler was confronted 
daily with the upper crust of society, the “atmosphere, elegance, [and] 
wonderful cars.”552 Her letter did not carry any signs of envy, but she 
struggled to justify that the decision to emigrate to a railroad flat in 
Manhattan was the right one. However, she was not complaining: She and 
her husband were taking care of themselves. And this was true for many 
of the writers, who explained their personal stories through a transnational 
lens that stressed their origins, though rarely as directly as Johanna Kuhn 
from Paris, Illinois. “So far,” she wrote, 
                                                        
549 A similar story is told by: Paul Schulze to VDA, HSTA 12460, 45-1938-722; 
550 Käte Küchler to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-106, 2. 
551 Küchler to VDA, 5. The term cabinet worker was used in the German original. 
552 Küchler to VDA, 2. 
  232
we have not, maybe because of our German skill 
[Geschicklichkeit], encountered any unemployment or 
hardship, those two sad comrades, which expelled us from 
the motherland. But we have not received any presents 
either, we have had to work for everything diligently and 
relentlessly.553   
For Kuhn, her Germanness defined her status in the United States. “There 
are so many opportunities here and diligent, ambitious people are very 
necessary here and well received everywhere and especially the 
Germans.” The reputation of German migrants and their work ethic, Kuhn 
wrote, made it easier for to integrate into and become an accepted 
member of American society.554  Just as generations before her, Kuhn 
relied on old narratives of diligence and character to ease the transition 
into America’s public sphere and create spaces of familiarity for herself 
and her family.  
Likewise, many migrants found that being German was not an obstacle 
in that process. Mrs. Kuhn was surprised about the frequent complaints 
that Germans were not valued in the United States. “Believe me,” she 
wrote, “ you are mistaken. […] I, we, have always found that everyone has 
respect for the German Man [Mensch] and can understand the political 
uprising in Germany as well […].” 555  Written in 1937, her letter was 
thoroughly apolitical and she voiced her hope for international 
                                                        
553 Johanna Kuhn to VDA, HSTA 12460, 46-1937-916, 1.  
554 Kuhn to VDA, 1-2. Kuhn’s son Wolfgang went on to become “a pioneer in the 
development of computer-assisted instruction in music” and taught at Stanford 
for over 25 years. See: http://news.stanford.edu/pr/03/kuhn319.html (retrieved: 
January 16, 2016). 
555 Kuhn to VDA, 1. 
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reconciliation and peace between all people. It carried no sign of anti-
Semitism or belligerence towards Germany’s neighbors. But even those 
that were aligned with the aggressive, ugly side of Nazism frequently 
found that being German opened doors, rather than closing them. One 
such letter was received from Harald Arias, an artist who traveled 
throughout the United States and made no secret out of his anti-Semitism. 
Arias reported that Hitler’s policies had won him admiration in some 
American circles: “I have already met countless 100%-Americans who tell 
me bluntly: What we need overhere [sic] is not one Hitler, but 10 
Hitlers!” 556  Similarly, John Rehnig of New York, who had immigrated 
around 1905 and naturalized in 1921, used his German heritage to assert 
his Americanness and continued to draw strength from what he believed 
to be the achievements of the Nazis. “As an American citizen with a real 
German heart, I greatly respect your ‘Führer’,” he wrote in German, “over 
here in America we need six of the kind of your Dear Adolf Hitler.”557  
Many Germans complained about the anti-German views of 
newspapers or worried about a Jewish world conspiracy. But it is worth 
noting that, like Mrs. Kuhn, not all of those who experienced their 
Germanness as an integrative element during the 1930s were outspoken 
supporters of Hitler’s racist and anti-Semitic policies. And among those 
that were, not everyone felt excluded in the United States.  
                                                        
556 Harald Arias to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-245. English original italicized.  
557 John Rehnig to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1938-94. 
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4.2. Experiencing the Volksgemeinschaft Abroad 
 
The fact that many writers still felt a strong connection to their 
ancestral homeland brings up the question of whether or not the idea of a 
transnational Volksgemeinschaft, manifested in work, had any impact 
among German Americans after 1933. Some responded directly to the 
theme invoked by the VDA. Martha Osterwalder of New York, for example, 
pointed to the importance of work not simply for one’s survival but to 
create meaning and community across social boundaries: “We are all 
dependent on each other, from the smallest scavenger to the great Führer. 
The worth of a human is his [sic] performance and his character. Only 
work and true camaraderie can bring an ideal life for the general public 
[die Allgemeinheit].”558 Osterwalder, who worked as a maid at the Swiss 
Embassy, was one of many writers, who found comfort in the 
Volksgemeinschaft, in the prospect of it anyway, which elevated the 
meaning of work beyond mere financial gain. Already, she believed the 
common suffering that the German people experienced across the globe 
“can only bring us true solidarity and camaraderie, in Germany, as abroad, 
without interference of class pride [Klassenstolz].”559  
But for the majority of those who wrote to the VDA, being German still 
meant local, not transnational community: “We are sticking together,” 
summarized the wife of Otto Krause her experience as a member of the 
                                                        
558 Martha Osterwalder to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-347, 1.  
559 Osterwalder to VDA, 2. 
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German community in Wethersfield, Connecticut. Many writers reported of 
ample opportunities to preserve bonds to the homeland in the United 
States. “Of all the Auslandsdeutschen [in the world],” wrote A. Stock, “we 
probably have it best. Here in New York, there are over 100 German 
associations, there are German hours on the radio and we have here 
several German streets with German stores.”560 “We really shouldn’t be 
homesick here in New York,” George Durschmidt concurred, “after all, 
there are so many German churches, clubs, amusement facilities etc. And 
yet,“ he continued, “especially among the urbanites no intimate alliance 
will develop, something that is so much easier to do on the 
countryside.“ 561  Indeed, there was a persistent sense of disunity that 
pervaded many of the letters – and especially those from the cities562 –, 
which mirrored the sentiments published in the German American press 
and in the literature about German America. 
Why was it so hard to unite German Americans beyond the local 
village or neighborhood? The reasons that was cited most frequently by 
the writers were political disagreements and social differences. For 
example, Max Lippold of Hartford, Connecticut railed against the 
“troublemakers and club enthusiasts [Vereinsmeier], who cannot let go of 
socialism and communism.” As a supporter of the new Nazi government, 
                                                        
560 A. Stock to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-20 
561 Georg Durrschmidt to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1937-1036. 
562 A great example of disunity in the countryside is provided by Stephen Gross, 
“The Battle over the Cold Spring Dam: Farm-Village Conflict and Contested 
Identity among Rural German Americans,” Journal of American Ethnic History 
21:1 (Fall, 2001), 83-117. 
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he especially chided one particular speaker at the Hartford Sängerbund, 
“who used to be a Minister of Justice in Prussia and stole the pennies out 
of the little man’s pocket.” The fact that this man had spoken against the 
Third Reich did not come as a surprise to Lippold, who believed that the 
Sängerbund and similar organizations were responsible for the disunity 
among German Americans.563 Lippold’s letter points to a larger trend that 
was noticeable among socialists as well: an increasing equation of political 
and national identity. Everyone outside of one’s own political conviction 
could not represent the “real” Germany.  
For the supporters of the new Nazi government, being “German” in the 
1930s meant supporting the Nazi cause. Many immigrants, like Christoph 
Klinger from Providence, Rhode Island, who “have not found a new 
Heimat across the ocean” celebrated the ascent of National Socialism as 
the incarnation of the Volksgemeinschaft, while condemning its critics and 
those who neglected to defend Nazism. Klinger offered a familiar 
argument when he pointed out that anti-German propaganda in the United 
States was only successful because “the number of the few real Germans 
is oh so small.”564 Throughout the 1930s, many recent immigrants viewed 
expressions of German identity in the United States in increasingly 
exclusive terms: Arthur Rentsch from Jackson Heights, New York, bought 
into the Nazi logic that saw the National Socialists as the only true 
                                                        
563 Max Lippold to VDA, HSTA 12460, 45-1936-1292. 
564 Christoph Klinger to VDA, HSTA 12460, 45-1936-198. Klinger was among the 
few who remigrated to Germany in 1940. 
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manifestation of Germanness at home. He thus rejected all cultural events 
that did not explicitly acknowledge Hitler as Germany’s leader. 
“Unfortunately,” he wrote, “only few Germans abroad have followed the 
call of the Führer. How many of them deny directly or indirectly their 
membership in the German Volksgemeinschaft. […] Singing and 
gymnastics festivals are held in the belief that they performed German 
Kulturarbeit but they still deny the great Führer of all Germans.“565 
But very few were unequivocally determined to let the Nazis stand in 
for the entire Germany, even among the sympathetic group of writers, who 
responded to the VDA. Many immigrants could not forget the boundaries 
of class that had divided the homeland and had prompted them to leave 
for the United States. Emigrants had often left for good reasons, which 
featured prominently in respective assessments of life in the United States. 
Migration had not been mere adventurism, but a dismayed escape from a 
nation whose elites had repeatedly betrayed the people. In 1935, many 
migrants remembered leaving Germany unwillingly, in order to escape 
poverty, insecurity, and a lack of opportunity. Many blamed their departure 
on social divisions and class difference. Karl Ficker from Miami, Florida 
wondered, if there still was 
that damned German class difference, the affluent, parasitic 
boasting of the shirt-and-tie people and the ugly disdain 
that your, our brothers have for the poor class of human 
existence, is there still the cheating and dumbing down of 
the lacking mass of Germans […]. Is there respect for 
                                                        
565 Arthur Rentsch to VDA, HSTA 12460, 42-1938-1349. 
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everyone, or is the opportunity for a real life […] just given 
to the class of owners and capitalists. [sic] 566 
Many German Americans found ways to answer that question for 
themselves. They stayed informed about developments in Germany. 
Communication with the homeland was faster and cheaper and many 
emigrants used the opportunity of expedited and more affordable travel to 
visit relatives as often as possible.567 During a visit to Germany in 1933, 
eight years after his migration to the United States, J.G. Mühlhausen from 
New York recalled meeting several old acquaintances now rising in the 
Nazi hierarchy: “many of them were and still are everything but honest 
Germans.” Having recently met some members of the German Foreign 
Service, he complained, “the caste spirit [Kastengeist] and class 
arrogance [Standesdünkel] in these circles goes beyond anything I saw in 
the Second Reich.”568 Consequently, Mühlhausen expressed doubts about 
the future of the Third Reich.  
While these critics rejected the classism of the Reich, they could only 
muster an ambiguous embrace of the opportunities and securities for 
migrants in the United States. An anonymous writer reported having lived 
in the United States for 30 years and though the writer still “remembers 
                                                        
566 Karl Ficker to VDA, HSTA 12460, 45-1935-79. 
567 Admittedly, the evidence for this is anecdotal. For example, in their letters 
many writers mention recent trips to Germany (Examples include: Rudolf 
Blumentritt, HSTA 12460, 45-1934-25 and M. Haenel, HSTA 12460, 41-1937-
1088). Moreover, data now publicly accessible via commercial providers like 
ancestry.com suggest that even less affluent families were able to visit on a 
regular basis. 
568 J.G. Mühlhausen to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1937-1875. 
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the old Heimat with melancholy”, “my new Heimat has become dear and 
valued to me. I received my citizenship papers years ago. Und during the 
war time nobody hurt me because of my German descent.”569 Similarly, 
Helene Sachse of New York City remembered having to emigrate from 
Germany in hard times and described a place where “those that cannot 
keep pace with the course of time will be trampled mercilessly. But still,” 
she continued, “it would be ungrateful, if we were not to be thankful to the 
country that had to become our new Heimat for giving us work and income 
in hard times. Our emotional and spiritual life, however, had to withdraw 
itself; deeply inside the heart it is encapsulated.” 570  This pragmatic 
assessment of their situation connected many writers to the United States. 
Regarding their livelihood, many German Americans preferred the United 
States over Germany. “Everything is much cheaper here and workers like 
me don’t have to pay taxes,” explained A. Stock from New York City, who 
worked for a Jewish family. “We like it very much here in America, but still 
we are saving our money for the next trip to the Heimat.”571 Fritz Strecker 
of Staten Island noted a recent severe sickness and added that “my family 
received very selfless assistance from American official and private sides, 
financially and otherwise, during my stay at the hospital [though] I do not 
want to give the impression that we were under duress, except for the 
                                                        
569 Unknown to VDA, HSTA 12460, 45-1938-455. 
570 Helene Sachse to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-408. 
571 A. Stock to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-20. 
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state of health.”572 And Käte Küchler praised the American health care and 
education systems, food and electricity prices, the radio, and the 
availability of consumer items, such as electric washing and sewing 
machines. Even though her husband, the painter, had trouble finding 
steady employment, a union salary ensured that all bills were paid. “I don’t 
know how a worker scrapes by a living in a Berlin tenement,” Küchler 
ruminated, “maybe he envies me.”573 
5. Conclusion 
 
For many German Americans, the idea of a German 
Volksgemeinschaft was appealing after 1933. But in a nation with diverse, 
multi-ethnic populations, being German could never be more important 
than being American – at least not in public life. Those that disagreed 
could return to Germany, though only very few did.574 Among those that 
remained, many attempted to reconcile the transnational 
Volksgemeinschaft with the American Way of Life, which meant to 
reconcile a concept of belonging based on community with a concept of 
belonging based on individuality. The bridge between both was an ethnic 
identity that marked its members not only as white but also productive 
contributors to society – as hard-working, diligent, clean and effective.  
                                                        
572 Strecker to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1937-970.  
573 Küchler to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935-106. 
574 One source puts the number at 6850, between 1933 and 1939. See Rippley, 
German-Americans, 208.  
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In this chapter I have explored one of the reasons why this ethnic 
identity never developed comprehensive unity during the interwar era, a 
unity as imagined by Alpendorn and many others after World War I: 
Persisting social boundaries among German Americans and a focus on 
the exigencies of everyday life among lower-class immigrants, who made 
up the majority of those considered “German American.” As conflicts 
between the various social and political fractions in Germany became 
more vicious and violent throughout the 1920s, competing ideas about 
what it meant to be “German” affected the ways in which migrants thought 
about themselves in the United States – but they never forgot why they left 
the country of their ancestors to seek a better future elsewhere. 
The traces of those divisions can still be found in American life today. 
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, belonging to either 
the political left or the political right has been determined in part by 
individual social and cultural origins. In a radio interview with NPR, the 
writer Michael Lind once described the rift between left and right as 
follows: “The right’s fundamental narrative has been that liberals or 
progressives are snobbish, upper-class unpatriotic traitors. The 
progressive narrative is that no person could possibly disagree with liberal 
positions […]. There is […] constant fear on the part of progressive 
intellectuals that at any moment their fellow citizens will turn out to be 
secret Nazis and round everybody up.” Lind specifically ascribes this 
development to the presence of Marxist immigrant intellectuals from 
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Weimar Germany, like Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer who used their experiences back home to interpret what they 
witnessed in the USA. They were, Lind told the interviewer, “interpreting 
American politics through the lens of their traumatic experiences.” 575 As 
did, I would add, the hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the 
working class who may or may not have disagreed with these social elites. 
Either way, the role of German Americans in the politics of the 1950s and 
beyond has not been studied. I argue it should be.  
                                                        
575 Emphases mine. Interview with Michael Lind on NPRs On the Media “Lies, 
Lies, Lies,” December 4, 2015. (available online: 
https://www.wnyc.org/radio/#/ondemand/557375, accessed January 15, 2016). 
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Chapter 5: “As Familiar as an Old Friend” - Consumer Culture and 
Gender in German America 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Immigration to the United States has often been described as a one-
way street that forces those who travel it to abandon old customs and 
conventions in order to be accepted – culturally, politically, and 
economically – as full members of American society. “Being American is a 
matter of abstention from foreign ways, foreign food, foreign ideas, foreign 
accents,” the cultural anthropologist Margaret Mead wrote in 1975.576 At 
the same time, Mead’s argument was decisively assimilationist: 
immigrants could signal their belonging by literally buying into the 
“American Way of Life.” New Americans were made, so to say, in 
department stores, amusement parks and movie theaters, where 
newcomers displayed their ability to navigate consumer culture.577 
                                                        
576 Margaret Mead, “Ethnicity and Anthropology in America,” in Ethnic Identity: 
Cultural Continuities and Change, eds. George deVos and Lola Romanucci-Ross 
(Palo Alto: Mayfield, 1975), 189. Quoted in: Marylin Halter, Shopping for Identity: 
The Marketing of Ethnicity (New York: Random House, 2000), 9. 
577 Two groundbreaking texts that first investigated the intersection of immigration 
and consumer culture are Roy Rosenzweig’s Eight hours for what we will: 
Workers and leisure in an industrial city, 1870-1920 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983) and Kathy Peiss’ Cheap Amusements: Working Women 
and Leisure in Turn-of-the Century New York (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1986). For a more complete bibliography, see my discussion in Section 3 
of this chapter. In my use of the term “consumer culture” I follow Don Slater, who 
defined it as a culture in which a) “core social practices and cultural values, ideas, 
aspirations and identities are defined and oriented in relation to consumption;” b) 
commodities are produced for markets, not for personal need; c) “[m]arket 
relations are anonymous and in principle universal;” d) private choice equals 
  244
But was an embrace of the “American Way” always tantamount to the 
abstention from “foreign ways,” as Mead proposed? I argue in this chapter 
that consumption could also be quintessentially conservative, a process 
that strengthened old values and helped immigrants stay connected to the 
homeland. This argument is not new of course,578 but German American 
historiography – perhaps unlike any other – has centered on the 
assumption that migrant participation in the American marketplace 
signaled “a retreat from ethnic concerns and from the German ethnic 
component of multiple identity.”579 I will demonstrate that such arguments 
are certainly not inaccurate, but miss the considerable investment in the 
Old World that accompanied migrants’ navigations of American consumer 
culture. During the interwar era German Americans trusted in a variety of 
norms that determined their patterns of spending in the American 
marketplace. And they negotiated these norms through a variety of 
transnational discourses in German language newspapers, ethnic 
advertisements, and magazines like the Heimatbriefe, which allowed 
German Americans to synchronize their own evolving sense of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
freedom and vice versa; e) unlimited and insatiable desires are celebrated and 
essential; and f) consumption emerges as the “privileged medium for negotiating 
identity and status within a post-traditional society.” See: Don Slater, Consumer 
Culture and Modernity (Malden, Ma.: Polity Press, 1997), 24-32. 
578 I discuss specific examples of such scholarship in section 3 of this chapter. 
579 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock,108. See also: Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Patterns 
of German-American History,” in: Germans in America: Retrospect and Prospect. 
Tricentennial Lectures Delivered at the German Society of Pennsylvania in 1983, 
ed. Randall M. Miller (Philadelphia: The Society, 1984), 14-36. 
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American Way with parallel conceptions of Americanism and 
consumerism back home.  
To provide a concrete example of continued investments in the Heimat, 
this chapter discusses the 1932 campaign by a coalition of German-
Philadelphians to bring back recently cancelled advertisements placed by 
the Wanamaker department store in the German-language daily Gazette-
Democrat. German American consumers saw the advertisements as more 
than shopping guides by a trusted member of the local community. For 
them, the advertisements were “maps of modernity,” to use the words of 
sociologist Don Slater, which not merely replaced traditional authorities 
but established connections between the old and the new.580 Moreover, 
readers realized that advertisements helped ensure the financial wellbeing 
of the newspaper – a space where American life (or life in America) could 
be discussed and understood in a familiar language and a familiar cultural 
context.  
The fact that women led the protests speaks to the important role that 
consumer culture played in the negotiation of gender roles during the 
interwar era. As primary authorities on domestic finance, consumption, 
and ethnic conservation in the home, German American women wielded 
enormous influence over the choices that migrants made in the 
                                                        
580 Slater, Consumer Culture, 86-87. See also section 4. 
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marketplace. 581  And while many of them embraced the liberating 
opportunities of consumerism, others found solace in stability and 
continuity. The image of the nuclear family582, for example, that eventually 
became a staple of “American Way” iconography, was largely consistent 
with traditional German gender norms and thus provided a space for 
migrant women to realize their American dreams while staying connected 
to and consistent with old world traditions.  
This chapter lays out the interconnected evolution of consumerism and 
gender in the context of migration. It first discusses the German discourse 
on Americanism, a synonym for modernity in the interwar era, and 
explores how conservative objections against consumption impacted the 
ways in which German Americans saw themselves as consumers in 
America.583 After providing an overview of competing discourses in the 
                                                        
581 Dorothee Schneider, “’For whom are all the good things in life?’: German-
American housewives discuss their budgets,” in: German Workers in Industrial 
Chicago: 1850-1910. A Comparative Perspective, eds. Hartmut Keil and John B. 
Jentz (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1983), 145-160. Andrew 
Heinze made similar observations on Jewish immigrant women: Andrew Heinze, 
“Jewish Women and the Making of an American Home,” in: The Gender and 
Consumer Culture Reader, ed. Jennifer Scanlon (New York: New York University 
Press, 2000), 19-29. 
582 According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the “nuclear family,” as a 
sociological concept, is “the basic family group consisting typically of father, 
mother, and their dependent children.” It is usually contrasted with the “extended 
family” that spans beyond two generations and includes other relatives living in 
proximity to the nuclear family. According to the OED, it first appeared in 
sociological literature in 1924. See: "nuclear, adj. (and adv.) and n." OED Online 
(Oxford University Press, March 2016), retrieved March 12, 2016. However, from 
its conception the term had normative connotations regarding gender roles, in 
which the man was the sole provider of income, while women were viewed as 
homemakers in charge of raising the kids (see section 3.2 of this chapter).  
583 For a great discussion of the cultural juxtaposition of Americanism and 
modernity, see Victoria De Grazia, “Americanism for Export,” Wedge 7-8 (Winter-
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United States, I examine the transnational culture of German America and 
close with a discussion of the campaign to return the Wanamaker 
advertisements. 
2. “Americanism” and German National Identity 
2.1. Consumer Culture 
 
As the global economy vacillated between booms and busts 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, proponents and critics 
debated the promises and pitfalls of industrialization, internationalization, 
and consumer culture. On the one hand, innovations in mass production, 
technology, distribution, and marketing put within public reach a variety of 
products that mitigated the backbreaking routines of rural life, provided 
new opportunities for social advancement and opened up the world of 
leisure and amusement to the lower classes. On the other hand, those 
same innovations were in part responsible for the economic struggles of 
peasants, artisans, and local traders. The new industrial order rendered 
obsolete traditions and customs and undermined the cultural authority of 
old elites. 584  While the German Empire certainly embraced the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Spring 1985), 71-81; and De Grazia, “Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The 
American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960,” Journal of Modern 
History 61 (March, 1989), 53-87. 
584 Slater, Consumer Culture, 8-24. See also: Jean-Christophe Agnew, “Coming 
Up for Air: Consumer Culture in Historical Perspective,” in: Consumer Society in 
American History: A Reader, ed. Lawrence Glickman (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), 374-398; and Regina Lee Blaszczyk, American Consumer Society, 
1865 - 2005: From Hearth to HDTV (Wheeling, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 2009). The 
entire literature on the development of consumer society cannot be reviewed 
here. A good recent overview of literature produced in both Europe and the 
United States is provided in: Andreas Wirsching, “From Work To Consumption. 
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opportunities of the new age and established itself as an economic and 
military power during the late 1800s, a persistent, stubborn anti-
modernism became entrenched in Wilhelmine society. Critics of 
modernity585 were particularly concerned about the corrosive effects of 
consumer culture, which purportedly threatened the integrity of the 
Kulturnation Germany. When the monarchy collapsed at the end of World 
War I, this concern turned into outright fear about the future of the country. 
For many Germans the specter of modernity bore the name of a rival for 
global supremacy: Amerika.586 
The United States had inspired both dreams and nightmares long 
before the war, of course, but during the 1920s America “emerged as the 
symbol of modernity tout court.”587 To many conservatives it seemed as if 
                                                                                                                                                       
Transatlantic Visions of Individuality in Modern Mass Society,” Contemporary 
European History 20:1 (February, 2011), 1-26, especially Footnote 4, page 2. 
585 In this section, I cannot always account for the various competing criticisms of 
modernity that flourished in the Weimar Republic and often shared metaphors 
but not necessarily arguments. It would be misleading, for example, to classify 
cultural critics like Max Weber, Gottfried Benn, or Thomas Mann in the same 
group as some of the völkisch voices like Hans-Christoph Kaergel and Adolf 
Halfeld, who later supported the National Socialist regime. For a brief but 
succinct discussion of the differences and similarities between cultural critics and 
anti-modern pessimists, see Peukert, Weimar Republic, 185-188. 
586 Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization 
of Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3-11; Adelheid von 
Saldern, “Überfremdungsängste: Gegen die Amerikanisierung der deutschen 
Kultur,” in: Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. 
Jahrhunderts, eds. Alf Lüdtke et. al. (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996), 213-244; Frank 
Trommler, “Aufstieg und Fall des Amerikanismus in Deutschland,” Amerika und 
die Deutschen. Bestandaufnahme einer 300jährigen Geschichte, ed. Frank 
Trommler (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986), 666-676. 
587 Peukert, Weimar Republic, 179. For a fantastic account of U.S. consumerism 
in Europe, see Robert Rydell and Rob Kroes, Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The 
Americanization of the World, 1869-1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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American culture was taking over the Old World. American bands played 
Jazz in Berlin nightclubs, movie theaters showed Hollywood films, and 
department stores sold American fashion. “The nation’s thinking has 
indeed become Americanized, through and through,” warned the 
Protestant cleric Günther Dehn in 1929, “it is not socialism but 
Americanism that will be the end of everything as we know it.”588 Such 
laments could easily be dismissed as the last gasps of a disappearing 
conservative minority, but the reality was more complex. After all, 
throughout the 1920s Germany continued to suffer economically and 
many Germans were concerned about the future of humane values in a 
time of increasingly unregulated capitalism. By pointing to the failures of 
the American system, many critics participated in a legitimate debate 
about the country’s path into the future. “The public debate about ‘America’ 
was really a debate about German society itself and the challenge that 
modernity posed to it.”589  
In many ways, then, the discourse on consumer culture epitomized 
ambivalences about the arrival of global “Americanism” and vice versa: 
Germans addressed their anxieties about the country’s future in an 
American century through debates about consumer culture. Having lived 
through the war, many craved for American products and fashion, which 
remained out of financial reach for the majority. Germans across all social 
                                                        
588 Quoted in Peukert, Weimar Republic, 178. See also: Retterath, 
Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 145. 
589 Peukert, Weimar Republic, 178.  
  250
and political boundaries praised the rationalization of the American 
marketplace and household, and welcomed similar methods in Europe.590 
At the same time, however, there was a popular push for economic 
nationalism, driven, for example, by leading German housewives’ 
associations. Seeing poverty and misery as the result of global pressures, 
activists denounced everything from department stores and mass 
produced clothing to oranges and white bread as foreign to German 
society and responsible for its economic disintegration. 591  Patterns of 
American consumerism were often the main point of criticism after 
delegations had visited the United States. American products, the visitors 
argued, were mass produced and sold under questionable circumstances 
in department stores that offered little to no service.592 
Especially widespread among critics was the idea that American 
culture seduced individuals. Catchwords like “Americanization” and 
“Yankeeification” signaled the conviction that American-style mass 
consumerism incapacitated the willpower of individuals, particularly 
German immigrants, who embraced it all too eagerly. “In America,” wrote 
Adolf Halfeld in his widely read Amerika und der Amerikanismus (1927), 
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“the civilization of the mass has been realized […]. There is certainly 
something great and new here – a machine that works with impeccable 
precision, but also displays all disadvantages of the machine: total 
sovereignty of the rule and death of the free will.”593 The journalist Hans-
Christoph Kaergel found a fitting metaphor for that perspective when he 
argued that the amusement park Coney Island resembled American 
capitalism in that it was like “a single giant gyroscope, whirling around 
Millions of people, defrauding every one of their reasoning and 
independence.”594 This perspective of the consumer as object or hapless 
pawn perspired in many observations: pulp magazines “dulled” their 
readers, sensationalized movies “vulgarized” the masses, and 
advertisements misled buyers. “At best, consumers were worrisomely ill-
understood, unpredictable social figures. At worst, their needs were 
identified with the demands of lower orders, volatile, ravenous, capricious, 
hence contributing to the unpredictability of economic trends, political 
polarization, and the degradation of national culture.”595 
It should be noted in this context that neither exuberant celebrations of 
American abundance nor prejudicial condemnation of the United States 
rested on broad objective or scientific observations but rather betrayed the 
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subjective nature of this surrogate debate.596 In fact, anti-modern critics 
prided themselves on their lack of objectivity and scientific observation, 
which they derided as benchmarks of American civilization. Instead they 
promoted emotional depth and spirituality as unique qualities of German 
culture.597 Kaergel, for example opened his book with a frank confession 
of his own subjectivity: ”I have not examined this new world with statistics 
and new economic gauges. I have seen it as a human, but most of all as a 
German.”598 The point here is not merely that German observers often 
indulged in obvious, intentional misrepresentations of the United States. 
Instead, discourse on U.S. consumer culture and modernity helped refine 
a German cultural exceptionalism in the struggle against capitalism’s 
consequences. By emphasizing the special qualities of German Kultur as 
a safeguard against the pitfalls of modernity, cultural nationalists offered a 
model that was applicable around the world. Whether in Germany or the 
United States, uprootedness and alienation could be mitigated by a strong 
connection to the Heimat, a “conscious living with a German soul,” as 
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Kaergel called it. “Those that successfully preserve the soul of the old 
Heimat, are […] always at home. […] Maybe that is the core of the 
German question. Those that have given away their innermost core to 
false gods, have been lost to themselves and us.”599 In a book about the 
United States, this was a direct charge at German Americans, and in 
particular at German American women, the domestic guardians of culture 
and main culprits in the anti-consumerist tirades of the Weimar Republic. 
They held the key to Germanness in their spending.  
2.2. Gender and Domesticity in Weimar Republic and Third Reich 
 
“I don’t have to tell anyone what a Girl is,” wrote Hans-Christoph 
Kaergel to open his chapter on gender roles in the United States. 600 
Indeed, by the 1920s the omnipresent icon of American femininity, the Girl, 
embodied modernity for many Germans, not least because changing 
gender roles were a central aspect in the postwar renegotiation of German 
national identity.601 Even before World War I, Germans had discussed the 
role of women in American society with a mix of admiration and 
apprehension. While praising their civic engagement and high level of 
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education, many conservatives felt that American women pursued their 
public goals too aggressively. Female “shopping” became a particular 
annoyance for those who believed that American-style consumerism was 
a careless and rather pointless act of waste and vanity, which, if imported 
to Germany, threatened the fabric of traditional society. 602  During the 
1920s, the rise of feminine iconography propagated in newspapers and 
magazines, in novels, movies, and advertisements, seemed to confirm the 
worst fears: suddenly it seemed as if independent women were taking 
over German society “armed with bobbed hair and made-up face, 
fashionable clothes and cigarette, working by day in a typing pool or 
behind the sales counter in some dreamland of consumerism, frittering 
away the night dancing the Charleston or watching UFA and Hollywood 
films.”603  
Though little more than “male-generated fantasy” – the vast majority of 
women continued to work in domestic settings and those that did not could 
rarely afford the propagated lifestyle 604  – the feminine threat from 
overseas triggered a very real German angst about social stability and 
traditional gender roles.605 Such anxieties were exacerbated by first-hand 
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reports like Kaergel’s Wolkenkratzer or Halfeld’s Amerika und der 
Amerikanismus. While admitting (and occasionally admiring) the self-
confidence that American women displayed in public, both Kaergel and 
Halfeld saw female independence as a threat to society. In their view, 
women’s advances in factory and white-collar labor had devastating 
effects on masculinity and the social fabric. American men were 
submissive and had ceded all control in the household to their wives, who 
were focused on themselves, neglected their duties as mothers and 
domestic caretakers, spend most of their time working and shopping and 
gave birth only if the budget allowed it. 606 Such views of American women 
permeated German society and even though many Germans knew better 
than to believe every rumor, some of the stereotypes stuck. German men 
of various social and intellectual backgrounds saw the United States as “a 
land where women rule and men are slaves,” in the words of the German 
American journalist H.L. Mencken, who was well-known and widely read 
on both sides of the Atlantic.607 
Once more, the question was what all this meant for the future of 
Germanness around the globe. For Kaergel, at least, female conspicuous 
consumerism symbolized the decline of tradition and its consequences. To 
him, make-up, hairstyles, and the culture of smiling proscribed in 
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American advertisements were dangerous manifestations of the very 
mass society that threatened to erase cultural differences, which set apart 
German women from other nationalities. “I may have seen hundreds of 
thousands upon thousands [Hundertausende und Abertausende] female 
beings [in America]. And yet not a single exceptional, memorable face has 
remained […]. All I see is the Girl. Entirely without a name. Entirely without 
exceptional appearance.” 608  Following his description, Kaergel asked 
rhetorically, whether or not his readers really wanted the Girl as the future 
of German femininity. “No,” he answered preemptively,  
we want to go back to nature! I believe that the German, 
female being will be far ahead of the Girl in this competition. 
[…] All I want is that we realize that the Girl is not a special 
creature, but an unnaturally acquired character[;] that we 
seek beauty […] the beauty that makes everyone into a 
human individual […], into a Mädchen [German: girl], a 
woman, a mother. But never into a Girl.609 
Many Germans shared that view. For the bourgeoisie, the Girl 
embodied the conspicuous, uncultured, and uneducated masses.610 And 
this was as true for the conservative, völkisch right as it was for the 
intellectual left wing. The sociologist and journalist Siegfried Kracauer, for 
example, described a troupe of female American line dancers, the Tiller 
Girls, and their highly organized, choreographed performances, as the 
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incarnation of the capitalist age and the self-organizing masses, or what 
he called a “mass ornament:” “[t]hese products of American ‘distraction 
factories’ [Zerstreuungsfabriken] are no longer individual girls, but 
indissoluble female units [unauflösliche Mädchenkomplexe], whose 
movements are mathematical demonstrations.” 611  Kracauer largely 
refrained from moral judgment; he even argued “that the aesthetic 
pleasure gained from the ornamental mass movements is legitimate.”612 
Nonetheless, his observations, too, bore the signs of fear omnipresent in 
the German middle-class – a fear of the masses. More importantly, he 
recognized in the Tiller Girls and their routine the inauguration of an 
“American age” in Germany, particularly an age of mass production and 
consumption. They were “a representation of American virtues, a flirt by 
the stopwatch.” 613  
On the conservative, völkisch end of the political spectrum, there was 
little sympathy for this American import. Many feared that the entire 
German nation would be emasculated if American-style feminism and 
consumerism took over. And even the organized women’s movement 
complained that American notions of femininity undermined German 
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domestic and motherly virtues. 614  Groups like the League of German 
Housewives’ Associations argued that American patterns of consumption 
undermined the German nuclear family and the nation. Whereas American 
women shopped for cheap clothing and canned foods and wasted money 
on beauty products, the idealized German woman, the “master housewife,” 
was devoted to thrift and saving: “She put up, canned, or stored foods of 
every kind when they were in season; sewed clothes for all family 
members; repaired and altered worn clothes; ensured thriftiness through 
meticulous bookkeeping; and wasted not.” 615  This model was almost 
diametrically opposed to the stereotypical image of the American 
consumer Girl, who “wasted” all her money on conspicuous consumer 
items, cared little about her children and even less for her husband or the 
home she was in charge of. The extent of the misinformation circulating in 
German society is probably best exemplified by the belief that Americans 
never washed their underwear. “People simply buy cheap underwear and 
throw it away after they have worn it….Heaven preserve us from this 
Americanization of the household,” one article in Die Deutsche Hausfrau 
[“The German Housewife”] argued.616 
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Again, the point is not to suggest that all Germans believed such 
rumors or, obviously, that they reflected reality. But many thought that 
American notions of femininity and consumerism threatened the very 
ideals of separate spheres that were formative for a gendered German 
national identity. 617  Not surprisingly, the alternative model of German 
womanhood promoted by conservative circles during the Weimar Republic 
and by the Nazis during the Third Reich was in many ways the direct 
opposite of the public German image of the Girl. Though recent 
scholarship on gender and nationalism has shown that women took on 
various public functions in the 1920s and 1930s, 618  their main 
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responsibility in propaganda and ideology was that of mother and 
domestic housekeeper. This traditional image was propagated across the 
global German diaspora as well,619 for example through publications like 
the Heimatbriefe.  
2.3. Gender, Nation, and Migration in the Heimatbriefe 
 
Not surprisingly, the writers of the Heimatbriefe looked back 
unfavorably at the Weimar Republic, “when it seemed […] as if many a 
German woman had almost forgotten her high destiny. She wanted to be 
totally free and independent, free of her highest duty, only wanted to live 
according to her own wishes, be as equal as possible to men.” Such 
characterizations were strongly informed by stereotypical descriptions of 
egoistic, profligate American women and ignored decades of pre-war 
history, when women in Germany had already contributed financially to 
household incomes. The Heimatbriefe blamed the “chaos” of the 1920s on 
the intrusion of “foreign” ideas, such as democracy and consumer 
culture.620 With little use for democracy and perhaps even less respect for 
its privileges, the writers behind the magazine did not account for the 
possibility that some women had actually embraced the opportunities of 
the previous decade. During the Weimar Republic, “fate had denied 
women the fulfillment of their destiny, to give to their Volk new life” by 
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giving birth.621 The Heimatbriefe thus strongly denounced gender equality 
and made clear the separate purposes of men and women in the 
Volksgemeinschaft.  
The man is discoverer and pioneer [Vordenker], leads in all 
matters of spirituality, of science, of state, and of war. While 
working, he is directly exposed to all kinds of difficulties and 
dangers. The gift of the woman, however, is internal: in heart 
and mind […]. In home and family, at the domestic stove is 
the domain of the woman and her strong responsibility.622 
To be sure, there were many women on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean who would have disagreed with such antiquated gender norms and 
it is one of my arguments that German American “assimilation”623 was as 
much a rejection of restrictive German nationalist norms as it was an 
embrace of the American Way.624 However, it should not be ignored that 
the Heimatbriefe did not simply deride women but celebrated their 
important function in the trans-national community, the Volksgemeinschaft. 
“Nobody feels as deeply the living togetherness [Zusammengehörigkeit] of 
the Volk as the German woman! It is she who […] keeps alive the flame of 
love for Volk and home soil, in far away lands as here in the Reich.” 
Women, the Heimatbriefe argued, were literally saving Germanness at 
home and abroad by devoting themselves to the preservation of a 
community of people “of equal blood, equal type and custom, and equal 
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mother tongue.” 625  They taught children language and respect for 
traditions and customs. “She imparts upon the child in songs, fairy tales 
and stories the beginnings of language, in play and cheerful dance she 
introduces [the child] for the first time into the community life of the 
Volk.”626  
Ultimately, then, the Heimatbriefe argued that it was the obligation of 
women to preserve German morale and ensure that families remained 
“brave, diligent and decent [anständig].” They were to provide a safe 
haven for children and husband, who could return to “the home, the cradle 
of peace.” 627  Equally important, the mother was in charge of the 
Volksvermögen, a term that could mean both national wealth and wealth 
of the people. “Here in the Heimat, the woman takes her house wife’s duty 
as administrator of the Volksvermögen, which has been earned through 
hard labor, as seriously as any soldier his military duty.” Whether simple 
commodities of everyday life, clothing or groceries – German women 
could not spend money thoughtlessly and were required to be as thrifty as 
possible “so that no damage will be inflicted upon the 
Volksgemeinschaft.”628 
The readers of the Heimatbriefe did not simply accept the ideology 
presented by the editors wholesale, but adopted parts and portions that fit 
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their needs and thus constantly renegotiated what their “Germanness” 
meant to them. For example, Martha Osterwalder from New York asserted 
that  “[m]y Heimat means more than anything else to me.” Having lived in 
the Americas for 21 years, “I have not lost my Germandom and I will never 
lose it as long as I live. How many times have I been forced to defend my 
fatherland abroad, oftentimes better than any man.”629 As a maid in the 
Swiss embassy, she was well capable of earning her own income and 
seemed to reject the idea that women should be restricted to home and 
hearth. However, she also complained:  
Women whose husband has a good income are taking away 
the work from single men and women. And [from] mothers 
whose husband is out of work. They want to save money 
where others have not enough to eat. They do not care for 
their fellow human beings and the poor hungry children. As 
long as they can enjoy their rich lives. […]  
If they [presumably: the government] were to send home 
female teachers and teach them how to cook their husband’s 
soup, and replace them with men, so that the children enjoy 
a better education […] they could not accomplish anything 
better for the public good.630  
Few women were as frank as Martha Osterwalder. Unlike their male 
compatriots most refrained from criticizing the writers of the Heimatbriefe. 
But even those that did comment, as is evidenced by Osterwalder’s 
complicated remarks, could hardly escape the dominating beliefs in the 
discourse on gender and domesticity at the time: In Osterwalder’s view, 
US liberal individualism undercut national solidarity and the traditional 
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separation of genders trumped the female desire to participate in the world 
of work and consumption. 
The discussion about the future of German femininity had obvious 
implications for migrant women, especially those living in the United 
States. If consumerism undermined Germanness, then how should they 
navigate the American marketplace? To be sure, there were many who 
simply ignored such warnings and went about their business as they saw 
fit.631 But as I will show throughout this chapter, there were many others 
who took seriously their roles as managers of the household and 
guardians of (some) cultural heritage. For them, ongoing debates about 
the preservation of German culture took on special relevance and there is 
some evidence that women found ways to participate in the American 
marketplace while retaining a meaningful connection to the homeland. 
Nonetheless, I also suggest that the increasingly restrictive vision of 
German womanhood made such negotiations more and more difficult. 
Their role in the Volksgemeinschaft obliged women to “lead an exemplary 
pure life” and stand as an example for her children “as a stable and strong 
personality”632 in the face of an ostensibly corruptive American Way. As 
we shall see in the next section, however, American consumer culture was 
not nearly as unequivocally modern as many Germans assumed.  
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3. Migrants and American Consumer Culture 
3.1. Consumer Culture in the United States  
 
The discourse on consumerism in the United States was significantly 
more optimistic than in Europe. Especially after World War I the positive 
trajectory of the country as a rising industrial power with increasing reach 
across the globe led many Americans (as well as many non-Americans) to 
believe that its system of capitalist distribution was superior in both 
economic sustainability as well as social equality and carried great 
benefits for individual citizens. Even though it hardly reached every 
American, the abundance celebrated in the interwar era increasingly 
convinced the nation that mass culture meant mass prosperity and that 
consumerism was citizenship: “The American citizen’s first importance to 
his country is no longer that of citizen but that of consumer,” wrote Robert 
and Helen Lynd in their influential 1929 study on “average” America, 
Middletown. “Consumption is a new necessity.”633  
 For migrants, the American marketplace symbolized the promise of 
equality and democracy, or at least some compensation for the loss of 
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home. 634  By buying American products and partaking in leisure and 
amusement, they not only reaped the benefits of their migratory sacrifices 
but also signaled their embrace of and incorporation into American culture. 
By choosing to spend their hard-earned American money on movie tickets 
or washing machines, migrants could thus demonstrate individual self-
determination, rational assessment of value, and social advancement.635 
Moreover, in silent movie theaters and amusement parks they 
experienced American culture first-hand, redefined social boundaries, and 
broke down inter-ethnic barriers.636 The spectacle of difference celebrated 
in these institutions, however, was both fascinating and terrifying, a rite of 
initiation and a challenge to individual and collective identities. In the 
words of one German immigrant, Käte Küchler, who wrote to the VDA in 
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1935 with a mixture of shock and fascination: “The characters you could 
see in Coney Island, an ‘entertaining’ tableau of international life of the 
lower classes! Be still, my heart!”637  
Küchler’s remark suggests that immigrants did not always embrace 
American culture unequivocally, passively shedding all remnants of old-
world belonging in the course. Nor did American consumer culture simply 
wipe out ethnic differences. The work of Roy Rosenzweig and Lizabeth 
Cohen has shown that migrant immersion in American culture was a 
process far more complicated than suggested by assimilationist narratives 
of – positively – the “Melting Pot” or – negatively – “cultural suicide,” the 
latter an accusation made with particular fervor by middle-class Germans 
and German Americans against their lower class kin. Instead, participation 
in the American marketplace frequently constituted a form of awakening, 
which substantiated a more concrete ethnic sense of origin and allowed 
migrants to appropriate products and leisure activities to pursue their own 
ends, be it pleasure, profit, or politics.638 Irish pubs and German beer 
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gardens, for example, catered to those seeking familiarity in a world of 
difference and created hyphenated experiences that helped shape public 
representation of the ethnic group in the United States, even though they 
rarely encompassed the heterogeneities of the Old World. Since 
patronage was frequently universal, the existence of such “traditional” 
establishments not only gave immigrants income opportunities and a 
place to feel represented, to belong, but also provided a space to 
introduce an ethnic group to others, initiate social interaction, and 
negotiate the position of the respective group within society.639  
It is worth remembering that until at least the 1920s even large 
corporations were sufficiently impressed by the cultural resilience of many 
migrants to devise entire marketing ploys to meet their demands. 
“Immigrant consumers compelled American businesses to adapt to 
preferences and traditions brought from their homelands and to develop 
‘ethnic’ products and markets even as these immigrants slowly adjusted to 
American-made goods.” 640  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, companies began to realize the potential markets behind these 
ethnicities. Some advertised their products specifically to homesick Irish 
Americans, while others amended their recipes to accommodate the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Gender, Nationalism, and the Cultural Politics of Memory (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2009). 
639 Arlene Dávila, Latinos Inc: The Marketing and Making of a People (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 2.  
640 McGovern, Sold American, 124. 
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kosher demands of Jewish immigrants.641  During the 1920s, the soap 
manufacturer Colgate hired advertising agencies to learn about the 
specific desires of migrants in Chicago, Buffalo, or New York. Meanwhile, 
ethnic radio stations drew huge audiences throughout the country.642 And 
in Philadelphia American corporations like Chevrolet, Gillette, Lucky Strike 
and Kellogg’s had their advertisements translated to German for print in 
the local Gazette-Democrat. 643  American consumer culture was thus 
“globalized” by immigrant markets and demands.644 
This is not to say that the American marketplace per se fostered 
pluralism. In fact, many of the products marketed specifically to 
immigrants were merely vehicles “for greater Americanization and 
uniformity rather than for heightening distinctive ethnic tastes.” 645 
Advertisers hoped to transform immigrants from old-world traditionalists 
into modern American consumers. Especially during the 1920s and 1930s 
                                                        
641 Halter, Shopping for Identity, 34-36; Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: 
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644 Hoganson, Consumer’s Imperium, 8. 
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an increasingly nationalized corporate culture demanded the assimilation 
of tastes and abandoned diversity in the marketplace – often against the 
resistance of consumers.646 At the same time imagery and language used 
by advertisers obfuscated the destruction of “the old ways” behind a veil of 
conservatism and tradition.647 For example, Roland Marchand has shown 
how large enterprises and corporations capitalized on nostalgic memories 
of family ownership by devising marketing campaigns that displayed the 
“owner” as the good guardian of his workers despite the fact that 
managerial structures had long divested many families of company 
management.648 By thus simulating tradition and familiarity, commodities 
catered to anxious customers and eased the transition into modernity. 
According to Warren Susman, consumer culture took on a “conservative 
and domesticating role” which helped Americans come to terms with full-
fledged mass culture, especially concerning the renegotiation of gender 
roles in everyday life. For example, rather then undermining traditional 
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notions of separate spheres, advertisements reinforced female domesticity 
by promoting products that intended to help women prepare meals and do 
the laundry at home instead of utilizing commercial or collective venues to 
achieve the same ends while they pursued their own careers.649 Such 
consumerist models of motherhood and domesticity allowed many 
German American women still invested in the homeland and its culture to 
excel in an area that was mutually respected in both the United States and 
Germany. Even though many of them realized the apparent inequalities 
inherent in the separation of genders, their role as mother, manager and 
guardian of culture and morality allowed them to wield considerable 
influence in a country that began to advertise the family as the most 
important micro-unit of society and “American Way.”650 
3.2. Women in Consumer Society 
 
Once relegated to the private sphere of domestic housekeeping651 and 
auxiliary labor, women across the Atlantic world seized opportunities in 
industrial and white-collar work to gain access to the public sphere, 
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financial independence from their fathers and husbands, and, eventually, 
equal rights of citizenship. Some took advantage of leisure and 
consumption to redefine themselves beyond the norms of traditional life, 
while others embraced their new roles as managers of household finances 
and consumption to escape the confines of the domestic.652 By the 1920s, 
women were not only active as rational consumers and responsible 
household managers, but also engaged in public activism and pursued 
careers in the consumer industries. For example, under the leadership of 
Florence Kelly the National Consumers’ League pressed department 
stores to eliminate child labor and attacked retailers for their low wages.653 
And the female employees of the J. Walther Thompson Company 
Women’s Editorial Department successfully redefined boundaries of 
womanhood and femininity in advertising. 654  More than simply giving 
women access to the public sphere and a variety of products, consumer 
culture provided the foundation for a “new individualism” that allowed 
women to challenge their role in American society: “Mass consumer 
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culture presented to women a new definition of gender that carved out a 
space for individual expression similar to men’s and that stood in tension 
with the older definition passed on to them by their mothers and 
grandmothers.”655 
In recent years, scholars have complicated that perspective. For 
example, Margaret Finnegan’s analysis of consumer activism among New 
York and Chicago suffragists shows that the protagonists expanded 
female access to the public domain by utilizing modern methods of 
advertising and marketing. When “department stores, manufacturers, and 
a changing society made consumption central to middle-class women’s 
lives, suffragists turned their roles as shoppers into arguments for granting 
women the ballot.” However, Finnegan also demonstrates that 
consumerism curtailed the feminist imagination of American womanhood 
by organizing the vision of women’s citizenship around white, middle-class 
ideals that perpetuated old stereotypes and created new ones.656 Similarly, 
in her work on the Get-Out-the-Vote (GOTV) movement, Liette Giedlow 
discusses how women employed modern strategies of commercial 
advertising to propagate their message, a message that encouraged the 
white middle-class to vote, while explicitly excluding non-white working-
class Americans. The “commodification of political culture,” Gidlow argued, 
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“helped to make politics the province of people who were white and middle 
class or elite.” 657  Both Gidlow and Finnegan ultimately suggest that 
“mainstream suffragists”658 of the interwar era often helped consolidate the 
consumerist order rather than challenge predominant paradigms. 
This argument is extended beyond the nation-state in Kristin 
Hoganson’s Consumer’s Imperium, which investigates the intersection of 
U.S. domesticity, consumerism and empire. White middle-class women, 
Hoganson argues, “asserted agency through their shopping, decorating, 
and dining preferences and their choices of leisure and reform 
activities.”659 For her, these women were actively involved in what she 
calls the “globalization of the United States” since “consumption 
constituted a form of interaction with the wider world.”660 At a time when 
white global supremacy came natural to the people of Western nation-
states, those that successfully mastered imperial culture and 
demonstrated their belonging to a superior civilization at home, by 
consuming foreign foods or displaying exotic cozy corners, helped justify 
both global and domestic hierarchies. 661  This was familiar territory for 
many German American women. Despite all inter-national differences, 
German migrants came from an imperial culture that was inspired by 
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similar discourses of cultural superiority. 662 In this context, the culture of 
consumption celebrated by American women often allowed for the 
preservation of foreign traditions – as long as such traditions signaled a 
belonging to Western civilization. The “immigrant gifts” movements, for 
example, celebrated cultural artifacts, which linked Americans back to 
their ancestral homelands, most preferably those lands that allowed them 
to claim for themselves and the country a white European, Protestant 
heritage. The movement, writes Hoganson, “made Americanization more 
palatable by suggesting that it did not demand choices between 
homogeneity and difference, modernity and tradition, or social control and 
individual expression.”663  
Hoganson’s conclusions, though aimed at the pre-World War I era, 
thus open up an investigative space for the interwar period. Even though 
the cultural space for expressions of hyphenate belonging began to close 
between World War I and World War II in the wake of heightening nativism 
and nationalization campaigns, the persistent identification of many 
Americans with their ancestral homeland provides ample opportunity to 
explore the ways in which American domestic life was influenced and 
shaped by inter- and transnational currents – even though it was 
simultaneously heralded as an insulated haven from global poverty and 
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despair. The spread of foreign ways through American consumer culture, 
whether driven by Hoganson’s middle-class consumers or by migrants 
from across the globe, shows the openness of American culture to the 
“foreign ways, foreign food, foreign ideas, foreign accents” that Margaret 
Mead denounced as distinctly “un-American” in the 1970s. 664 
Consumerism certainly provided room for German American women to 
demonstrate their belonging by connecting them to both the ancestral past 
and the American present. Nonetheless, as I have discussed in Section 2, 
German and American conceptions of how an individual should approach 
modern consumer society were hardly equal, sometimes even 
diametrically opposed. German migrant women had their own ideas about 
norms and practices guiding their status within the family and society at 
large, about individual and collective identities in the United States. But 
rather than simply disappearing, with every migrant family that arrived, 
such ideas about gender, domesticity, and national identity entered into 
and became a part of what it meant to be American.665  
4. German Migrants Navigate Consumer Culture 
4.1. Consumerism and German America 
 
Germany and the United States reacted differently to the ascent of 
consumer culture, the latter more optimistically, the former with a certain 
unease. Whereas Germany’s marketplace was defined by bourgeois 
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social distinctions, American consumerism promised equal access to well-
paid jobs and, consequently, to an abundance of mass-produced goods. 
The discrepancies between both countries were in part responsible for the 
migration that connected them during the nineteenth and twentieth century. 
In the United States, German migrants pursued opportunities they were 
denied at home while simultaneously remaining skeptic about the impact 
of modernism and conspicuous consumption. American culture, many 
believed, threatened traditional gender roles and undermined family 
values, community, and culture – all trademarks of German migrant life.666 
Especially bourgeois proponents of German culture abroad advocated that 
both countries, Germany and the United States, should help “each other to 
supplant, wherever necessary, the wild egoism, materialism, greed, 
sensuality and pleasure madness of the present time with a sound and 
peaceful philosophy of life, useful activity and a full and pure enjoyment of 
the short span allotted to us.”667 
There would be no such cooperation, of course. Nonetheless, German 
migrants left behind their imprints on American consumer culture, though 
exactly how remains an unresolved question, since the intersection of 
German America and American consumer culture has received so little 
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attention by scholars in the past.668 Kathleen Conzen has argued that 
German festive culture with its beer gardens and social celebrations 
developed parallel to American commercial culture with little interaction 
between the two, and it disappeared subsequently.669 But William Leach 
successfully demonstrated that the developing American consumer 
society had distinctly German elements, which encompassed and 
reflected the migrant experience. Leach specifically cites the example of 
Gemütlichkeit, an emotional state of “contentment, ease, and satisfaction, 
all in one” 670 that found expression in the mixture of food, music, drink and 
sociability, which characterized German organizations and helped define 
German ethnicity abroad. Other Americans could experience 
Gemütlichkeit at events such as the Oktoberfests, which introduced the 
public to the customs and culture of the group.671 According to Leach, 
German American businessmen, among them John Wanamaker, 
incorporated the emotional connotations of Gemütlichkeit into their 
department stores, introducing, for example, the custom of playing music 
at all times. Their efforts, writes Leach, “did much to improve [American 
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culture] by encouraging all Americans to love music, to relax a little more, 
and to take pleasure in sensual and beautiful things.”672  
Whether or not this particular argument is accurate: The point is that 
the presence of German immigrants changed the shape of American 
consumer culture and that their role helped them claim certain spaces and 
traditions for themselves, even though exclusively German institutions 
suffered in the course. Consumption, in this regard, offered an alternative 
to many German migrants who loathed the social control they experienced 
in ethnic organizations (see Chapter 4) without necessarily undermining 
their sense of heritage and belonging. Though not exclusively German, 
department stores like the one operated by John Wanamaker in 
Philadelphia offered a glimpse of the migratory past and the products to 
take that experience home. Moreover, through its advertisements 
Wanamaker emphasized the department store’s “responsibility for sound 
merchandising.” Since the market with its overwhelming plethora of 
products remained unpredictable, volatile, and capricious, Wanamaker 
thus assured its customers that “it is the endeavor of this Store at all times 
to sell goods at the lowest fair and reasonable prices possible—but we 
shall not reduce the qualities of our merchandise.”673 In another instance, 
one of Wanamaker’s competitors, the American Stores Company, thanked 
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“the German people of Philadelphia” and the Philadelphia Gazette-
Democrat for their continuous loyalty. “This [loyalty] is proof,” its 
advertising manager J.S. Kraemer wrote in April 1933, “that a people 
highly discriminating in the quality of foods find that the American Stores 
afford them many advantages in the way of thrift.”674 Similarly, American 
corporations like Chevrolet, Gillette, Lucky Strike and Kellogg’s appealed 
to values traditionally associated with the ethnic group, like product quality 
and reliability, by placing translated ads in German-language 
newspapers.675  
Consumers trusted such advertisements in their navigation of the 
marketplace and relied on newspapers to bring them the ads. I have 
discussed the continuing importance of ethnic newspapers in various 
contexts throughout this dissertation. During the 1920s, they were still one 
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of the few spaces that migrants could turn to on an everyday basis for 
trusted information. Apart from advertisements, consumers could also 
read advice columns, which told them what to buy and what to avoid. With 
ethnic newspapers, however, such discussions became increasingly 
transnational during the 1920s, since improving methods of travel and 
communication facilitated exchanges between old and new world: ethnic 
newspapers like the Philadelphia Tageblatt, the Gazette-Democrat, and 
the New York Staatszeitung frequently reprinted articles from Germany 
and criticized the impact of consumerism on German national culture at 
home and abroad. The Philadelphia Gazette Democrat explicitly 
emphasized the continued importance of the homeland by advertising its 
Sunday editions, which contained an entire section with articles about and 
from Germany, by announcing: “Intimate bonds with the old Heimat are 
established through the Sunday edition of the ‘Philadelphia Gazette-
Democrat’ and Your ‘Illustrated Weekly’ produced in Germany.”676 Even 
though readership was certainly declining, many German Americans still 
looked to such sources of comfort and guidance and the advice they 
received influenced the decisions they made. Not coincidentally, a great 
number of articles were directed specifically at women, whose role as 
guardians of culture required them to be particularly careful to avoid the 
forces of Americanization.  
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4.2. Gender and Consumerism in German America 
 
The general custom among German migrants families, even those 
from the working class, dictated the presence of women in the home. 
Similar to what they encountered in American society, migrant women 
tended to take on the role of household managers in the emerging 
consumer marketplace.677 As I have discussed in section 2.3, in the minds 
of those who valued Germanness and wanted to preserve it, this role was 
imbued with additional importance since wives and mothers were in 
charge of maintaining a sense of “German identity behind the scenes, in 
the domestic sphere.”678 When women challenged such conventions or 
male leadership, men often responded indignantly in private and public. 
For example, Carl J. Hexamer, the president of the National German-
American Alliance had a reputation for deriding the Women’s Rights 
Movement.679 And the Lutheran pastor Georg von Bosse proclaimed: “In 
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my house, I am Herr, and there does not rule some ‘New Woman’ or the 
will of the child.”680  
The conflict between tradition and modernity defined the ways in which 
German American women renegotiated gender norms. Like their “native” 
American peers, they carefully opened up spaces that allowed them to 
engage publically without alienating the men of their community. This is 
not to say, of course, that none were ready to cross such boundaries more 
self-confidently despite male objections, for example by participating in the 
women’s rights movement. But for the majority, their work in church 
groups, charity or social events was often based, as Anke Ortlepp has 
observed, “on a very conservative reading of gender relations, limiting 
women to the home as mothers, educators, and faithful supporters of their 
husbands and the church.”681 In this context, consumer activism offered a 
unique way to enter into and influence a significant area of American 
public life, an area in which both their husbands at home and the greater 
society accepted women as legitimate authorities.  
Scholarship on German American female consumerism and consumer 
activism is rare, in part because historians have tended to interpret any 
                                                        
680 Quoted in Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 88. 
681 Anke Ortlepp, “German American Women’s Organizations,” in Adam, 
Kaufman, Germany and the Americas, 413-418. See also: Blaschke, Frauen 
wandern aus; Irene Häderle, Deutsche kirchliche Frauenvereine in Ann Arbor, 
1870-1930 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1997); Patricia Herminghouse, “’Sisters, Arise!’ 
The Intersections of Nineteenth-Century German and American Feminist 
Movements,” in: Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore, eds., The German-American 
Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800-2000 (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 49-60. 
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engagement in the marketplace as a form of Americanization.682 Yet, the 
little work that has been done shows how women often found old-world 
familiarity in their navigation of American consumer culture.683 Following 
the lead of other American newspapers, for example, German-language 
dailies recognized women as readers and consumers and started 
publishing regular women’s pages long before their German counterparts 
did. “Capitalizing on women’s new roles as major shoppers in a rapidly 
expanding consumer society, publishers across the nation began courting 
the woman consumer.” 684  Far from proposing an abdication of 
Germanness, German-language publishers recognized the importance of 
women and their choices in the marketplace to the coherence of the 
community and specifically aimed for the female consumer to stop the 
perceived erosion of a cohesive German ethnicity in the United States. 
Magazines such as the Milwaukee-based Deutsche Hausfrau, founded in 
1904, informed its readers about the newest cultural and consumer trends 
and survived into the 1920s and 1930s with a circulation between 40,000 
and 50,000 nationwide.685 The Hausfrau was a guidebook to the American 
                                                        
682 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 95-108. 
683 Monika Blaschke, “Communicating the Old and the New: German Immigrant 
Women and Their Press in Comparative Perspective around 1900,” eds. Dirk 
Hoerder and Jörg Nagler, People in Transit: German Migrations in Comparative 
Perspective, 1820–1930 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 313-
328. 
684 Blaschke, “Communicating,” 316. 
685 Blaschke, “Communicating,” 318. The magazine did experience a severe 
subscription crisis during World War I, when it lost more than half of its 
readership. Nonetheless, it continued until 1993, when it changed its name to 
Das Fenster, “The Window”. As such it continues until this day, April 2013, under 
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market for German readers that featured “a colorful mixture of sentimental 
Old World memories, serialized German fiction, news of the world, 
introductions to American life-style, household hints and domestic advice, 
a fashion section, plus extended space for letters to the editors and other 
avenues for reader participation.”686  
Especially during and after World War I, German American women 
embraced their unique opportunities as providers of spiritual, cultural, and 
dietary nourishment. During the 1910s and 1920s organizations like the 
Hilfsverein Deutscher Frauen (“German Women’s Aid Organization”),687 
the “Quarter-Collection (for Immediate and Permanent Relief)”, founded by 
Margarete Cronau, 688  or Chicago’s Columbia Damen [“Ladies’”] Club 
(CDC)689 established connections to the homeland as well as to other non-
German organizations devoted to similar causes. The CDC, for example, 
engaged in activities initiated by important feminists like Jane Addams and 
supported diverse causes in Germany, such as a soup kitchen in 
Karlsruhe, the Red Cross in Berlin as well as German theatre and 
                                                                                                                                                       
the self-proclaimed slogan “America's oldest and most popular German language 
magazine.” See also: www.dasfenster.com [retrieved, April 30, 2013] 
686 Blaschke, “Communicating,” 318. 
687 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 158-159. 
688 See, for example: “Quarter Collection kauft neues Heim,” New York 
Staatszeitung, January 16, 1921, 1. Members of the “Quarter Collection” 
committed to donating a quarter every Sunday for the cause. The organization 
helped found several hostels across Germany, where sick children could recover. 
Among them was the “Margarete Cronau-Heim” near Altenberg, Saxony, which 
was later run by the VDA. It still exists today and continues to be named after 
Cronau.  
689 Harzig, “Creating Transcultural Space,” 134. 
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education activities in Chicago.690 Countering critics both in the United 
States and in Germany, women proceeded carefully to avoid reprisals691 
and accusations of negligence. As one contemporary writer noted, 692 
potentially to address critics like Kaergel or Halfeld, who saw public 
activism as a sign of assimilation and thus dangerous to German 
womanhood: ”No fear need be entertained that German women will lose 
their femininity, as is sometimes remarked by those that would restrict the 
rapid rise of gifted women. The love of home and family is as vivid as ever 
in normal German women and will enable her to find the right course to 
assist in the uplift of her people.” 693  
This spirit of trans-national continuity was also communicated through 
the pages of newspapers such as the Gazette-Democrat, often very 
similar in tone and message to the Heimatbriefe, advising women on their 
duties towards home and family. For example, a daily page, the 
Frauenseite [women’s page], advised women on topics such as “Silence 
                                                        
690 Harzig, “Creating Transcultural Space,” 134-135. As I have discussed in 
Chapter 5, women also played leading roles in the committee that organized the 
Horror on the Rhine Mass Meeting in New York in late February 1921. And they 
did so with the explicit support from leading German-American men like George 
Sylvester Viereck, who provided female writers ample room to express their 
opinions in his magazine American Monthly. See for example: “How the White 
Woman Can End the Rhineland’s Black Horror,” Viereck’s American Monthly 
(VAM) 13:1 (March, 1921), 13; and “Women to the Front!” VAM 12:2 (April, 
1920): 48. 
691 See for example: “Frauenehre,” Philadelphia Tageblatt, Jan. 6, 1921, 5. 
692 Though it is not entirely clear, who wrote those lines, its location among the 
papers of the leading German-American activist Rudolf Cronau speaks to its 
origins in the social milieu of bourgeois migrant circles. “The German Woman,” 
Undated Essay, Rudolf Cronau Collection, GSP, Folder 16. 
693 “The German Woman,” 22-23. 
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in marriage,” suggesting that it was their responsibility to recognize and 
alleviate emotional issues. Other columns provided advice concerning 
“The naughty child,” “Burned Dinner,” or “The Dear Vanity.”694 Another 
column told its readers: “The way to a man’s heart, is through his stomach. 
Therefore: Girls, wanting to get married, learn how to cook!”695 In these 
sections of the newspaper, the German heritage was frequently invoked. 
A regular series of weekly articles called “A Guide for Housewives” [“Ein 
Führer für Hausfrauen”], which contained recipes, beauty advice, and 
other tidbits of information, noted that the “German housewife in America 
is always eager to receive recommendations to expand her knowledge in 
the performance of her obligations as housewife and mother.” 696  The 
column, which displayed images of women cleaning, cooking and reading 
with a child, suggested that it could help women master their “obligations” 
and thus reinforced a number of conceptions about the role of women in 
American society and the specific qualities that particularly German 
women brought to the task.  
Not surprisingly, consumerism was one of the main foci of these advice 
columns. How were women to navigate the treacherous world of American 
consumer culture without belying their heritage? The “Frauenseite” 
regularly advised women on how to use make-up or how to dress. “Our 
                                                        
694 “Das Schweigen in der Ehe” and “Das ungezogene Kind,” Gazette-Democrat, 
June 1, 1927, 3; “Angebranntes Essen” and “Die Liebe Eitelkeit,” Gazette-
Democrat, June 15, 1927, 3.   
695 “Mannesliebe geht durch den Magen,” Gazette-Democrat, March 7, 1930, 3. 
696 See, for example, Gazette-Democrat June 1, 1927 or June 2, 1927, n.p. 
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German woman does not need to be dressed particularly elegant—she 
does not need make something of herself.” Unlike French women, the 
article argued, German women were always graceful: “They always carry 
a silent, bright flame deep in their heart, a holy belief in the victory of the 
good, a pious hope in the grace of God and a modest, warm love for 
Heimat, youth, and beauty.” 697  I am not suggesting that all German 
American readers accepted such advice without hesitation. It is difficult to 
determine how exactly women felt, since newspaper rarely provided space 
for readers to respond beyond the realm of domestic and foreign politics. 
But as the next section shows, many did indeed appreciate the newspaper 
and the advertisements therein as important guidelines for the retention of 
Germanness abroad. 
4.3. Wanamaker Advertisement Controversy 
 
In the final section of this chapter, I discuss the controversy around a 
discontinued series of advertisements in the Philadelphia Gazette-
Democrat that aroused the anger and criticism of the newspaper’s 
readers, among them many women, who protested against the 
discontinuation of the ads as individuals and as members of German 
American organization. Though short-lived and minor in its extent, I 
maintain that the incident exemplified the continued importance of 
hyphenated belonging in the context of consumerism and mass culture. In 
                                                        
697 “Das Ideal der Dame,” Gazette-Democrat, June 9, 1928, n.p.  
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their attempts to reinstate the ads, German Philadelphians showed that 
even in 1932 their heritage mattered to them as they went shopping in the 
city’s department stores. The gradual disappearance of a diverse, 
hyphenated shopping experience was not merely the result of a disjointed 
migrant community or increasing assimilation among second-generation 
German Americans, but as importantly a consequence of economic 
pressures on producers and providers in the Depression marketplace.  
In the spring of 1932 the John Wanamaker department store, a staple 
of Philadelphia shopping since the 1870s, decided to discontinue its 
advertisements in the Gazzette-Democrat. The ads had been printed in 
the newspaper since the late 1800s and were widely embraced by the 
readership until they disappeared in late April 1932. As a response, the 
newspaper received roughly 130 letters of protest.698 Russell Kazal has 
interpreted the fact that most writers complained in English as a sign that 
particularly younger German Americans now possessed the necessary 
language skills to succeed in American society and were thus no longer 
reliant on or interested in German-language newspapers. Using a familiar 
“measurement” of Germanness – language – Kazal argues that despite 
the protests, the letters showed “that consumer culture continued to attract 
German Philadelphians, in ways that enabled some to de-emphasize their 
                                                        
698 The department store wrote back to at least some of the complainants, usually 
using a standard response that cited “the necessity of curtailing our advertising 
expenditure.” Wanamaker also held out the prospect of returning the ads as soon 
as economic conditions allowed such a reversal. See, for example, John 
Wanamaker Philadelphia to Mr. Fred C. Gartner, June 2, 1932. HSP, Balch, Call 
Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2. 
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ethnic identity while partaking of new collective identities of consumption, 
including those open especially to women.”699 As key evidence Kazal cites 
a letter by Mrs. A. Castor who threatened to discontinue her subscription 
to the Gazzette-Democrat if the Wanamaker advertisements were not to 
return, since she did all her shopping there and it was her mother who did 
not want to give up the paper. For the younger generation, Kazal 
maintained, losing the Wanamaker ads “was more a matter of concern for 
their parents’ generation; given their language skills, they could always 
subscribe to an English-language paper ‘with the Wanamaker ad in it.’”700  
Of course, Kazal’s argument reflects the larger reality of second-
generation immigrants, who often felt less attached to a country they had 
never seen than their parents, who were born there. Nonetheless, he fails 
to capture the complexities of the protests and its implications for German 
American life. Language is hardly the issue here. Most Germans spoke 
both languages and it seems unlikely that they would have written to an 
American department store in German, even one they regarded as 
traditionally catering to German customers. By contrast, the vast majority 
of those who complained directly to Gustav Meyer, the publisher of the 
Gazette-Democrat, wrote in German. Moreover, among the roughly 45 
letters (of the original 130) still archived at the Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, Mrs. Astor’s letter is one of very few that 
                                                        
699 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 201. 
700 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 201. 
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threaten to discontinue the paper. 701  The majority of respondents 
recognized the discontinuation of the Wanamaker advertisements as a 
serious threat to their community. This was especially true for German 
American women, the majority of the writers. 702  They protested as 
individuals or as members of ethnic groups such as the Women’s Auxiliary 
of the German Society of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia Turngemeinde or 
the German Club and Technical Association and clearly saw matters 
pertaining to shopping and consumption as their territory. As such, they 
were unwilling to give up on the ads, which they regarded as critical to the 
performance of their duties as household managers. 
The arguments brought forward by the protesters centered around 
three main issues. First, there was the matter of tradition and history: John 
Wanamaker’s department store had been founded by the descendant of 
eighteenth century German immigrants, a fact celebrated by writers such 
as Rudolf Cronau and Albert Bernhardt Faust (see Chapters 3 and 4), who 
listed Wanamaker prominently and claimed him as a leader of German 
                                                        
701 I found a total of two letters, including Mrs. Astor’s, threatening to cancel their 
subscription. The other one was from an unknown Philadelphian who wrote: “We 
don't want your paper any more, unless the Wanamaker Store Adv. apier [sic] in 
it again[.] we sure do miss it!” A third respondent, Mrs. W. Loeb, did point to her 
mother as the main reason, why she wanted the ads back. Finally, Mrs. A. Feyler 
wrote that “now we are forced to buy an English paper,” suggesting that she, too, 
might be more inclined to discontinue her subscription if the ads would not return. 
(HSP, Call Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2). 
702 Though I was not always to determine the gender of writer, by my own count 
women outnumbered men 3 to 1. 
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America.703 A letter signed by William Moennig and Carl F. Haussmann, 
the latter a prominent figure in the affairs of German Philadelphia, who 
later became and archivist for the German Society of Pennsylvania, 
pursued this line of argument. German patrons, Moenning and 
Haussmann wrote, “favor the Wanamaker House for the German ancestry 
of the founder who frequently proclaimed his pride of the German blood in 
his Grand [sic] parents.”704 Another letter by the ladies auxiliary of the 
Philadelphia Turngemeinde brought forward a similar argument, claiming 
that Germans across the city “pride themselves of the German ancestry of 
the founder of the John Wanamaker Store.”705 And Mrs. Auguste Senger 
from Landsdowne, Pa. stressed how Wanamaker ads had been part of the 
German communal experience for the last 25 years of her life. Senger 
especially pointed to the “Writings of the Founder,” which were a 
prominent part of the ads and “which often are real gems of psychology, 
businessnowledge [sic] and common sense. These ‘writings’ are often 
commented on during our gatherings.”706 Even though John Wanamaker 
                                                        
703 See, Cronau, Drei Jahrhunderte (1909), 336 and 400-401. Faust, Deutschtum 
in den Vereinigten Staaten, Volume 1, 107. 
704 HSP, Call Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2. 
705 HSP, Call Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2. Other examples 
include a letter from German Ladies Aid Society and a resolution by the German 
Ladies Aid Society of the German Society of Pennsylvania, which stated: 
“Inasmuch as the Germans, as a rule, pride themselves of the German ancestry 
of the founder of the John Wanamaker Store, it would seem to be of great 
advantage to the management of the John Wanamaker Store to at least cater to 
the same degree for the German trade, as they do for the English trade, by 
placing their daily advertisement in the German patrons' favorite newspaper, the 
Philadelphia Gazette Democrat.” 
706 HSP, Call Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2. 
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himself had died in 1922, German consumers looked to the small columns 
for advice and inspiration. Much like the “Frauenseite,” the “Writings of the 
Founder,” though not exclusively aimed at German Americans, provided 
readers with a sense of access and belonging to American consumer 
culture – and, of course, with a sense of personal connection in the 
increasingly anonymous world of department store shopping.707  
While a number of writers thus pointed to the long tradition of reading 
the ads over the past decades, an equal number acknowledged that they 
missed them for practical reasons. Advertisements, as Don Slater has 
argued, serve as “maps of modernity,” “authoritative (if unstable) 
‘discourses through and about objects’ which allow us to orientate 
ourselves to the social meaning of things in a commercial world. 
Advertising thus replaces traditional authorities about such meanings (e.g. 
religion and custom) with a modern information system.”708  At a time, 
when many German Americans were less enthusiastic about membership 
in ethnic institutions dominated by social elites (while simultaneously 
agreeing with many of the arguments advanced by those elites), 
advertisements filled a cultural void. Through such strategies as the one 
employed by Wanamaker, many companies successfully convinced 
                                                        
707 It should also be noted that such writing were directed specifically at women 
who were expected to make up between 80 and 85 percent of the audience for 
advertisements, See: Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: 
Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985), 66; Daniel Delis Hill, Advertising to the American Woman, 1900-1999 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002), vii. 
708 Quoted in Slater, Consumer Culture and Modernity, 86. 
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consumers that they could help replace old authorities for the benefit of all. 
This trend was exacerbated by the disappearance of local merchants and 
small corner stores, as more and more Americans moved out into the 
suburbs and only returned to the city for their weekly trips to the 
department store. When the advertisements disappeared, it was the topic 
of some debate. “I […] have been asked by quite a number of my friends 
why it is, that we cannot get the 'News' of the Wannamacker [sic] bargains 
in the Gazette,” wrote Mrs. Elizabeth Hummel, “please see to it that we 
may see it again as we would like to take advantage of their bargain 
prices.” Through the advertisements, readers of the Gazzette-Democrat 
felt they were informed about the best deals in town when it came to 
fashion, household items and other important products. Kate Krocker thus 
hoped that the ads would soon return, “for the best of the Germandom”, 
after all, it was “very annoying to drive into the city at random, only to find 
out that it is better and cheaper to buy in a different store.”709 Having 
shopped at Wanamaker for 35 years, Mrs. A. Feyler was “at a loss not 
seeing their daily advertising.”710  
The question remains: why did so many German Americans decide to 
protest the absence of the ads instead of simply switching their 
                                                        
709 Unlike the previous letters, Krocker’s was in German. Translated by the author. 
HSP, Call Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2. 
710 HSP, Call Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2. Similar letters, 
who lamented the loss of the ad as a “guide” were received from Mr. Arthur Marx 
(undated), Mrs. Ch. Hanne (May 25, 1932), Frau M. Hoeling (May 28, 1932), Mrs. 
A. Oster (June 1, 1932), and Hulda Schuelke (May 28, 1932), who asked (in 
German), why the Gazzette-Democrat “no longer publishes this valuable guide 
[Wegweiser] to a shopping tour?” 
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subscription to one of the countless English-language newspapers that 
still published the Wanamaker ads, as any “assimilated” immigrant would 
likely do. To be sure, there were some who did. Kazal’s assessment of the 
“assimilating” effect of consumer culture is thus not entirely incorrect, 
though I would argue that many second-generation German Americans 
did not need to assimilate, mainly because they were born in the United 
States, had grown up bilingual and shaped the country as much as they 
were shaped by it. The point is that this example shows how many 
German Americans still depended on newspapers and other ethnic 
institutions that buffered their communal experience in the increasingly 
diverse and anonymous American city. This was the third, and arguably 
most important argument invoked by the writers. They understood that 
newspapers such as the Gazzette-Democrat were critical to the cohesion 
of German Philadelphia and that there was a mutual dependency between 
the newspaper and its readers. The ads thus not only served as a guide 
for the consumers, but also provided financial support for the newspaper 
and ensured “that our favorite journals may enjoy a full measure of 
Circulation and success in all of its various departments,” as one undated 
letter by the German choir “Rheingold” to the Wanamaker department 
store claimed. Without the advertisements, “our people” were at a 
“disadvantage.”711 More than simply an act of disenfranchisement against 
the German American citizen-consumer, discontinuing the ads was a 
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“mutual loss to both the Wanamaker Store and the German Daily 
Newspapers,” according to Mrs. Rosa Busch, the President of the ladies 
auxiliary of the German-American Federation of Pennsylvania.712  
Maybe the totality of all arguments was best summarized in a letter 
written on May 25, 1932 by Albert Mansdoerfer. His family, he argued, 
valued Wanamaker for its prompt delivery and great service and because 
it had provided historical continuity during a chaotic time of change.  
This store was as familiar to us as on old friend – after all, it 
was [at Wanamaker] where we bought our first piece of 
furniture, a ‘Standard’ sewing machine, which we are still 
using and if we need needles for it, we still go to the same 
saleswoman, who sold us this item more than a quarter of a 
century ago. […] How we loved going to Wanamaker’s, 
when a ‘good sale’ was displayed – no bargains – but 
tasteful, durable things – and while shopping we always had 
the opportunity [to listen] to the delightful sounds of the St. 
Louisen organ […]713 it almost felt like being in a German 
cathedral. The Wanamaker ad told us of all [those 
experiences] every morning in the ‘Gazette’ [sic] and now we 
miss that.714 
Whether or not Wanamaker had actually tried to achieve an 
atmosphere of “Old World” familiarity: Many German Americans claimed 
the department store as one of their own and the ads as its guide. Their 
absence was debated with friends and neighbors, who wondered, 
according to Mansdoerfer, “why Wanamaker’s suddenly turn their backs 
[sic] on the Germans.” Far from simply accepting defeat, a coalition of 
                                                        
712 HSP, Call Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2. Letter undated.  
713 Unfortunately, a section of the letter is stuck to the record book with glue, 
making parts of it illegible.  
714 HSP, Call Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2. 
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associations and individuals decided to do something about what they felt 
was an important institution in German American life. They knew that 
diversity was threatened by the economic depression and a nationalized 
consumer culture that preferred uniformity. Nonetheless they asked: 
“Wouldn’t it be possible to convince this department store to publish their 
advertisement in the German newspaper again – we are subscribing to 
the German morning paper, not least because of the kids so that they 
won’t forget the German [language].”715 Far from simply assimilating or 
giving up their ethnic peculiarities, many German migrants in the United 
States were still committed to the preservation of tradition and culture. 
5. Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, the attempts to have the Wanamaker advertisements 
returned were unsuccessful – just like many other attempts to preserve 
tradition and diversity in the face of an increasingly nationalized consumer 
culture. However, the decline of the diverse consumer marketplace, as it 
panned out during the 1930s, was a process much less smooth than has 
been accepted so far, at least in the case of German America. Its 
homogenization often occurred against the resistance of those who 
treasured German immigrant culture for its emotional value and for the 
access it provided to help navigate the complicated new world of mass 
consumer society. Therefore, it is misleading to argue, as historians have 
                                                        
715 HSP, Call Number 3469 Phil. Gazette Publishing Box 1 of 2. See also the 
letter by Rudy Malessa, May 28, 1932. 
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done in the past, that German migrants simply turned away from their 
heritage and assimilated. While many migrants certainly embraced 
American consumer society, they often did so in ways that allowed them 
to stay connected to the past. This was especially true for women, since 
their role in the consumer marketplace extended beyond the domestic 
sphere. As mothers, they were expected to preserve the memory and 
traditions of the homeland and keep alive its language. But as household 
managers, they were also in charge of domestic finance and, thus, 
navigating the complicated American marketplace. For them, institutions 
such as the Gazette-Democrat provided valuable guidelines to American 
society, for example advertisements, which allowed them to compare 
prices and learn about the newest trends. Their commitment showed that 
many, though certainly not all, German American women merged their 
identities as women in the United States with the duty ascribed to them by 
the ethnic nationalism of German America. Ultimately, then, I suspect that 
the question why German American institutions and ethnic enterprises 
experienced such decline during the 1920s and 1930s has to be answered 
by tying their history into, first, evolving nationalized mass consumer 
culture and, second, diverging conceptions of Germanness in the United 
States and back home.  
And vice versa. Investigating and answering such questions is not 
without consequence for the general history of the United States. During 
the 1940s and 1950s, the war experience and the baby boom increased 
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pressure on men and women to adhere to traditional visions of the nuclear 
family. The role of women in the mass consumer society reverted to, 
primarily, wife, mother, and consumer – and those who varied from the 
norm faced condemnation. What role did German Americans play in this 
process? To be sure, ethnic differences mattered less than they had a few 
decades before. Nonetheless, as I have shown in this chapter, ethnic 
traditionalists may have found ways to promote familiar values – traditional 
motherhood, separate spheres, gendered consumerism – in post-war 
America, thus driving the discourse instead of simply assimilating and 
passively accepting it. The history of American consumerism thus offers 
yet another field for scholars of German immigrants in the United States to 
explore the remnants of “Germanness” beyond language, (high) culture, 
traditions, and ethnic organizations.  
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Conclusion 
 
On September 23, 2015, the journalist Erik Kirschbaum once more 
asked that familiar question, which perplexed so many historians and 
journalists in decades past and which has driven this dissertation: “What 
Happened to German America?”716 His answer, however, brought little 
new information. After World War I, Kirschbaum concluded, “those who 
could hid their Germanic roots; some switched their names; many others 
canceled their subscriptions to German newspapers, which virtually 
disappeared. Whatever vestige of German America remained after the 
1910s was wiped out by similar pressures during World War II, not to 
mention the shame that came with German identity after it.” 
I have argued throughout this dissertation that it is time to move 
beyond that paradigm. For one, I suggest that the period between World 
War I and World War II offers plenty of opportunity to trace the history of 
German migrants in the United States, and that ethnic identification 
persisted, if one is willing to look beyond traditional measures of 
“Germanness.” I have suggested different approaches to investigate the 
ways in which German migrants interacted with American society, for 
example its civic, racial, social, gender and consumer politics. The 
sources I evaluated for this dissertation – German American newspapers, 
                                                        
716 Erik Kirschbaum, “What Happened to German America?,” The New York 
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contemporary German American histories, internal documents from 
immigrant organizations and the letters written by German Americans in 
the 1930s – offer plenty of evidence. They show that migrants in the 
United States continued to find ways to reconcile their German origins with 
their desire to be included in the American body politic. Instead of 
passively assimilating they used their transnational knowledge of racial 
and social relations, of gender roles and consumer society to actively 
shape the society they lived in. Instead of failing to adapt to the “American 
Way,” many migrants quite successfully became part of and shaped the 
America they called “home.”  
At the same time, nothing comparable to Irish-American or Italian-
American culture survived in German America, no proud remembering of 
the European past celebrated in popular culture and on the streets of the 
United States. The reasons for that absence cannot simply be located in 
the anti-German hysteria and the Americanization campaigns, which 
rarely, if ever successfully pressed immigrants of any group into 
“assimilating.”717 Instead, the answers lie in the disparate nature of the 
community, its inability to overcome internal divisions, and its failure to 
craft a transnational culture adaptive of American society, its conventions, 
values, and norms. Individuals adapted for sure, but the ethnic community 
did not.  
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Most importantly, however, at least in the context of this dissertation, 
many German Americans actively turned away from the Third Reich and 
its policies. While applauding Germany’s ostensible economic revival, few 
became permanent and unequivocal supporters of National Socialism 
during the 1930s. If we are to understand this process, simple dichotomies 
fall short. The historian Valdis O. Lumans, for example, has argued that 
while “a few [German Americans] were unabashedly Nazi sympathizers 
and saw themselves as true Volksdeutsche, the vast majority regarded 
themselves as Americans and valued their Germanness merely as cultural 
heritage, void of any political predispositions.”718 Even Cornelia Wilhelm, 
who rightly laments the lack of critical engagement among German 
American scholars with the period, notes a diametrical opposition in the 
existing scholarship between National Socialist “race politics and 
Volksgemeinschaft” on the one side and Americanization on the other.719 
To be sure, there were many who simply celebrated their Germanness in 
cultural organizations. Yet, such a dichotomy obfuscates the 
interconnectedness of ethnocultural and political representations of 
national belonging. Among those involved in the German American Bund 
or other American organizations supporting the Third Reich, not all were 
simply unabashed Nazis and among those not involved, many were.   
                                                        
718 Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 130.  
719 Wilhelm, Bewegung, 14. 
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Instead of simply viewing their origins as cultural heritage, many 
German Americans remained invested in the politics of the homeland. In 
fact, events back in the old world were one of the dominating factors in 
ethnic American life and among the leading topics in the ethnic press 
during the 1930s. The publishers of the New York Staatszeitung, for 
example, were initially elated about the rise of Hitler and the Nazis – they 
hoped, as did many German Americans, that a revival of German strength 
could also improve their status as citizens of the United States. While 
critical of Nazi anti-Semitism, the editors of the Staatszeitung viewed the 
accompanying violence as “temporary” and evaluated events in Germany 
with “some patience, some understanding and some optimism.” It was not 
until the late 1930s that the Staatszeitung took a stronger stand against 
the Reich and condemned its regime.720 The Steuben Society was more 
openly supportive of Hitler, but it too attempted to stake out a position that 
would allow its members to assert their Americanness while retaining their 
connection to the homeland. It frequently clashed with Jewish 
organizations and resorted to anti-Semitic rhetoric reminiscent of Nazi 
diatribes in Germany. 721  And then there was the infamous German-
American Bund, an organization that has garnered much attention both by 
contemporary observers and historians. But, as I have noted, its 
membership was small and it short-lived publicity was much less evidence 
                                                        
720 Kupsky, The True Spirit, 135. 
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of a particular German American consciousness than a representation of a 
new American culture less tolerant of totalitarianism and ethnic 
nationalism.722 
In fact, by the late 1930s, moderate German Americans had 
recognized that the American public had turned “on the German-American 
element in the mistaken opinion that we agree with the harassment, which 
is now being promulgated in Germany.” 723  Many tried to position 
themselves accordingly. An editorial in the Baltimore Sun, for example, 
called on German Americans to take a stand and denounce the Nazis: 
“Unless we Germans act, the people of the United States may be justified 
in believing that all Germans approve of the present German policies as 
announced by Herr Hitler. Germans in this country are peace-loving and 
law-abiding, but if we do not express ourselves accordingly, we may be 
looked upon with suspicion as emissaries of the German Government.”724 
German Americans had to choose sides. Among those who conversed 
with the VDA, this painful process was laid out in some of the letters sent 
back across the Atlantic in the late 1930s. “I have endangered many of my 
friendships here with my sympathies for Germany,” wrote Rudolph Blank 
from New York City to the VDA in September 1937. “I am a faithful [treuer] 
American citizen, but one that clings to the tribal culture of Germandom.” 
                                                        
722 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 263. 
723 Kupsky, The True Spirit, 141. 
724 Editorial by Gustav Mühlenberg, published in the Baltimore Sun, February 18, 
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Perhaps unlike any other, Blank’s letter speaks to that inner strife among 
many German Americans who, to use Blank’s words, attempted to “raise 
an understanding” for Germany, its culture and its people in the United 
States, but did not agree with the anti-democratic militarism of the Third 
Reich. Blank was clearly not a Nazi. In fact, he abhorred the regime and, 
not understanding the connection between the government and the VDA, 
he challenged the editors of the Heimatbriefe to put a stop to the regime’s 
“mischief [Unwesen]”. “Dear God,” he pleaded, “all of you help put an end 
to those enemies of Germandom.”725 Blank wasn’t simply an assimilated 
American. But in the United States, there was no place for his 
“hyphenated” nationalism anymore.    
Many others were similarly torn between their love for the homeland 
and the pressures of American life. They were not sure whether or not to 
believe American newspapers, even though doubting the reports from 
Germany became harder and harder as the decade progressed and the 
Nazi regime became less and less apologetic about its actions. “We read 
so many things in the newspaper, you never know if it is true,” wrote 
Martha Hesse from Evanston, Illinois. “To be honest, sometimes I hope it 
is not true. It is not only nice things that one reads. But let the newspapers 
write what they write.”726 Her minced words do not reveal her real thoughts 
or relate to any specific event – it is the timing of the letter that is telling: It 
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was written November 10, 1939, one day after the Kristallnacht, when the 
Nazis attacked and looted Jewish stores and synagogues, killing more 
than 80 individuals. Like many others, Hesse never wrote another letter to 
the VDA.  
To be sure, many German Americans continued to be invested in the 
homeland and their contributions to the political discourse of the 1930s 
and 1940s certainly helped rebuild the German-American relationship 
after World War II.727 They had to tread carefully, of course, but many did 
so successfully. The New York Staatszeitung effectively maneuvered 
through the 1940s by appeasing authorities, who viewed all German 
newspapers with suspicion. The newspaper was published and sold until 
1991.728 Even the Steuben Society found a way to survive the Second 
World War II. In the late 1940s, it began re-entering the political scene 
collecting relief funds for Germans across Europe and taking on an anti-
Communist stance. It continued to defend “the German characteristics of 
self-reliance, personal sacrifice, and a capacity for hard work.”729 It still 
exists today. 
This is not to say that ethnic institutions did not struggle. Many 
German-language newspapers all across the nation, like the Philadelphia 
Tageblatt, folded in the 1940s and the 1950s. German-languages services 
at religious institutions also faded away, though some still exist. But as 
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second, third and fourth generation German Americans grew up into an 
American society, whose culture and prosperity was the envy of the entire 
globe, it came as little surprise that there was less and less interest in 
institutions that attempted to foster the culture, language and traditions of 
a nation that had just caused the single greatest catastrophe in human 
history: World War II and the Holocaust. “It was no time to take pride in 
German heritage.”730 
In the light of that history, it is surprising how resilient the historical 
artifacts of German America have proven to be. There are countless 
communities across the Midwest and beyond that still bear the traces of 
German influence to this day: In architecture, regional culinary traditions, 
and heritage sites, for example at the University of Wisconsin, where one 
of the largest student cafeterias, the Rathskeller, pays tribute to its 
German roots; or in celebrations of German origins, particularly the many, 
many Oktoberfests from Pierz, Minnesota and Glendale, Wisconsin to 
Chicago, Illinois and Cincinnati, Ohio, which hosts the second largest in 
the world after Munich, Germany. But more importantly, German migrants 
left their traces American culture by participating in the “white flight” that 
shaped American suburbia as we know it today; by working on the 
transatlantic relationship after World War II and creating a lasting 
partnership between the United States and Germany; by establishing 
American brands in Germany, thus contributing to post-war U.S. 
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prosperity; or by participating in the anti-Communist agitation of the Cold 
War era.  
To underline that argument, I want to provide just one additional 
example: Historians of the modern conservative movement often find the 
roots of anti-Communism among the frustrated white working class that 
moved from the urban centers into the suburbs in the 1930s and 1940s 
and formed a “fusionist consensus,” in the words of the journalist E.J. 
Dionne, around a common anti-Communism. 731  Early traces of these 
ideas, though not yet consolidated around a movement, can be found in 
many of the letters written to the VDA, especially from German American 
living in urban areas. For example, in 1935, Albert Brueckner from 
Flushing, New York wrote:  
It is today an open secret in the United States that the so-
called New Deal of President Roosevelt has its origins in 
Moscow, Roosevelt is often connected to Jewish and 
Communist actions and the recognition of the Soviet 
government by him at the time caused bad blood among the 
real Americans and by that I mean those that have been 
living here for several generations. 
  
Brueckner observed the rise of Communism in the United States and 
denounced several New Deal initiatives like the National Recovery Act 
(NRA) as unconstitutional. His hope was with the presidential election of 
1936. But, he wrote, “it would obviously be completely wrong to propagate 
National Socialism in the United States. […] Let us leave to the United 
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States its own salvation and redemption from the danger that is 
approaching with rapid strides.”732 I am convinced that “salvation” was in 
part shaped by German Americans like Brueckner. American history 
would be incomplete without an investigation of the transnational origins of 
such debates.733 This dissertation does not actively write such history – 
but it opens a methodological door for others to follow.  
At the same time, to keep the narrative focused on the conceptual 
renegotiation of German American historiography, this dissertation 
disregarded plenty of intellectual and historical ground. For example, 
German American life beyond the 1920s and its influence on American 
society overall cannot be accurately portrayed without exploring the role of 
religious institutions, ethnic “safe spaces” where German language was 
spoken, its culture and values preserved, well beyond World War I. 
Protestantism, Judaism, and Catholicism furthermore provided common 
grounds, where German migrants could form alliances with other migrant 
groups and where they could help shape American views on a variety of 
discourses, from changing views on gender and family to U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East, particularly U.S. relations with Israel. Old world 
religious views and experiences helped shape the new world politics of 
such influential characters as Henry Kissinger, Hannah Arendt or Reinhold 
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Niebuhr. They could not be explored here, but they should be in future 
research. 
Moreover, the history of German migration to the United States, the 
fate of the ethnic community and its interaction with American society at 
large are also relevant for historians of contemporary Germany. While this 
dissertation’s narrative has mostly taken place in the United States, I 
suggest that it would be an instructive comparison to examine how 
conceptions of “Germanness” have drifted apart on both sides of the 
Atlantic during the first and the second half of the twentieth century – and 
how they didn’t. Culture and language, rather than civic norms, have been 
stubbornly defended as markers of “Germanness” both in the United 
States and in Germany and the debate on its ethnic roots are far from 
over. As hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and 
Subsaharan Africa stream into Germany, debates on German 
womanhood, the preservation of its Kultur and the erosion of its language 
emerge once more.734 Historical perspectives such as the ones offered in 
this dissertation complicate black-and-white narratives by showing the 
historical precedent and its possible consequences. 
Most importantly, however, there is a rich history here that has so far 
been left unexplored. Originally, I set out to investigate the subjective 
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historical environments of eight German Americans, who took part in a 
1942 German World War II mission to sabotage the American war effort. 
Two of them defected and turned themselves in to the FBI, betraying the 
other six and thus causing the mission to fail. In a widely reported trial, the 
two defectors were sent to prison and eventually deported. The other six 
were executed in August of 1942. I was interested in the consequences of 
this trial on the families of the failed saboteurs, on the German American 
community, and on American society as a whole. Moreover, I wanted to 
know what drove them to return to Germany during the 1930s and sign to 
participate in a mission that brought them back to the United States. When 
I began my research, I quickly learned that the research on German 
American life in the 1930s and 1940s simply didn’t exist – that I had to set 
out and do it myself. This dissertation is the result. Along the way I have 
come along countless fascinating stories of German American life that are 
worth exploring. Some of them I have touched upon in the pages above. I 
hope I will inspire others to probe deeper and resuscitate the lost histories 
of that period. 
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